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Abstract 
The contention of this thesis is that the demutualisation of building societies may be understood 
as resulting from the process of reconceptualisation that mutuality has undergone throughout its 
history. It is suggested that the history of mutuality is the history of the tendency towards its own 
destruction as building societies evolved from small local concerns into being some of the largest 
financial institutions in the national economy. Further to this, it is suggested that observation of 
the nature of mutuality at various historical moments provides insights into the nature of building 
societies per se. Furthermore, the nature of mutuality at any historical moment reflects the 
contextual forces that prevail upon it. In other words, mutuality provides an index to the political, 
social and economic forces at a particular moment in history and understanding mutuality in this 
way provides a framework in which to understand future developments in mutual building 
societies. 
In support of this hypothesis, this thesis demonstrates that mutuality in the context of early 
building societies denoted equality between members in respect of rights, responsibilities and 
benefits. Mutuality meant equality, responsibility and benefits and the concept described actual 
material relations. However, when building societies became widespread and highly capitalized, 
policy and legislation combined to construct a mutuality that created a manageable financial 
institution for the wealthier working classes and lower middle classes. Mutuality denoted the 
political imperative to encourage thrift and property ownership within a legislative framework 
and it was characterized by the separation ofthe borrower- member role from the lender-
member role and the fOlmal creation of a legal entity, the incorporated building society. 
By drawing upon distinct historical periods, this thesis contends that this hybrid commercial 
organization, the mutual building society, is to a great extent the creature of government policy, 
which is central to the construction or destruction of mutuality. This is patiicularly evident in the 
politics that informed the passage ofthe 1986 Building Societies Act, which provides for 
conversion or demutualisation. However, as this thesis demonstrates, mutuality reflects the 
internal character of building societies such as the relationship of the membership to the society, 
and external factors, such as the political and economic climate. Thus, the maintenance of 
mutuality will de1)end on the interplay between these factors. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In Grundisse, Marx set out his method for analysing the political and economic character of 
society. I This method, described in the context of a critique of the Hegelian dialectical method, 
is a partial adoption and a modification of this investigative approach. Like Hegel, Marx viewed 
the whole of reality as a single historical process and adopted Hegel's dialectical method. Yet 
crucially, Marx connected that which the analysing mind concluded, with real, tangible 
phenomena and thus distinguished his approach from Hegel's internal journey of the mind. That 
is, for Marx, the experience of the analysing mind is an experience initially derived from real 
tangible phenomena. In contrast, Hegel attributed the conclusion of the mind to the creative act 
of the mind alone. The method that Marx developed from Hegel's dialectics, Marx called 
dialectical materialism, a dialectical method for the study of material factors. 
As a method for comprehending society and phenomena within society, dialectical materialism 
begins with a living whole, such as the population and the state. It then attempts to distil simple 
but detennining features of this society, 'detenninate, abstract, general relations such as division 
of labour, money, value,2 and from that point draws out the connection between these latter 
I Marx, K (1973) "Grundisse, Foundations of the Critique of the Poli,tical Economy (Rough 
Draft)" Penguin 
2 ibid p99 
4 
'simple relations' and the establishment of economic systems.3 Simple relations such as labour 
and exchange are crucial components of the accompanying economic system. The economy is 
accommodated and protected by a political system which it spawns and which modifies its 
activities. The living whole, (individuals, state and economy), is the amalgamation of many 
diverse and contrary simple factors; it is a concrete whole but perversely. 'a unity of the 
diverse,.4 
It is the co-existence of the diverse that, in dialectical method, accounts for motion and change. 
A concrete whole consists of contradictory phenomena which contain the seeds of their own 
destruction and the dynamic for the emergence of the new. For Hegel, the dialectic described the 
development of the idea, an intellectual joumey that would lead to perfect knowledge and, 
therefore, absolute freedom. The process by which history embodies the dialectical development 
of the spirit (or Geist) is that of the movement from thesis to antithesis and then to synthesis. An 
historical point (thesis) gives rise to counteraction (antithesis) and the merging of these two 
points give rise to a synthesis, a higher stage of history and therefore Geist. This synthesis then 
exists as the new thesis which give rise to the counter-reaction and the whole process begins 
agam. 
In contrast to Hegel, Marx argued that a conception of the concrete whole, at any historical stage, 
is reached by observation and analysis of real observable phenomenon in their most simple and 
abstract f01111. 
The method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is the only way in which 
thought appropriates the concrete and reproduces it as concrete in the mind. 5 
3 ibid plOO 
4 ibid 
5ibidplOl 
5 
And, unlike Hegel he argued that 'this (thought or Geist) is by no means the process by which 
the concrete itself comes into being' .6 
By way of illustration, Marx observed that even simple abstractions such as exchange value 
could not exist outside a population producing within paliicular set of social relations and 
situated within a particular kind of family and under a particular kind of state. In other words 
even a simple abstract, though understood and contained in the mind, cannot actually exist and 
therefore be available for comprehension, outside the actual existence of a material whole. 
Furthermore, although it is possible to observe simple categories existing as a long- standing 
historical phenomena in highly diverse concrete wholes, the character of these categories differ 
according to their historical context. Marx notes, for example, that money existed in antiquity, 
and therefore historically preceded the existence of capital, banks or wage labour. However, 
although money was present in both societies, within the concrete whole of Greek and Roman 
society, money was not understood in the same way. In a developed market economy, money 
expresses the value of all commodity exchanges whilst existing as a commodity in its own right. 
In the economies of antiquity, money did not represent the value of all exchanges and was only 
really utilised for the payment of the army because its personnel were drawn from many diverse 
and semi-conquered peoples who traveled extensively in pursuance of their duties. Here, money 
was required as a symbol of payment that was transferable in the diverse places they traveled or 
retumed. In contrast to this practice, the settled townspeople of Roman society engaged mainly 
in transactions that were paid in kind. 7 And, although there was some exchange and lending in 
6 ibid 
7 ibid pl03 
6 
coinage, this practice was understood to be anti-social and destructive. Money should not be 
worth more when repaid than it did when it was lent as this undermined its function as a fair 
expression of value causing disharmony in the exchange of goods and services. 
Likewise, in less developed agricultural societies, trading and money transactions tended to be 
subordinate to bmier and class detelmined rewards. This approach to money reflected the 
dominant character of a feudal hierarchy which overarched agricultural production and in which 
abstract value such as money was not generally appropriate. So, for example, in early mercantile 
England, where commodity exchange still represented a fledgling portion of the economy, the 
idea of money being a commodity was almost unnatural. So, although money- lenders did 
operate in mercantile England, making money from the temporary gifting of sums to their 
customers, their activities were not generalised, normalised or condoned. On the contrary, 
money- lenders were reviled as usurers and, notwithstanding a period of relaxation during the 
Elizabethan period, (where interest of up to 10% could be charged), usury was considered an 
immoral and illegal act. In Britain, the usury laws were not repealed in their entirety until 1858 
and contravention of these would make a man, 'liable under the statute of usury and liable to 
forfeit three times his capital'. 8 FUlihermore, even during the aforementioned time of relaxation, 
Shakespeare famously characterised public attitudes to money- lenders (and therefore Semites), 
in The Merchant of Venice. So, in the words of English literature's most famous money- lender, 
Shylock, 
You call me misbeliever, cut-throat dog, 
and spit on my Jewish gaberdine, 
And all for use of that which is mine own 9 
8 The Comish Metal Company (1787) quoted in Armand Du Bois.(1938) "The English Business 
Company after the Bubble Act" New York Commonwealth Fund p257 note 65 
9 William Shakespeare "The Merchant of Venice" Act 1 Scene 3 line 1 06-8 
7 
It was not until the development of the bourgeois economy, born from the womb of feudalism, 
that capital was placed at the centre of economic activities. In the context of this new market 
economy, money- lending was no longer reviled but considered a desirable and respectable 
activity, to be performed in the main, by upstanding financial institutions. The movement of 
capital within particular exchange relations of the new economy, from purchaser to vendor or 
from lender to debtor (with interest), was both normalized and generalized. In other words, 
money, as a generalized system and as a commodity with an exchange value, did not emerge 
until the concrete conditions of a more developed society existed. 
Thus, the dialectical method of historical materialism shows how a single element of a society 
can both describe the norms of that society and, in tum, may alter its own internal meaning 
according to its position in an existing concrete whole. Like money, mutuality is a concept that 
existed and exists within a particular historical period and which displays characteristics that 
describe the norn1S of that period. So, when the concrete whole in which mutuality exists, 
changes, so too does the meaning of mutuality. And, conversely, mutuality will affect the context 
in which it finds itself, that is, within building societies operating as part of the concrete whole. 
Historical materialism, therefore, is adopted in this thesis as the most appropriate method of 
understanding the changing nature of mutuality and the manner in which mutuality has 
simultaneously affected the concrete whole. 
8 
Mutuality and Dialectics. 
Mutuality is a term that has been attributed, (descriptively and then prescriptively in statute), to 
the organisational fOlm taken by building societies since their emergence in the late eighteenth 
century. Early building societies operated along mutual, egalitarian principles that gradually 
deteriorated in the last part of the nineteenth century. So pronounced was this deterioration that 
two hundred years later, in the 1990s, the concept of mutuality retained so little positive meaning 
for building society members that they only became aware that their building society was a 
mutual society when voting to eradicate mutuality. The apparent invisibility of mutuality in 
building societies led many commentators in the latter part of the twentieth century to assert that 
mutuality no longer existed. For example, in The Myth of Mutuality, the author, Paul Barnes, 
argued that mutuality was a fiction and a fraud. For Barnes, mutuality no longer existed in 
building societies, largely because the power wielded by management had eradicated any 
meaningful exercise of democracy by its members. 10 
It is the contention of this thesis that this assessment overstates the case against the existence of 
mutuality. Rather, it maintains that mutuality has changed in response to partiCUlar historical 
developments which have modified but have not eradicated its classic characteristics. It further 
contends that by using the method of historical materialism, it is possible to analyse those 
historical factors that have shaped and continue to shape the meaning of mutuality. 
The mutuality of building societies originated in the context of the social and material needs of 
the newly emerging working class who were landless, but possessed some financial means. 
10 Paul Barnes (1984) "The Myth of Mutuality" Pluto Press 
9 
Furthermore, mutuality arose in a period of heightened political change and shifting allegiances. 
The gradual transformation of the economy from agricultural production to commodity 
production was accelerated by the passage of hundreds of enclosure Acts at the end of the 
eighteenth century which extinguished the long held rights in land held by members ofthe 
community. From 1761 to 1780 over a thousand such Acts were passed with a further nine 
hundred passed from 1781-1800. 11 Furthermore, between 1793-1813, 2,260,000 acres ofland 
were put into cultivation following the passage of 1,883 Acts. 12 This had the obvious effect of 
creating a landless labour force on the one hand, and on the other, the concept that land was a 
commodity, the title to which could be owned privately. In a dramatic surge of change, the 
labourer was transformed into an individual who no longer worked according to the duty owed to 
his political superior, but one who privately 'owned' his ability to work. 
The feudal social hierarchy that largely determined status, work and reward was, with the 
emergence of the market system of production, replaced by the notion that work was a 
commodity that could be exchanged like any other commodity by the individual who 'owned' it. 
In the absence of slavery, (for slavery continued to operate in the British colonies among white 
as well as black people), this particular commodity was owned by the individual that actually 
performed the activity. 13 Thus, the worker could exchange his property for a reward that was, at 
least in theory, negotiated by himself and the individual who wished to purchase it. With that 
transaction completed, the worker could then exchange the negotiated value of his work for other 
commodities that he required or desired. And, with the emergence of land as a commodity that 
11 Halevy, (1924) "The History of the English People" 1815, p261 
12 ibid 
13 Zinn (1999) "A People's History of the United States" Longman 
10 
could be purchased, that desired commodity could be a home. So, it was these factors that 
presented the initial and crucial context for the emergence of mutuality and represented material 
changes in the English economy. 
Related to these factors were the diverse ideologies that legitimated this method of economic 
organisation and those that modified it. In other words, the dialectical relationship between the 
ideology of the old system, feudalism, and the ideology of the new market system were factors in 
constructing mutuality. The philosophy of the old system was connected to the ideas of 
conservatism whilst the philosophy of the new was connected to the ideas of liberalism. The 
ideas of conservatism, unlike those of liberalism did not have a set of formal philosophers to 
articulate them 14 but it is possible to understand conservatism as a set of ideas through the 
writing and speeches of conservative politicians. Foremost in this group was Whig politician 
Edmund Burke whose treatise against the French revolution insisted upon the need for social 
hierarchy and strong Government continuing the trajectory defined by classic Greek 
philosophy. 15 The classical thinkers, from Aristotle to Plato believed that society existed as a 
predetermined fact based on the natural hierarchy of individuals. For Aristotle hierarchy was 
articulated mainly in terms ofthe humours, an ideology of which legitimated women's inferiority 
to men. Men were supposedly possessed of dry hot (superior) humours whereas women 
possessed cool, damp (inferior) humours. ArId these notions explained the external nature of 
male genitalia and the internal nature of female genitalia, the latter being merely inverse male 
organs that had insufficient 'heat' to externalise. 16 
14 Thomas Hobbes has been claimed as a conservative philosopher for his emphasis on the need 
for a strong 'Leviathan' state. He has also been claimed as a liberal thinker for his emphasis on 
individual 'natural' attlibutes. 
15 Edmund Burke (1790) "Reflections ofthe Revolution in France" Owen: London 
16 Aristotle (1990) "The Works of Aristotle" Chicago press 
11 
These ideological quasi- biological notions continued in English thinking until the rise of science 
and rationalism. For example, a pregnancy resulting from an alleged rape would disbar any 
action by the alleged victim. This was because a woman, understood to be an inverse man, 
produced her 'seed' upon pleasurable ejaculation, like a man. Pregnancy required the female 
seed and thus orgasm therefore the copulation must have been pleasurable and could not have 
been forced, a view of conception that continued until science better understood human 
ovulation. 
For Plato, hierarchy was understood in temlS of the 'metal' of the individual's soul, the purest 
'metal' being possessed by the philosophers who strove to understand the truth and therefore 
understand the divine; the meanest metal being possessed by artists, who sought merely to 
reproduce, in a useless f011n, that which already existed in a useful fOlm. 17 Thus, for the 
philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and the conservative thinking that it infOlmed, society was an 
organic whole, composed of inferior and superior beings. Social order, a state where humanity 
could be productive and creative, resulted from an acceptance and enforcement of the natural 
hierarchy; be that between men and women, Philosopher King and artist or rich and poor. For the 
conservative thinker, failure to observe this natural order would result in brutality and social 
destruction. 
This way of understanding social reality served admirably to legitimize the fixed social hierarchy 
of feudalism that underpilmed England's agricultural economy. Individuals were born into a 
particular social strata in which they remained until death, generation after generation ad 
infinitum. Social stratification detennined rights in the land, duties to superiors, responsibilities 
17 Plato (1984) The Republic: Second Edition (revised) Penguin Books 
12 
to inferiors and familial reward. Social mobility was virtually non- existent, thus, questions such 
as 'what will I be', and 'who am I', were irrelevant for the ordinary person. The church and state 
edited the bible to emphasise hierarchy rather than equality, exemplified in such hymns as, All 
things bright and beautiful, whose Christian message outlined a hierarchically organized world. 
Everything had a place in creation. God, himself had rubber stamped inequality, extending from 
the lowliest animal to hierarchy in the human social world, as the song goes, 
The rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate, 
He made them high and lowly and each to his estate. 18 
However, this understanding of social reality could not describe or legitimize the new 
burgeoning market economy. As one writer put it, 
Exchange, or the circulation of commodities, is predicated on the mutual 
recognition of one another as owners by those engaged in exchange. This 
acknowledgment, appearing in the fonn of an inner conviction or of the 
categorical imperative, is the maximum conceivable height to which commodity-
producing society can rise. But in addition to this maximum to be realised, it is 
sufficient for commodity owners to act as if they acknowledged one another 
mutually as proprietors. Moral conduct here is contrasted with legal conduct, 
which is characterised as such irrespective of the motive which generated it. 19 
So, in contrast to conservatism, liberal ontology placed the individual before society. For the 
liberal, society was merely the decision of an amalgamation of separate autonomous individuals 
to come together in order to pursue individual self- interest. The form that society took was not a 
given fact and celiainly not divinely ordained but depended upon a series of decisions that 
private but pragmatic individuals had taken. A dynamic society was one that properly reflected 
the will of individuals and that could not occur unless those individuals were free to make 
18 "All Things Bright and Beautiful" 
19 Pashukanis, EB (1989) "Law and Marxism" p162 Pluto Press 
13 
choices. Thus, liberal thought tended to stand for social equality and freedom of expression 
coupled with personal responsibility for those decisions, and society was understood as a market 
for the exchange of freely made material choices. 
Legally, the responsibilities of individualism and the absence of morality outside the values 
individuals choose to adopt, were, and are, most readily reflected in modern contract law. In a 
world of autonomous individuals engaging in exchange relationships of their own choosing, 
contract personified the new role of the state in liberal, market capitalism. The state's role in the 
liberal view is essentially that of enforcer of agreements made between 'free' individuals 
vigorously pursuing their own interests and desires, rather than one of enforcing hierarchy and 
social order. 
In his classic book, P.S. Atiyah traces the connection between liberalism, the free market and 
contract. 20 He argues that it was liberal notions of autonomy and personal responsibility that 
provided the philosophical rationale for the courts' re-conceptualisation of contract in 
nineteenth- century England. According to Atiyah, during the period between 1770-1870, liberal 
values and ideas shaped the law's attitude to the making of contracts. Judgments assumed that all 
consequences of a contract were the product of the will of the parties, so the courts would not 
intervene if the parties had made a bad bargain and would not consider the possibility or 
consequences of inequality of bargaining power between the parties. In contrast, the courts' 
attitude to the making of agreements in the eighteenth century emphasised and actively imposed 
a standard of fairness based upon custom. The law and the courts, (usually in the form of lay 
justices) would actively intervene and void or amend contracts on a wide variety of grounds. 
20 PS Atiyah (1979) "Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract" Clarendon Press. Oxford 
14 
COlmected to this nineteenth century move away from substantive ideas of fairness, Atiyah notes 
a growing hostility to the ideas of equity. The rationale behind this was that obligations imposed 
by the law should not take precedence over obligations voluntarily entered into by the fOlmally 
equal individuals of a liberal world. The rise of contract as the leading form of legal relations 
between individuals also accounts for the change in form of the contract itself and the most 
dramatic change was, in Atiyah's words, 'the rise of the executory contract'; that is the emergence 
of a legally enforceable document based purely upon the future promises and intentions of the 
relevant parties. In contrast to the types of contracts that courts would enforce in the eighteenth 
century, that is contracts that had been performed by at least one of the parties, nineteenth 
century courts began to enforce contracts where no consideration had been received or provided 
by either party. The mere exchange of promises was sufficient to make a legally binding 
agreement and the same rules that were applied to executed contracts were also applied to 
executory contracts. The bilateral executory contract with its conceptual basis in 'offer, 
acceptance and consideration' that now characterises most twentieth century contractual 
arrangements, emerged as a nineteenth century phenomenon. The intentions of autonomous 
individuals were elevated to such an extent that the mere exchange of promises became a piece 
of prope1iy in itself. Refusal to perform a promise could result in the payment of expectation 
damages in the same way that damages were payable on the one- sided exchange of 
consideration in the eighteenth century. 
Another striking consequence of the growing individualism of contract law was the dilution of 
certain rules applicable to contracts, namely rules relating to duress, mistake and frustration. For 
example, in contrast to the previous period, nineteenth century courts would not void a contract 
on the basis of, 'economic duress'. Liberal individualism was antagonistic to the notion that 
15 
autonomous, equal individuals could be forced into a legal agreement through economIC 
necessity, as fonnal equality and volition were assumed. Likewise, the eighteenth century notion 
of 'mistake' was insufficient grounds to void a contract. It was assumed that contracting parties 
were the best placed to detem1ine whether or not it was to their personal advantage to make the 
bargain. The making of a bad bargain was the responsibility of the individual, not the courts; 
hence the classically liberal pln'ase, caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). Even in contemporary 
contract law, an era Atiyah characterises as, 'the fall of the freedom of contract', the rules 
peliaining to mistake remain strict. A contract may be void by mistake if, in the case of mutual 
mistake, 'a mistake by both parties to the contract renders the subject matter of the contract 
essentially and radically different from that which both parties believed to exist at the time the 
contract was executed, the pmiy seeking to rely on mistake must have reasonable grounds for 
believing the mistake.' 21 Atiyah concludes that in keeping with rule oflaw ideology, nineteenth 
century comis adopted a fonnal non-interventionist stance to the making of contracts, a stance 
radically divorced from the moral notions of eighteenth century England. 
Freedom of contract and freedom to contract was essential for the development of the new 
market economy and liberalism defended this freedom by providing it with a philosophical 
rationale and ideological justification. But the market, with its requirement for freely contracting 
individuals, conflicted with many of the nonns of the feudal hierarchy from which it arose. 
Market ideology conflicted with feudal ideology. It was in the context of this conflict that 
building societies emerged. In an time of acute conflict between the old and the new society 
building societies become the products of, and to a certain extent architects of, the conflicts and 
resolutions that ensued. As chapter 1 of this thesis indicates, conservative thinkers under Pitt, 
sought, and for the most part obtained, strict anti-collective legislation. Politicians such as 
21 Associated Japanese Bank v Credit du Nord [1988] 3 AER 962 
16 
Edmund Burke, eloquently described the social chaos that would ensue if individual desire 
triumphed over a fixed hierarchical social order. Accordingly, organised collectives seeking 
social change were something to be feared and repressed and the social equality explained as a 
universal right by Thomas Paine, (writing in response to Burke's own Reflections on the French 
Revolution), was the first step to anarchy. In this context, Paine's practical entreaties to seize the 
potential of that point in history, to address the question of; 
whether man shall inherit his rights, and universal civilisation take place? 
Whether the fruits of his labour shall be enjoyed by himself, or consumed by the 
profligacy of governments? Whether robbery shall be banished from courts and 
wretchedness from countries? 22 
were dismissed as pandering to a mob mentality. Likewise, conservative criticisms of equality 
and freedom were prosaically expressed in the philosophical writings of 
Donatien-Alphonse-Francois de Sade, who offered a stark insight into contemporary critics of 
early liberal individualism. Writing in eighteenth century France, the Marquis echoed the 
sentiments of English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, published over a centmy before. In de Sade's 
brutal, erotic world, his fictitious characters show that the unfettered individual, will commit any 
maImer of atrocity in order to satisfy desire and that the absence of state interference in the life of 
the individual induces a reversion to animalism. Accordingly, as it is only social conventions 
such as morality which make murder or rape into crimes; a world without such conventions 
would degenerate into brutality In the words of de Sade's 'libertine' hero Dolmance in instruction 
22 Thomas Paine (1792) "Rights of Man, being an Answer to Mr Burke's Attack on the French 
Revolution" Fleet Street. p215 An offer by the publisher for the copyright for £1000 was offered 
although this was said in a later publication to be inspired by a desire to suppress pUblication and 
appease the English government. "This offer was promptly declined by Mr Paine, who wrote for 
the benefit of mankind and not for pecuniary reward" Liberty Books Freethought Press New 
York preface vi 
17 
to his fifteen year old 'pupil': 
It was the early Christians who, daily persecuted for their ridiculous beliefs, used 
to cry: "Don't bum us! Don't flay us! Nature says that man must not do unto 
others what he would not have others do unto him!" Fools! How could Nature, 
who always urges us to delight in ourselves, who never suggests any other 
instincts, other notions, other inspiration, assure us in the next moment that we 
must not, on the other hand, choose to love ourselves should it cause others pain? 
Ah, believe me, Eugenie, Mother Nature never speaks to us save of ourselves; 
there is nought so egotistic as her message, and what we most clearly divine there 
from is the immutable and sacred counsel: prefer thyself, love thyself, no matter 
at whose expense.23 
In parliament, and in contrast to these conservative fears about the social degenerative effects of 
liberty, stood the more progressive pro-market elements of the Whig party. Politicians such as 
William Sheridan, a rhetorician equal to Burke, argued against the Pitt govemment and in favour 
of the freedom of individuals to organise and to enjoy freedom from the increased state 
restrictions that followed the French Revolution and which he described as 'hysterical'. 
In this political climate, many working people found themselves in an unhappy and unique 
situation. Suffering from the demise of a feudal social support system and largely 
disappropriated from their homes, the working person needed to create their own system of 
support and their own access to accommodation. Low wages and insecure working conditions 
meant that individualised private solutions to these social needs was not an option, collective 
solutions would have to be found. The dominant views of the state, however, still grounded in 
semi-feudal politics (now denuded of its socially responsible elements), mitigated against 
collective activity. In contrast, the liberal's support of individual expression and independence 
did give some ideological space to expand. 
23 Sade, DAF (1995) The Philosophy of the Boudoir p56 Ondon Creation Books 
18 
~ 
The eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of collectives of working people who 
organised (under the legal fonn of a friendly society) to provide a 'safety net' for the insecurities 
of working life. However, because of the political climate, these societies overtly underlined 
their uncontroversial nature through the strict policing of their membership. Members of such 
societies could be disbalTed for drunkenness, swearing oaths against the King, political 
discussion, adultery, and even for contracting venereal disease. 
Early collectives that put money into a common fund in order to purchase property, or building 
societies as they became lmown, often registered as friendly societies in order to gain some legal 
status in the post-revolutionary period ofuncertainty.24 They were, as the context required, small 
and conservative, with the limited aim of saving collectively in order to fund the purchase of 
land or housing for the members. Their objects were a purchasing opportunity presented by the 
rise of the market but one that was proscribed by the political environment. These were the 
elements that constructed early mutuality. 
The limited aims of early building societies meant that every member joined for the same limited 
purpose and, expecting the same outcomes from membership, they contributed broadly to the 
same degree. Each member saved and each member obtained propeliy as a result of this 
continued commitment. When the objective of providing property for each member was 
achieved the society 'terminated', hence the early societies were called, 'tenninating societies'. 
Originally, therefore, mutuality was not constructed by legislation or govemmental policy but 
was something that described a method of organisation that arose organically from a particular 
historical context. 
24 The first such society was founded in 1767 
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Later, in the 1840s as the object of building societies was the acquisition of property and as 
property itself was political in a very particular way at this time, building societies found 
themselves playing a role that extended the movement in a way that fundamentally transformed 
the nature of mutuality. This was because as well as property being political in the macro sense 
described in MacPherson's thesis25 it also was political in the sense that ownership determined 
political rights to a limited franchise. 26 So, following the passage of the Reform Bill27, the vote 
was extended to those who owned property wOlih £1 0 in the boroughs and in the counties to £ 10 
copyholders, £10 long-Ieasers and £50 medium leaseholders as well as the existing forty shilling 
fi·eeholders. This meant that building societies could playa direct role in the extension of the 
franchise through the provision of property of sufficient value to allow the owner to meet the 
voting qualifications. 
In 1847, the first society to operate for the joint purpose of obtaining both property and the vote 
was established by a James Taylor and was called the Birmingham Freehold Land Society. 
Liberal politicians recognized a political 0ppOliunity to increase their electorate and were quick 
to act as trustees for these building societies, known as freehold land societies. The conflict 
between conservative landowners and liberal free marketers was orientating around the 
campaign to repeal the Com Laws, and building or freehold land societies became one of the 
25 described in chapter 1 
26 For liberal thinkers, it is the freedom of individuals to sell their personal skills and strengths in 
the market for a price detelmined by market forces that is the starting point for the ascendence of 
private property. Thus, 'having this most basic right in my own person seems to entail having the 
most basic of liberal freedoms- contractuallibeliy, liberty of occupation, association and 
movement and so on- and it is compromised whenever these fi'eedoms are abridged. The 
connection between property and the basic liberties is in these cases constitutive and not just 
instrumenta1.'. John Gray (1986) Liberalism p58 
27 1832 
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arenas in which this conflict was played out. Famous anti-Com Law leaguers such as Richard 
Cobden and his compatriots purchased large plots of land to create smaller plots of land of 
sufficient value to give the owner the vote. The huge quantity of land that had become private 
propeliy by virtue of the Enclosure Acts meant that there was plenty to purchase. The desire for 
homes and the vote meant that the freehold land societies were extremely popular and the 
support of rich politicians meant that they were highly successful. The result of this success was 
both the transfer of many acres of land into the ownership of working people and the increase in 
the number of voters by many tens of thousands. 
Freehold land societies ceased to be functional as a method of extending the franchise following 
the Reform Act of 1868. However, the effect of the freehold land movement on the building 
society movement as a whole had been highly transformative. For seventy years building 
societies had been small in size and number, never exceeding 80 in number, but, by 1850, 2000 
societies had registered under the 1836 Act.28 In addition to this they attracted large sums of 
money, by 1850 the entire movement was estimated to hold a total income of £2,400,000/yr.29 
This meant that tem1inating societies had become increasingly inappropriate as a vehicle for 
organising a large membership since they were designed for a small, non fluctuating group of 
saver/bon-ower members. 
The popularity of building societies during the freehold land movement era served to highlight 
the limitations of the terminating societies since individuals who wished to join throughout the 
existence of a society were often unable to do so due to the high costs of joining late and 
28Arthur Scratchley (1858) "Industrial Investment and Emigration", 2nd edition London John W. 
Parker West Strand p50 
29 ibid 
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effectively, having to 'catch up' with other member's savings. 3o 
The solution to this organisational problem was presented and published by the actuary Arthur 
Scratchly who argued for a society that did not telminate in a fixed period, but existed 
indefinitely. These he called, 'pennanent societies'. Under this organizational fonn, members 
would have an individual contract with the society designating them as either investors receiving 
interest or borrowers paying interest. Investors would be able to withdraw their investment with 
relative ease, while borrowers would make periodic repayments (usually monthly) over a fixed 
period, making their loan arrangement 'telminating' rather than the society itself. In this way the 
society could extend its borrowing according the amount invested in it and bonowers could join 
without"making up' the payments made by founder members. 
This system was highly successful and was concretised in the 1874 Building Societies Act, 
remaining as the method of organising societies today. But the effect this system had on 
mutuality was profound. Under this system, members had distinct and conflicting self interests 
rather than identical or mutual interests. Saving members sought high interests on their 
investments, so societies attracted investment by offering good rates. However, in complete 
contrast, the borrowing member sought low interest on repayments and was less able to influence 
the interest rate policies of the society as their ability to withdraw from the society was more 
restricted and could put their home at risk of repossession. Borrowers represented a potential risk 
requiring assessment in the interests of security for investors. Building society managers, 
therefore, were more likely to attend to the needs of investors rather than the needs of borrowers. 
The separation between borrower member and investing member and the individual agreements 
30 Chapter 1 Permanent Societies 
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members would have with the society rather than between each other was legally expressed in 
Section 9 of the 1874 Building Societies Act. This section determined that registration of a 
society automatically created a corporate entity, distinct from its members and possessing 
perpetual succession. 
So, by the 1870s the Building Society movement had ceased to be a small number of intimate 
groupings underpinned by little or no legislation and had, instead, become a popular financial 
institution WOlih millions of pounds and underpinned by detailed legislation and regulatory 
bodies. The nature of mutuality altered in the context of the factors outlined above and, in 
addition to this, the hierarchy within societies and between societies further distanced mutuality 
fOlm its origins in equality. 
In Chapter 2, the development of these hierarchies is outlined and the manner in which this led to 
an increased separation of the member from his society is assessed. In addition to this, Chapter 2 
shows how the governmental construction of mutuality ironically enhanced the power of the 
managerial elite by lessening democracy within societies. 
As Chapter 2 indicates, the development of hierarchies had much to do with the tendency for 
capital within the industIy to become centralised. In 1890, 2,286 societies were registered with 
total assets of £60 million. By 1988, total assets had increased to £188 billion but the number of 
building societies had decreased to 131. Fmihermore, a series of amalgamations had left a 
handful of societies, such as the Halifax and the Abbey National, with a huge proportion of the 
total assets. 
The power of the larger societies over the entire building society movement was increasingly 
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exercised through the Building Society Association. This organisation, originating in 1869 as an 
eclectic campaigning group for the reform of building society legislation, had historically 
displayed an elitist agenda, particularly in relation to its lending policy and in the selection of 
managers. As evidenced in its early publications, it sought to focus away from mortgages upon 
less humble abodes and desired to draw management fi:om the ranks of men fi:om, 'commanding 
social positions' .31 
The Building Society Association operated as trade association producing publications that gave 
general advice and providing a forum for sharing the views of individuals involved in the 
industry. However, its powers increased immeasurably following the economic slump in the 
1930s when the BSA began its policy of determining building society strategy with particular 
reference to 'advising' interest rates. 32 Furthermore, as the executive board of the BSA was made 
up from the top management of the wealthiest societies, advice was effectively determined by 
the small, and already powerful elite of the industry. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the mutual element of 'one member one vote' was a 
relatively ineffective mechanism for organizing against management decisions in large societies 
that had thousands of individual members and was, arguably, counter-productive. This led a 
number of writers to argue that building societies were no longer run for the benefit of members 
but for the benefit of management. Indeed, this was a view taken by many in the Labour Party in 
the 1960s and 1970s and in subsequent govemmental green papers.33 
31 BSA Gazette, No. 17. Vo1.9 May 1st 1870 quoted in chapter 2 note 10 
32 This is placed in invelied commas as this advice was taken as law by all members of the BSA. 
33 Paul Bames, Chistopher Hird. Ken Weetch MP. 
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In addition to the above factors, the nature of mutuality was further determined by a government 
policy that created legislation, confirmed in the courts, which effectively distinguished building 
societies from the more laissez-faire norms of commercial business. Whilst the company was 
treated with greater and greater latitude, the building society was treated as a quasi- social 
institution rather than a purely commercial enterprise. As Chapter 2 notes, at the same time that 
building society legislation was being tightened in respect of the increased powers given to its 
overseer, the Registrar of Building Societies, the limited liability company was enjoying 
increased freedoms. 34 Corporate identity was recognised upon the minimum of formalities and in 
respect of a company that was, in essence, a one-man business?5 In addition to this, although the 
judiciary often described the general duties owed by directors of companies in the same terms as 
those of building society directors, in many impOliant aspects they were treated differently. For 
example, in respect of maintaining company assets, the judiciary adopted a very liberal attitude 
to that which a company should maintain before declaring dividends, a precedent that remained 
in force until the passage of the 1981 Companies Act. In contrast, a building society manager 
was expected to recompense members for a negligently declared dividend.36 Furthelmore, 
although the objects of a building society were statutorily determined in each new piece of 
relevant legislation, the strict interpretation of the ultra vires rule in respect to early registered 
companies was gradually loosened and nearly abandoned by the judiciary.37 Thus it can be seen 
that whilst the government and the judiciary, in particular, placed commercial expediency at the 
heart of their policy for the company, the building society operated under much tighter controls. 
Whilst investors in companies were protected, for the most part, by limited liability, they risked 
34 Building Societies Act 1892 
35 Salomon v Salomon (1897) AC 55 
36 Leeds Estate Building Society v Shepherd [1936] 36 Ch.D 787 
37 Contrast Ashbury Ry v Riche (1875) LR 7HL 653 with Bell houses Ltd v City Wall Propeliies 
Ltd [1966] 1 QB 2071 
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the loss of their original investment. In contrast, investors in building societies could expect a 
greater degree of protection. 
However, it was the additional constraints placed on building societies for the protection of 
investors that produced the ultimate lure for the shedding of mutual status. Societies were 
required to maintain an annual reserve in order to protect its members from the fluctuations of 
the market. Over the years, these accumulated into substantial sums that could be used to provide 
cash or 'free' shares to members upon conversion. 38 
In this context, mutuality, originating as an organic expression of member's equality and control 
became something that was controlled and defined by the elite; the Building Society Association, 
the government and the judiciary. Mutuality was not a quality that a member would recognize or 
consider a benefit, it appeared only as a legal te1m expressing a remnant of the past. By the 
1980s, mutuality came under heavy criticism. For the political right it represented, 'bucking the 
market', while for the left it represented' elitist control'. The failure of mutuality to appeal to the 
entire political spectrum or to the members of building societies led, firstly, to the legislative 
facility to shed mutual status and, secondly, to the desire of members to make use of that facility. 
Thus, the 1980s represented a period when particular factors combined to leave mutuality devoid 
of any suppOliers outside a small number within the building society industry itself. As Chapter 3 
indicates, the failure of Labour's democratic socialism to impose the spending restraints 
demanded by the IMF, without losing their political credibility and the trust of the electorate, 
was a major factor (among others) in the ascendance of a new fonn of conservatism in the 
38 For example the 1981 Building Societies (Authorisation) Regulations required 2.5% of assets 
to be held as reserves. 
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Conservative Party, known as Neo-liberalism. Headed by Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative 
Party came to dominate politics, possessing both a large majority in parliament and clear, media 
friendly messages. Drawing upon the dominant, contemporary criticisms of the Labour Pmiy, the 
Conservative Party was able to represent itself as Labour's anti-thesis. Labour was authoritarian 
and intmsive while in contrast, Conservatism respected an individuals privacy and self-
sufficiency. 'Thatcherism', as this Neo-liberal ideology became known, argued that the social 
welfare policies of the Labour Pmiy were linked with intmsive and anti-individual state 
activities. Thatcherism, in contrast, would enhance individual liberty by reducing the role of the 
state, particularly in respect of its welfare role. 
According to Thatcherite ideology, the welfare state had, through over-taxation served to 
disappropriate individuals £i'om the money they earned and had created a culture of dependency 
among those that did not, or could not, work. Drawing upon the ideas of Adam Smith and, in 
particular, Hayek's post-war writing, Thatcherism associated welfarism with state intmsion, and 
state intmsion with the oppression of individualism and entrepreneurialism.39 It concluded that, 
individual creativity and productivity could only evolve in a market economy that was free £i'om 
state interference. And, in the same manner that Thatcherism proved the efficacy of its ideology 
through the sale of council houses into the private ownership of the tenants, so it sought to draw 
building societies from the shackles of state policy and into the norms of market control. 
The Thatcher administration achieved these aims on a number of different levels and with very 
little opposition. The Labour Party had already criticised the anti-market, oligargic organisation 
of building societies. The Wilson Report into building societies, which was eventually published 
in 1980,. recommended the abandonment of the BSA's 'recommended' interest rate system, 
39 Hayek, FA (1944) "The Road to Serfdom" Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1976 edition 
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which had been introduced in order to protect the weaker societies and hence the Building 
Society Industry as a whole. And, it did so according to market criteria, introducing market 
control over the industry by encouraging, 'greater competition among the societies' .40 
The subsequent Green Paper overseen by the Thatcher administration under chancellor Nigel 
Lawson concuned with the above proposal. However, like so many other pro-market strategies 
that were unpopular when proposed by the Labour Party, it was passed without dispute under the 
Conservatives. In addition to this, the 1984 green paper proposed a scheme whereby members of 
a society could elect to convert into an incorporated company. This iml0vation in building 
society legislation provided the legal facility to end mutuality and thereon subject demutualised 
building societies to the same legal norms that the incorporated company had enjoyed, and the 
freedoms that mutual building societies had been denied. 
This was not an innovation that Labour in opposition could feasibly dispute having been the 
foremost critics of the existing organisation of building societies. From the tax privileges 
societies enjoyed, to the uneconomic ally large numbers of branches they maintained, Labour 
Party politicians consistently questioned policy in respect of building societies, comparing them 
unfavourably to the more 'competitive' companies. However, despite an obvious lack of 
opposition from the Labour benches, the Conservative's Green Paper and the resulting Building 
Societies Act did not make 'demutualisation' an easy option, as it could so easily have done. 
Under section 97 of the Building Societies Act 1986, demutualisation could only occur following 
the participation in a vote to that effect by 20 percent of members entitled to vote of which 75% 
of investors and 50% of bonowers should be in favour. This was a huge quorum, far exceeding 
that required in company law and far exceeding usual participation in company AGMs for even 
40 Cmnd 7937 at pl14 
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the most controversial issues. In addition to this, under Section 98, the Building Societies 
Commission could refuse to confiml a transfer of business to a company subject to the 
proscribed criteria for such a refusal. 
The unwillingness for the legislation to make conversion a simple process thus annihilating 
mutuality with some rapidity may be explained as the result of the contrary norms of 
conservative thinking. Conservative ideology, reflected in the Building Societies Act of 1986, 
contained a combination of free market liberalism and Burkian social order through social 
engineering. Thus, part of Conservative thinking, described in Chapter 3, desired preservation of 
building societies for the role they played in the incorporation of working members of society 
into the norms of ownership which helped ensure a deference and commitment to a society that 
protected private ownership. The privileges enjoyed by building societies were a small price to 
pay for the retention of their important social function. Thus, we find that most of the 1986 Act 
was orientated around refomling controls on building society activities to enable them to 
compete with other parts of the financial sector without the necessity of changing their legal 
form. Much of the legislation attempted to preserve mutuality by enhancing the desirability of 
operating as a mutual. So, were it not for the desires of society managers and society members, 
sections 97-103 of the Building Societies Act 1986 would have been a dead letter. 
However, these sections have been greatly utilized. As Chapter 4 indicates, the management of a 
number of societies were extremely pro-active in the conversion process as were a small number 
of members. In addition to this, in almost all cases members have voted in favour of conversion 
by a huge majority. As a result, sections 97-103 have transformed the building society 
movement, taking more than 80 per cent of assets out of the mutual sector. 
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The Abbey National was the first society to demutualise, a process that was instigated and 
secured by a motivated and self-confessed pro-conversion management. Under the chief 
executive, Peter Birch, the Abbey forcefully put the argument in favour of demutualisation to its 
membership and, some argued, forcefully suppressed alternative views. It seems that the control 
that an elite management held over a large organisation of members precluded those very 
members from being able to make their views and wishes known. In effect, in the case of the 
Abbey National, mutuality was defeated by an absence of practical mutuality. The vote in favour 
of conversion, coupled with the promise of free shares upon conversion, was overwhelming and 
seemed to have rendered the Commission unable and unwilling to use its powers under the Act 
to refuse to register the transfer, despite the existence of ample evidence to justify this refusal. In 
addition to this, the judiciary offered a liberal interpretation of the Act, a judgment that gave 
rewards to recently joined society members as well as long term or 'two year' members. This 
meant that the process of demutualisation offered opportunities for individuals to join societies in 
order to benefit from free shares upon conversion. The motion to convert would often be 
proposed by these new members, who became known as carpet- baggers. 
Whilst the amalgamation of the Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society with Lloyds PLC 
in 1995 led to a cOUli decision which limited the payment of cash to two year members only, 
new members could still be offered free shares as a 'reward' for conversion.41 The third attempt 
by the Building Society Commission to mediate a conversion in court was in respect to the 
amalgamation and demutualisation of the Leeds Building Society and the Halifax Building 
Society. However, by this time the Commission's points had become mere legal quibble and the 
cOUlis had no problem in dismissing its complaint. 
41 Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society v Building Societies Commission [1994] Chd 
65 
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There followed a reasonably long period between the conversion of the Abbey National in 1989 
and the subsequent conversion of the larger societies, the Halifax, the Leeds, the Alliance and 
Leicester, the Woolwich and Northern Rock in 1997. However, evidence suggests that during 
this time the industry had failed to communicate to its members the benefits of retaining mutual 
status. As numerous speeches made and the results of studies conveyed at the Building Societies 
Conference of 1997 suggested, although there were clear material benefits for members in 
remaining as a mutual society, members were still largely unaware of these while the nature of 
mutuality itself remained something of a mystery. 
The process of demutualisation was further encouraged by the merger activities of pro-
conversion societies who had spent the years following the passage of the 1986 Act taking over 
the business of smaller societies, and thus removed an even larger proportion of societies from 
the mutual sector when they eventually convelied. This was an ironic outcome since mergers 
were suggested as a means to protect against corporate competition by following the 'safety in 
b ' . . 1 42 num ers pnnClp e. 
In contrast, over the same period, the Building Society Association displayed a remarkable 
apathy to the protection of mutuality, given the determination of the pro-convertors. However, 
eventually galvanized by the massive conversion activity in 1997, the remaining mutual 
members of the Building Societies Association (or rather their representatives in the forn1 of 
chief executive and chairman delegates) resolved to be more pro-active in promoting the benefits 
of mutuality. This thesis goes on to test this resolve in Chapter 5, which introduces a survey 
42 See tables in chapter 5 
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designed to assess how successful the BSA and building society initiatives were in enlightening 
members as to the nature and benefits of mutuality. 
First undeliaken in 1997 and then repeated three years later, the study concluded that whilst there 
was a noticeable increase in awareness of the meaning of mutuality and of the benefits this form 
provided for the average member, this did not translate into a commitment by those members to 
vote in against a pro-conversion motion, given the immediate material benefits of a successful 
vote to convert. The survey indicated that any future votes for conversion would be more 
difficult to predict, although an increased awareness of mutuality may make members more 
likely to assess the facts of a particular conversion and they might not necessarily assume that all 
conversions were beneficial. 
The final chapter contends that in the New Labour era, mutuality could have been expected to 
regenerate. Factors in favour of this contention include the increased understanding of mutuality 
by members, the enhanced commitment by societies' executives and a government policy 
committed to financial inclusion. This chapter analyses each of these factors. It begins by 
reviewing New Labour's 'stakeholding' rhetoric in order to contextualise its initiatives in respect 
'financial exclusion'. It then examines New Labour's consideration of the building societies' role 
in combating this social problem. The chapter goes on to assess the views of chief executives in 
the remaining mutuals, based on a series of interviews undertaken in 1999. The interviews asked 
chief executives to explain why they considered mutual status worth preserving and the role that 
it could play in addressing social problems. The chapter goes on to assess the new awareness by 
members of mutuality, evidenced by the unsuccessful conversion motions such as those of the 
Nationwide Building Society. 
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Finally, evidencing New Labour's lack of tangible commitment to mutuality, this chapter 
analyses the effect of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 upon building societies. It 
contends that the effect of this Act indicates that Government policy toward mutual building 
societies is materially opposed to the preservation of its distinct character and is, instead, 
committed to homogenizing the regulation of financial services per se. This chapter concludes 
with the view that New Labour's 'third way' is a rhetorical smoke screen that does not, and will 
not, translate into a positive preservation of mutuality. So, whilst government policy since the 
1830s has attempted to construct and preserve mutuality, the policies of administrations since the 
1980's have made mutuality dispensable. 
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Chapter 2 
The Origins of the Building Society Movement 
1. hltroduction. 
2. The Political Context: Cool Climate For Collectives. 
3. Friendly Societies. 
4. The Politics ofPropeliy. 
5. The Freehold Land Movement. 
6. Pelmanent Societies. 
7. The Legality of Building Societies: (i) The Pre-legislative Position. 
(ii) Legislation. 
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Introduction 
Any historical study of the building society movement will commence with the observation that 
the earliest lmown building society was Ketley's building society established in Birmingham 
around 1775 and that in the following fifty years a further sixty-nine such societies were created. 
It will go on to describe their early organisational status as 'terminating' societies, that is, 
societies with a fixed membership that ended when all members had sufficient funds to buy or 
build their home. Such historical analysis, while providing useful material, tends to 
decontextualise the role of building societies from their wider socio-Iegal and economic function 
and presents the historical development of building societies as a logical progression of their 
intemal dynamics. However, to consider the building society movement within its historical 
origins is to view it in the context of political conditions that would initially appear to mediate 
against its progression. For instance, the late eighteenth century exhibited a strong state aversion 
to independent organisations of working people largely because of religious and political dissent 
within the working classes, a perceived J acobin threat following the French revolution of 1789 
and a generalised social fi'agmentation caused by the rise of the market economy. Furthermore, 
the legality of building societies was questionable as it was possible that the aims and methods of 
building societies ran contrary to the aims of the Bubble Act 1720 (repealed 1825 6 GeoA.c.91). 
In addition to these factors the intemal divisions within Parliament and a deeply unpopular 
monarchy tended to result in a more paranoid response by the state to independent organisations. 
Thus, the very existence of building societies poses the question as to why they were tolerated 
and even encouraged by the state, at a time when the notion of collective organisations certainly 
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ran contrary to the rising ideology of liberal individualism and appeared to run contrary to the 
political and economic necessity to discipline the working class to the requirements of the rising 
market economy. The government was clearly preoccupied with the activities of collectives, as a 
cursory glance at the orientation of statutes passed between 1790-1830 would indicate.! 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the historical factors that mediated both for and against 
the rise of the building society movement. It will argue that it was the synthesis of these factors 
that molded building societies into their present organisational and ideological form, concretised 
by legislation, the earliest of which was the Benefit Building Society Act 1836. The mutual 
building society is a unique form of business organization. As Boleat observed, 'they are not 
companies subj ect to company law nor are they banks, pminerships nor co-operatives' . 
Building societies were conceived as organisations that contained two distinct and contradictory 
characteristics, characteristics that both developed or subsided according to historical context. 
Building societies emerged as bodies whose class content proscribed an organisational form that 
was grounded in collectivity and mutual reliance. As a collective, members could achieve aims 
that individually would have been substantially more difficult. The inherent interdependence of 
members was reflected in the idea of mutuality, that is, members contributed and gained from 
participation equally and maintained equal rights and responsibilities in the society. In contrast, 
the second primary feature of building societies was inherently individualistic. The aim of a 
building society was the provision of private property rights to its members, rights that are 
grounded in an individual's absolute legal power to exclude others. Thus, while a member 
remained associated with a society they maintained a relationship based on mutuality with its 
members. However, once that society was wound up, having succeeded in housing its members 
! As the statutes in the bibliography indicate 
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(in the case of terminating societies), the relationships between members dissolved, as they had 
then become individual private property owners. 
The contrast between building society's organisational methods based on collectivity, and their 
aims based in individualism, became a basis of conflict and development within the building 
society movement, a conflict that has left individualism the victor. However, the victory of 
individualism over mutuality is the result of a long and varied historical process. In this chapter, 
this process is firstly assessed in the context of the political orientation of the period in which 
building societies emerged. This patiicular period was marked, as previously noted, by state 
coercion of working people's organisations such that, in order to avoid state interference and 
maintain independence, collectives were obliged to avoid reference to political aspirations that 
might be perceived as threatening the existing social order. This is clearly evidenced in the 
preoccupations of friendly societies in general (early building societies were not distinguished 
from these groups) who engaged in the self regulation of members by penalising their 
provocative political and social attitudes through fines and expulsions. Throughout the 
development of building societies there resides a preoccupation with legality and respectability, 
most commonly expressed by the notion of prudence. In this context, there was a tendency for 
the egalitarianism inherent in mutuality to be contained purely at the level of organisation. Any 
potential for it to be extended into its objectives were largely curtailed by the political 
environment. 
The chapter goes on to explore the politics of individualism, atiiculated by the rising politics of 
liberalism that is inherent in private property ownership. Ideologically, this mediated against the 
collectivity of mutual organisation, but, conversely, whilst it diminished mutuality, it served to 
expand the building society movement as a whole. Exponents of free market liberalism tended. to 
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refute the more authoritarian measures of the Pitt government in respect to working people's 
collectives, broadly supporting freedom of choice and more explicitly upholding the value of 
absolute private propeliy rights. This in itself created natural allies for the building society 
movement which more explicitly manifested itself in Liberal politician's financial support of the 
freehold land society movement. The rapid success of the freehold land societies, discussed later 
in this chapter, massively increased the popularity of building societies, yet it was this success 
that caused the first major shift from mutuality of membership to individualism. 
Organisationally, this was evidenced by the usurption of the terminating society by the 
organisational form of the pennanent society. By the time the 1874 Building Society Act was 
passed, trends were in place that substantially reconceptualised the original meaning of 
mutuality. These trends may be summarised as the separation of the member as bOlTower from 
the member as lender, the rise of a professional class of building society managers and the 
emergence of an independent advisory body for building societies which resulted in the 
increased regulation of the character of the bOlTower and the tendency toward oligargic practices. 
Mutual status remained, but in a radically modified form. 
Cool Climate for Collectives. 
The evolution of radical political consciousness in the working classes found both form and 
inspiration in the pre-revolutionary politics of anti-monarchists in France. However, although the 
political groupings that arose in England were dubbed 'Jacobins' (generally used as a derisory 
term) their politics derived little from the French experience, tending instead to be constituted 
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around notions of constitutional reform rather than notions of revolution. However, in the wake 
of the French revolution of 1789, such organisations were considered by governing bodies to 
represent a similar political threat to existing social order in Britain, particularly by leading 
conservative elements of the government. The result was a plethora of repressive and censorious 
legislative political activity in a concerted attempt to criminalise and disband working people's 
collectives. 
One of the first notable organised collectives in this period, notable partly because of the 
attention it received from the state, was the London COlTespondence Society (the L.C.S.). The 
L.C.S. was founded in 1792 by shoemaker artisan Thomas Hardy and was later chaired by 
Francis Place. Organised into divisions or branches cOlTesponding with other branches in 
Sheffield, Manchester, Leeds, Rochester, Bath and Tewkesbury, its modest aims were to discuss 
constitutional reform and to cOlTespond with similar groups. Yet, despite the fairly innocuous 
nature of their activities the members of the society were treated with such unwalTanted and 
excessive repression that even a London jury would not convict them. Vividly described by E.P 
Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class; when Thomas Hardy was alTested on a 
charge of high treason, the penalty for conviction of high treason was sufficiently grotesque 
(disembowelment followed by the said entrails being burnt in front of the perpetrators face), for 
the jury to give a not guilty verdict; regardless of the facts and the Privy Council's determination 
to get a conviction on this charge.2 After a nine-day trial, Thomas Hardy was acquitted and other 
members of reform groups alTested in this purge were subsequently acquitted, including activist 
Home Tooke, founder of The Society for Constitutional Information, whose concerns were the 
free distribution of literature on constitutional reform. 3 
2 An argument forwarded by E.P. Thompson in "The Making of the English Working Class" 
(1982) Pelican Books. 
3 Ibid p20-21. 
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It is clear from the literature of this period that it was the organised nature of these groups, as 
much as their politics which caused such anxiety in the English ruling class. A level of 
organisation that E.P. Thompson argued, distinguished such movements from the random 
activities of the plebiscite 'mob' . For example, W.Windham, leading conservative politician 
argued in a parliamentary debate on seditious practices, 
When it was asselied, that such clubs met only for the purpose of parliamentary 
ref 01111, and conducted themselves in an orderly mal1ller, he thought that the 
ground for al31111 was greater; just as he should have more reason to fear an 
hostile army on being told that it was well disciplined.4 
In much of their organisation the many reform groups mirrored that of early building societies. 
The L.S.c. for example, required a monthly sUbscription from its members that was collected 
and held by a nominated official. Fmihe11110re, it operated under fixed procedural rules and held 
regular meetings, in local im1s, thus encompassing 'business' with a social occasion, as did 
building societies. Such organisational methods perpetuated both continuity and popularity 
enabling the L.C.S. to reach much of London, the Medway towns and p31is of the nOlih. But 
whilst these methods raised consternation in the context of groups like the L.e.s. it was tolerated 
in the context of building societies. Undoubtedly, it could be argued there is a qualitative 
material difference between the potentially subversive nature of organisations designed for the 
dissemination of ideas on constitutional reform and those constlUcted for the purchase of 
property. However, the anxiety generated in this period by the French revolution seemed to 
bypass rational appraisals by the state and resulted in the treating of all collectives with 
suspicion. Fmihennore, the abandolID1ent of a well-balanced assessment of the tlu·eat posed by 
collectives seemed to be considered a political virtue by the govermnent, pre felTing intuition 
4 Hansard (1793) 33 George III 'Debate on Mr Sheridan 's Motion' p542 
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above factual evidence, requiring building societies to underline their moderation. This anti-
rational approach by politicians is exemplified in a parliamentary debate on a motion put forward 
by W.Sheridan, 'for the House to resolve itself into the truth of the reports of seditious practices 
in this country'. 5 
In witty and backbiting speeches that make Tony Banks' politically incorrect 'foetal faux-pas' at 
the 1997 Labour conference seem complimentary, Sheridan and Fox put forward the argument 
for a fact-based assessment of the threat posed by reform collectives. Sheridan argued that the 
government had conspired to create a social panic, 'alarm was spread for the express purpose of 
diverting the attention of the public for a while, and afterwards leading them the more easily into 
a war'. 6 He evidenced this with a number of examples that included an incident when all the 
mail coaches in London were stopped and searched because the Lord Mayor had been told that 
there was a debating society in the Kings Anns at Cornhill. Sheridan, lampooning what he 
considered to be transparent repression, he said that at this Inn, 
Principles of the most dangerous were propagated, where people went to buy 
treason at sixpence a head, and where it was retailed to them by the glimmering of 
an inch of candle, and five minutes, to be measured by a glass, were allowed to 
each traitor to perform his task in oveliurning the state 7 
Sheridan went on to outline the distinctive treatment meted out to the ordinary citizen for 
engaging in the same kinds of debates that were regularly held in parliament, and wondered how 
those engaged in the latter debates could reconcile their hypocrisy, 
when they lmew that poor wretches were lying upon straw in the gloom of a 
5 ibid p523 
6 ibid p528 
7 ibid p530 
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prison, for having published sentiments, which they have solemnly professed in 
and out of parliament. The offence was the same in all, but mark the difference of 
the treatment! Punishment and prison were the lot of one set, whilst the others 
were honoured with places and emoluments and seats in his majesty's council! 8 
He noted that magistrates had the right to withdraw licenses from publicans if the discussions in 
the bar were, 'in the least displeasing to the govemment', 9 The burden of his argument was that 
given the extent to which the state could and did interfere into the life of the ordinary citizen and 
given the hundreds of cases involving 'real hardship sustained by innocent individuals', would it 
not be reasonable to set up a committee to examine actual evidence of seditious practices? 1 0 
Upholding Sheridan's argument, Fox went on to dispute the logic of Tory spokesman 
Windhams' speech saying, 'in his support of the present administration he had adopted the 
pmdent plan of giving up both fact and argument; for he could otherwise give them no consistent 
support' ,11 
The administration, however, clearly saw little need for evidence, preferring intuitive feelings of, 
'a discontented spirit' , 12 Exemplifying this course of enquiry, Windham argued that, 
Might not a man, from a combination of various disconnected circumstances, 
receive a convincing impression of a general fact, and yet not be able to state any 
particular proofs of such fact? Would gentlemen be convinced by nothing less 
than ocular or tangible evidence of every subject of enquiry?13 
8 ibid p536 
9 ibid p534 
10 ibid p535 
11 ibid p546 
12 ibid p540 
13 ibid p540 
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ConculTing, Edmund Burke, conservative philosopher and politician, added that the absence of 
factual evidence of seditious practices in Britain was ilTelevant as were the niceties of the rights 
of the citizen that might allow collective action. Upholding the ideals of natural rights were 
luxuries that could only be enjoyed by those outside govemment, not by the ruling 
administration, ('the natural guardians') whose duties lay in the maintenance of order at any cost 
in troubled times. 
In such times of difficulty and danger, those who saw the danger, were 
meritorious in accepting offices of trust and responsibility. In such times every 
sacrifice to the public good must be made by every good citizen. 14 
In critiquing libertarian notions such as free speech and assembly he directed his comments 
specifically at Fox, 'the right hon. Gentleman himself had sacrificed no interest to the value of a 
cats whisker. He was only sacrificing to the vilest idol that was ever set up.' 15 
Some years before, Burke had famously expressed conservative suspicion to the Jacobin threat 
and the perceived political shift from structured social order to individual rights in, Reflections 
on The Revolution in France (1790). In this piece he likened the adulation of the 'liberties' won 
in France to a celebration over an escaped criminal, 
Is it because liberty in the abstract is to be classed amongst the blessings of 
mankind, that I am seriously to felicitate a madman, who has escaped from the 
protecting restraint of his cell, on his restoration to the enjoyment of light and 
libeliy? Am I to congratulate a highwayman and murderer, who has broke prison, 
upon the recovery of his natural rights? This would be to act over again the scene 
of the criminals condemned to the gallies, and their heroic deliverer, the 
metaphysic Knight of the SOlTowful Countenance. 16 
14 ibid p556 
15 ibid p556 
16 Burke, E. (1790) 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' p89 
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Fervently disputing the validity and wisdom of the universal rights of man, 'this barbarous 
philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings,17 , he argued in 
favour of the traditional hierarchies that characterised past stability and retained legitimacy from 
history. Civil society could only be maintained with: 
Public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of 
an effective and well distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the 
solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social mmmers. 18 
Anxieties such as Burke's, over the disturbing effects of the French revolution, were frequently 
blurred into a generalised anxiety over intemal disorder. The political conflict with France was 
readily encompassed into a conflict with the enemy within national boundaries. This is 
exemplified in the parliamentary debate on the Traitorous COlTespondence Bill in 1793. On 
March the 14th 1793, the Attomey General rose to move for leave to bring the above Bill on the 
grounds of the law of Treason passed under Edward the Third. He moved to extend the law of 
treason to include acts of correspondence if that cOlTespondence should peliain to 'commerce 
and intercourse with his majesty's enemies' .19 He stated that there should be a specific, 
identifiable act capable of being termed treasonable within the tenns of the act, '1 st, compassing 
or imagining the death of the King .. .... .levy war against the King; or adhere to his majesties 
enemies, and fluid comfOli or abet them .. ..... counterfeiting the King's money' .20 Furthennore, he 
argued that the original statute had temporarily adopted specific circumstances that were deemed 
treasonable as and when when expediency demanded. Thus, he concluded that in the patiicular 
circumstances of war with France the Bill was justifiable in so much as it restricted such trade 
17 ibid p94 
18 ibid p90. 
19 Debate on traitorous Correspondence Bill. A.D. 1793 p582 Hansard 
20 ibid 
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with France as would capitalise its war effOli and would allow the scrutiny of those individuals 
returning to England. Opposition to the Bill centered around freedom of trade and the general 
libeliies of individuals. On the issue of freedom of trade, Mr Erskine MP argued that, 'it was 
surely absurd to prohibit persons from purchasing lands in France, in the present distracted state 
of that country, whilst this kingdom was in a condition so highly prosperous, and afforded so 
many favourable opportunities for the employment of money,.21 And, on the issue of libeliy he 
argued, that the abandomnent of mens rae meant that an individual could be condemned as 
traitorous through an ambivalent interpretation of his actions, 'with as little ceremony as if it 
were for pulling down a turnpike gate, or for some petty offence against the excise or customs,22 
The only effect of the bill he concluded to be, 'for the purpose of strengthening the hands of the 
govermllent, and weakening the liberties of the people,.23 
As the debate continued it became clear that the Bill was designed to circumvent the activities of 
working peoples' collectives, with frequent references made to 'that infernal shoemaker', 
(Thomas Hardy), the London COlTespondence Society generally and to Thomas Payne. On the 
issue of those returning from France, the Hon. Frederic NOlih argued that the strictest 
precautions should be taken against, 
those who are gone thither to contemplate more nearly that dreadful convulsion to 
the moral world, with whose effects we still tremble, from whose shock we are 
still in danger: that their return to this country should be dangerous, it is no 
slander on the people to suppose: it is no slander on the people to suspect that 
there be amongst us many persons liable to be seduced by their communication. 24 
A near state of war had been declared on working class activity that, in the fifty year period 
21 ibid p590 
22 ibid p589 
23 ibid p590 
24 ibid p598 
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preceding the passage of the Benefit Building Society Act 1836, involved the passage of overtly 
political Acts. From 1794 to 1822 Habeas Corpus was suspended no less than eight times. 
Legislation to criminalise celiain combination of workers was passed in 1799,25 1800,26 1801,27 
1803 28 and 181429. Legislation to prohibit discussion of issues deemed contrary to the interests of 
the state was passed in 1801,30 1817,31 1819,32 and related legislation in the form of prohibitions 
on the swearing of unlawful oaths was passed in 1810,33 1812 34 and 1823.35 These Acts, 
including other similar legislation can-ied a penalty of deportation or execution. 
The conflicting politics of conservatism, as demonstrated by Burke and Wyndham, and 
liberalism, as demonstrated by Fox and Sheridan, helped shape the building society movement. 
Broadly speaking, the politics of the fOlmer concerned with social control and the maintenance 
of traditional hierarchies, tended to instill a sense of caution and aversion to radicalism within 
building societies. Eighteenth century and early nineteenth century building societies deliberately 
avoided a political content of other collectives despite attracting the 'labour aristocracy' 
nOlmally associated with radicalism. In the latter part of the nineteenth century it was the politics 
of liberalism, with its emphasis on independence and responsibility that enabled the building 
society movement to flourish numerically and maintain a relative independence from the state. 
25 39 Geo.3 c.81 
26 39&40 Geo.3 c.1061 
27 41Geo.3 c.38 
28 43 Geo.3 c.86 
29 54 Geo.3 c.104 & c.180 
30 Seditious Meeting Prevention 1801(41 Geo 3 c.30) 
31 Seditious Meetings, 1817(57 Geo 3 c.19) 
32 Seditious Meetings 60 Geo.3 c.6 
33 50 Geo.3 c.102 
34 52 Geo.3 c.1 04 
35 4 GeoA c.87 
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The influence of these apparently conflicting ideologies may be evidenced in the changing 
attitudes within and to friendly societies generally, (before 1836 building societies often 
organised as friendly societies). It is clear that during the periods where the government most 
feared political insurrection, friendly societies consciously avoided provocative political 
0l1entations, actively engaging in the moral and political policing of its members. The latter pmi 
of the nineteenth century, in contrast, fOlmally gave way to the liberal individualism that balked 
at the interference in the workings of these kinds of organisations. It is to the case of friendly 
societies that we will now tum in order to understand part of the socio-Iegal origins of the 
building society movement. 
Friendly Societies 
Originating as far back as the late seventeenth century, the early friendly societies predated 
building societies. However, building societies tended to operate as friendly societies, so closely 
did they minor each other, that many early building societies followed the friendly societies 
practice of operating through trustees who, likewise, were often founder members. Fmihermore, 
following the Friendly Societies Act of 1793, many building societies registered themselves as 
friendly societies, 'this made their legal position clear and extended to them the exemption from 
stamp duties', granted by the Act. 36 
Created and maintained as 'self help' groups for working people and operating independently 
36 lCleary.(l965) p14 "The Building Society Movement"; Elek Books 
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from recognised state authorities, their aims were largely to circumvent the grosser failures of the 
market to deal with problems of social welfare, such as unemployment or injury and death in the 
workplace. Generally, members paid a monthly subscription into a central fund and in return 
were insured to a small degree against the vicissitudes of working life. 
For employers, seeking the maximum output from labour in return for minimum responsibility 
towards the workforce, the objectives of friendly societies had something to be desired. As Alan 
Fox notes, while the relationship between employee and employer maintained its feudal origins 
in respect to the 'servants' obligation to the 'master', 'the commitment of the whole person as 
against the segmental attachment of the alienated',37 the 'master' required the limitation of 
responsibilities to his servants that could be encapsulated in pure contract. Furthermore, in purely 
economic terms, the relief provided by friendly societies, 'reduced the number of paupers thrown 
upon the parish and in this way prevented the poor rates from becoming too heavy a burden on 
the taxpayer'. 38 
However, inherent in the practice of collective organisations lay the possibility of a political 
threat to the existing balance of power, for, noted one historian, 'what was a friendly society but 
a popular club likely during a time of political agitation, to become a centre of J acobin 
propaganda?,.39 And, as Gosden makes clear in his historical account of friendly societies, the 
early nineteenth century was marked by fears about their politically de stabilising effect. Home 
Office papers from this period evidence this. For example, in 1813, six employers in engineering 
films sent a memorial complaining about the activities of their journeymen. In it they stated that, 
37 Fox, A. (1977) Beyond Contract. Oxford 
38 Halevy, E. (1924) A History of English People in 1815. T.Fisher Unwin Ltd 
39 ibid p288 
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'laws are artfully and efficaciously evaded and defeated by and under the mask of Benefit 
Societies, institutions that have created, cherished and given effect to the most dangerous 
combinations among the several journeymen of our district'.40 And, in 1801 FM Eden, an 
individual generally sympathetic to needs of the working community, stated that, 'association is 
the prevalent malady of our times. In all cases its real object should be ascertained, and its 
progress vigilantly watched by those who are entrusted with the governance of this country'. 41 
Membership of diverse friendly societies represented a significant proportion of the working 
population. At the tum of the nineteenth century the population of England stood at an estimated 
10 million.42 In 1802 there existed 9,672 societies and by 1815 the number of friendly society 
members was estimated to be 925,429.43 The numerical popularity of friendly societies within 
the context of such political flux was enough to alatm the most objective observers. For example, 
in P.Colquhoun's A Treatise on Indigence he states that with 164,424 different meetings taking 
place in 9,672 Inns, individuals, 'ill-infonned', 'open to seduction and heated by political frenzy, 
atifully worked up ............. may alatm and afflict the peaceful subject' .44 
Collective organisation on the basis of shared interests was made possible by the breakdown of 
feudalism and the enhanced mobility of labour. This, argue many commentators, led to a new 
consciousness in working people- distinct and potentially more destabilising that the random 
activities of 'the mob'. The rapid disintegration of 'ascribed status' as a mode of social 
40 P. H. J. R. Gosden (1961) "The Friendly Societies in England. 1815-1875" R.OA2/172 
Manchester UP 
41 quoted by Gosden p158 taken fi'om F.M. Eden, Observation on friendly societies, 1801 p.24 
42 WR Cornish (1989) "Law and Society in England 1750-1950" Sweet and Maxwell 
43 Statistics from appendix No.1 of the Fourth Report of the 1874 Royal Commission Report 
into Friendly and Benefit Building Societies 
44 Quoted in Gosden p158 
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organisation prior to the eighteenth century resulted in the evolution of groups organised around 
the broad principle of 'justice' and a notion of class as, 'a group far from homogenous but with 
realisable ambitions as a group and not a mere collection of individuals' .45 It was this new 
consciousness, argue many historians, which gave rise to highly politicised collectives among 
which :fiiendly societies are counted. 
In the new towns there were large numbers of working men's friendly clubs and 
trade societies and employees' associations and combinations, the fOlmer looking 
to 'unions' for strength, the latter binding themselves together to protect their 
interests both against the farmer and the artisan.46 
It is true that friendly societies did have the potential to be incorporated into politically radical 
movements and occasionally realised that potential, famously encapsulated in the plight of the 
Tolpuddle Mmiyrs. However, it is perhaps too tempting for social historians to over emphasise 
the radicalism of early workers' collectives in their, albeit commendable, effOlis to promote the 
notion of the working person as an actor rather than a victim of historical events. Some friendly 
societies did, no doubt, provide some relief to those engaged in trade disputes. However, what is 
more apparent from the objects of friendly societies is their conscious attempt to appeal to the 
more 'respectable' elements of the working class and of their promotion of the values of 
abstention, hard work and saving, coupled with collectivism. Their radicalism lay not in their 
involvement with political issues, such as universal suffrage, but in maintaining economic 
independence from both government and employers by an insistence upon meticulous 
organisation within societies and standards of behaviour from its members. For example, as early 
as 1688 the miicles and regulations for governing the Town Porters' Friendly Society, instituted 
on the 12th of March of that year, required members to be, 
45 Briggs, A. (1959) "The Age ofImprovement 1783-1867." p65 Longman 
46 ibid 
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Of sound constitution, free of maim, bruise, hereditary or constitutional disease, 
capable to gain an honest livelihood by their employment, of good moral 
character, and his wife, ifhe has one, in good health.47 
The rules and regulations of the Trades Society at Annan, stated in article 1 that, 'every person 
who should be admitted a member of this society be of good repute, and of sober life' .48 
Similarly the rules for the United Philanthropists Society, instituted in 1833 stated that members 
must be, 'a man of credit and reputation, his eaming not less than twenty-four shillings per week, 
and not afflicted with diseases of any kind whatsoever' .49 
Drunkenness was particularly frowned upon. The Castle Eden Friendly Society fined members 1 
shilling for each offence of, 'dnmkenness, fighting, betting and cursing', whilst at a meeting. 50 
The Trades Society controlled drinking at meetings by only authorising elected officers to order 
drinks for the assembly and members attempting to order their own drinks were fined sixpence.51 
Claims for benefit that were considered to be self- inflicted were almost universally negated by 
Societies, 
No person shall receive any benefit from the stock of this society that had any 
distemper prior to his entrance, or whose sickness lameness or blindness, shall be 
caused by his own defense, or by being in any riot or drunkenness, or the venereal 
disease. 52 
If his distemper is found to be forged or the result of excessive drinking, fighting 
47 Article 3 of the atiicles and regulations of the Town Porters Fliendly Society Printed at the St. 
Michael press by C. M'Lachan, 1801 
48 Aliicle 1 of the Trades Society at Annan ibid 
49 Article 3 of the rules of the Philanthopists Society 
50 Al-ticle 27 of the Castle Eden Friendly Society 
51 Al-ticle 18 of the rules of the Trades Society 
52 Article 5, The Society of Taylors, Stanhope Street,Clare market, London. 1787 
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or qualTelling, he shall be dispelled from the society. 53 
No benefit will be forthcoming if sickness is caused by drunkenness, fighting, 
unlawful or needless exercise, or from immoral conduct of any kind. 54 
Furthermore, expulsions for engagements in illegal activity were commonplace regardless of 
whether such actions were connected to, or affected, the member's role in the society. For 
example, the Town Porters' Societies articles stated that, 
When a member shall be judicially convicted of theft, or any other crime infelTing 
infamy and moral depravity he shall therefore be deprived of all further 
connection with the Society and shall forfeit all he has contributed to the funds 
and be expelled from the Society as an unworthy member. 55 
Similarly, atiicle 14 of the Angel Society'S rules stated that, 'if any member be convicted of 
felony, peIjury, fraud, or notable crime that may bring disgrace on the society, he shall be 
excluded,.56 
To be sure, such strict policing of members indicated a clear moral agenda, (it was the whole 
moral and economic person that was required by Societies), but it was a morality that was 
internally generated. As historian David Neave argued in his archival study of friendly societies 
in rural East Riding, this was a morality of a distinctive working class character, not a set of 
moral codes imposed by middle class concerns. Although organised to help individuals, it was an 
organisation based on collectivity, 'the labels of 'individualism' and 'self help' should be 
replaced by 'collectivism' and 'mutual aid' and there is little sign of 'social exclusiveness,,,.57 In 
53 AIiicle34, The Town pOliers' friendly society 
54 AI,ticle 11, The Angel Inn Friendly Society, Bedford, 1826 
55 Article 44 of the Town's Porters Society 
56 Article 14 of the Angel Society's rules 
57 David Neave (1991) Mutual Aid in The Victorian Countryside: Friendly Societies in the Rural 
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addition, this fonn of moral policing bespoke of a desire to maintain some independence from 
the state by proving their collective ability to self-regulate. Political radicalism by members 
would have invited state intrusion and was generally unwanted in these stoically independent 
organisations. Clearly underlining this point, the Beneficit Society of Tinwold (1793) stated in 
their articles that, 'none shall be admitted into this Society who are suspected of being friendly to 
the new fangled doctrines of LibeIiy and Equality and the Rights of Man as set fmih by Thomas 
Paine and his adherents,.58 By presenting a moral and non-provocative image it 'was earnestly 
hoped that benevolent institutions of this nature may not be cramped by rules' .59 
In the context of the rise of 'laissez-faire' liberal economics, this hope was to a great extent 
realised in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as the government acknowledged the viIiue of 
ensuring friendly societies' relative independence from the state. In response to arguments for 
the establishment of a highly regulated 'National Friendly Society managed and therefore 
viIiually guaranteed by the Government',60 the Commission concluded that, 'the great object of 
fostering a spirit of independence among the people is attained by a system which leaves them to 
make their own proVIsIOn against sickness and their own ability to work and to bear the 
consequences if they make an inadequate or improper one,.61 State interference, it argued, should 
be limited to the provision of information upon which societies may base financial decisions and 
the correlation of friendly societies' accounts, 'with care to publish that guarantee is not to be 
implied ....... sound tables may be framed, and it is intended that the condition of every society 
should come under periodic review'. 62 As Gosden argued, 'the principle enemy of independence 
East Riding 1830-1914 p98 
58 Quoted in Gowers Principles of Company Law p31 (1992) 
59 Preface to the rules and atiicles of The Castle Eden friendly society 
60 cxcii fourth Report Friendly Societies Commision 
61 ibid 
62 Fourth Repmi of the Friendly Societies Commision ccxviii 
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was thought to be state aid or interference in the field of friendly society activity' .63 Thus, the 
1875 Act, though far lengthier than in previous legislation, broadly speaking limited state 
interference in friendly societies to the issue of registration. 
Property 
The particular purpose of building societies was to advance such funds as were sufficient for its 
members to purchase property. This apparently innocuous purpose involved the acquisition of an 
element of social life that was, and is, charged with political character. In the eighteenth century, 
the legal conceptualisation of property encompassed the evolution of socio-economic relations in 
Britain as both a material reality and a potent symbol of an emerging new order. It was the arena 
within which much of the ideological dispute between Whig and Tory took place and it was the 
arena within which much of the arguments for constitutional reform were fought. The 
reconceptualisation of property directly affected large swathes of the popUlation by rendering 
them homeless and without their traditional means of survival, but facilitated the unique 
historical development of the market economy enabling Britain to become the first industrialised 
economy in the world. With the weight of history bearing down upon the issue of property, it 
would not be surprising that as building societies maintained as their object the acquisition of 
property, that the politics of property would have a profound impact on the development of the 
building society movement. The emergence of early building societies encapsulated a basic 
conflict, for whilst the members of building societies were 'buying into' the norms of a market 
63 Gosden p163 
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economy through the acquisition of private housing or land, they were maintaining a more 
desirable position of independence and self- determination. 
The creation of private property in the land was almost entirely completed by the passage of 
hundreds of Enclosure Acts in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Over a thousand 
Enclosure Acts were passed from 1761 to 1780, with nine hundred being passed from 1781-
1800.64 In the period spanning 1793-1813, one thousand, eight hundred and eighty-three such 
Acts were passed, putting 2,2600,000 acres of land into cultivation.65 By this process, 'common 
land lying continually fallow on which everyone had the right to pasture his cow, to cut a little 
wood, and dry some leaf, became by virtue of the Enclosure Act, the private property of an 
individual owner'. 66 Or as E.P. Thompson puts it, prior to enclosure and engrossment laws, land 
was held subject to a 'hierarchy of co-incident use-rights', a hierarchy that correlated to an 
individuals' social status.67 
Property rights in land prior to the domination of the market economy did not merely denote an 
individuals' wealth. More significantly, it demonstrated an individuals' political, social and legal 
status. Fornlally, there was little in the way of a universally socially stratified justice although 
there were many exceptions to the principles of common law. For example, Scottish miners 
remained as 'bound labour' until 1774, slavery remained legal until 1772, while the Master and 
Servant Act, which made breach of contract by an employee a criminal offence, was not repealed 
until 1875. More significantly, propeliy dominated the legal system by the fact that appointment 
to legal office carried a property qualification. W.R. Cornish, whilst maintaining that there was a 
64 P.S. Atiyah (1979) "Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract" p26-27 Clarendon Press 
65 Halevy "A History of English People 1815" p201 
66 ibid 
67 E.P Thompson (1977) "Whigs and Hunters:The Origins of the Black Act" Pelican Books 
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long- standing tradition common law in England, indicates that social position remained the 
comerstone of legal appointment. Judges in the higher courts, or Royal courts were men of 
'considerable social position".68 Indeed he argues, 'it would have been remarkable had it been 
otherwise. Those who acquired the highest office were expected to purchase an estate 
commensurate with their station; and they had to show the social accomplishment befitting their 
place in the order of precedence'. 69 Lower down the judicial hierarchy, justices of the peace were 
drawn from lesser property owners and jurors too were selected by a 'householder property 
qualification' .70 hldeed, those who administered justice were those who had the most to gain 
from existing propeliy arrangements. In the towns, 'mill-and mine-owners were drawn onto 
benches, to continue there the hostilities over discipline and conditions that infected many work-
places.,7! 
In Atiyah's Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract, he notes that until the complete emergence 
of the market economy, it was propeliy law that dominated the English legal system, usurped in 
the latter part of the eighteenth century by contract law. He argued that, 'this transition from 
property to a law of contract relating to property merely reflects the now familiar process by 
which the significance of property rights changed from their use value to their exchange value,.72 
Transformed under the market economy, propeliy emerged as just another commodity, valued by 
the market. Previously, property denoted stability, continuity and heritage, providing for material 
needs and ensuring the continuity of relationships of deference and domination. However, 
Atiyah's assertion that the increased ability to alienate and exchange property (through the 
contract form) had depoliticised property is not in accord with other important work on the 
68 W.R. Comish p21 
69 ibid p22 
70 ibid p20 
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72 Atiyah op cit pI 03 
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nature of property. Macpherson, for example, argues that property itself is not neutral, but 
representative of a particular set of social and political relationships. He argues that, when (and 
only when) property is for the most part held as private propeliy it appears to be the case that, 
'propeliy is a thing'. This is because the right to both enjoy and dispose of property is held by 
one legal entity. The true essence of property is that it exists as a 'political right between 
persons'. And, in the case of private property, it is the political right to exclude all persons from 
use of the thing. Altematively, common property represents a shared mutual right of all 
individuals to the thing. Propeliy rights are, by their very nature, only meaningful when 
accompanied by a political and coercive organisation that is capable of enforcing recognition of 
these rights. Private property, therefore, is only a meaningful right because of the political 
phenomenon of the state; an organised, specialised system of enforcement that ensures private 
property owners' absolute right to exclude others. The nature of a right being entirely derived 
from its enforceability as a claim and the enforceability of that claim depending upon a particular 
set of political relations. 
In pre-capitalist agricultural England, an individual's legal rights to the land gave a highly visible 
testimony to their social status. Thus, at the level of politics, property ownership entirely 
detelmined an individual's right to enfranchisement. Ownership of property was central to the 
right to vote and remained so until 1868. Macphereson argues that the association of property 
rights with political (voting) rights had posited itself in the English consciousness for many 
centuries and this association was so deeply and universally entrenched that is was part of the 
ideology of the ruling class and radical working class groups alike. In the protracted debates on 
enfranchisement in the seventeenth century, that most radical of organisations, the Levellers, 
consistently excluded the possibility of giving the right to vote to wage labourers, beggars and to 
those receiving alms. The Levellers argued that these men could not experience the 
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independence of mind and fi:eedom that ownership of their own means of subsistence would 
have given them. Freedom was associated with private property ownership, and freewill could 
only be expressed by the free born Englishman, free because he was not dependant on the 
property of another. In debate with Oliver Cromwell the Leveller, Petty, stated, 
I conceive the reason why we would exclude apprentices of servants, or those 
who take alms, is because they depend on the will of other men and should be 
afraid to displease (them). For servants and apprentices, they are included in their 
masters, and so for those that receive alms fi-om door to door.73 
Whilst the Levellers argued on the basis of pragmatism or merely an acknowledgement of 
material reality, political philosophers, in the emerging liberal tradition, presented private 
property as a universal, natural and even moral right. John Locke and those following in the 
Lockean tradition argued that private ownership was an intrinsic quality of a physical object, and 
that private property ownership was intrinsic to human nature. The 'natural state' of mankind 
was to be engaged in private property ownership, even if that property was limited to 'property 
in self . Adam Smith emphasised the importance of legislation that underpilmed the absolute 
nature of private property rights as essential toward facilitating the exchange of goods and 
services. As a corollary to tIns, government should be restrained in their power to intervene with 
individual property rights; private property rights should be maintained as an immutable 
principle to which all other interests, including that of the governments, should be subordinate. 
The political theory of private property was co-opted (notwithstanding its libertarian potential) 
into the politics of Whig landowners who were undoubtedly keen to uphold the immutable right 
to private property as against the interference of sovereign or state. 
73 Quoted by Macpherson p123 in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Hobbes to 
Locke (1962) Oxford Press 
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Thus, propeliy underpinned the ideology and aspirations of diverse groups in England and the 
economic, social and political relations therein. For the working class, private property 
ownership, if only in one's labour, determined freedom, in the sense of freedom from 
subjugation. Thus material freedom was seen as a cmcial mainstay of political freedoms. For the 
landed Whig classes, the maintenance of private property sustained a privileged lifestyle, 
ironically as a moral imperative. Politically and philosophically, Whigs associated with the 
ascending liberal principles. The political correlation between the aims of building societies and 
liberalism created powerful if not pragmatic advocates for the movement. The universal right of 
individuals to make choices as to how they utilised and acquired property in self and other 
commodities served both of these group's interests. 
The correlation of these interests crystallised in a surprising and ingenious manner in the middle 
of the nineteenth century with the emergence of a particular strand of building societies, the 
freehold land societies. This movement incorporated the political aspiration of working men to 
achieve enfranchisement and private property in land with the political aspiration of liberal 
politicians. Yet, ironically, it was the very success of the movement that began to undermine 
mutuality. 
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Freehold Land Societies 
In 1847, James Taylor set up the first known land society called the Binningham Freehold Land 
Society, its main economic purpose being to acquire freehold land by accumulated shares or 
sUbscriptions from its members, but its political purpose being the attainment of enfranchisement 
for its members. As such, this organisation and the others that followed represented a hybrid of 
both constitutional reform groups and building societies. Initially registered as friendly societies, 
their legitimacy was ensured by the legal recognition of building societies (in 1836) in their 
purpose of advancing funds for the purchase of property and subsequent societies tended to 
register under the Building Societies Act. 
The 'Land Society Movement' owed its origin to the political opportunities for working people 
that were, perhaps unwittingly, opened by the 1832 RefOlID Bill. The Bill extended the vote to 
owners of propeliy worth £10 in the boroughs and to £10 copyholders, £10 long-leaseholders 
and £50 medium leaseholders as well as forty- shilling freeholders in the counties. 
Strictly within legal limits and aimed precisely at Conservative strongholds in the counties, 
Taylor organised collectives of forty shilling freeholders. Originating in Birmingham, working 
people were invited to become members of the society and to form a common fund based on 
small weekly SUbscriptions with which freehold land was purchased and distributed amongst its 
members in small plots. As long as the plots maintained a market value of forty shillings, 
members obtained a county vote. At the end of the first year, subscriptions amounted to £500 per 
month and allotments had been made to over 200 members. The movement spread rapidly 
throughout the country and after only three years consisted of eighty similar societies with 
30,000 members subscribing for 40,000 shares with paid up SUbscriptions of £170,000. As 
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building societies, they operated under trustees who guaranteed mortgages and on occasion put 
up the initial funds for purchasing property. Up until the 1852 election, trustees were drawn from 
the ranks of liberal politicians. Particularly prominent in the freehold land movement were anti-
com law leaguers and free marketeers, Richard Cobden and John Bright and their success and 
occasional duplicity was not universally approved, as the Morning Herald of 1852 testified in its 
article, More Faggot Votes- New Purchase by the League 
An estate containing between 400 and 500 acres of land, situated at Horfield, two 
miles from Bristol, has just been bought by Cobden, Sir Joshua Walmsley and 
another Anti -Com Law Leaguer; for the purpose of creating 1000 40s freeholds in 
West Gloustershire. The property is bought at 40L. per acre, and belonged to the 
Rev. Mr Richards, whose solicitor took it to a country farmer looking man, who, 
when he had paid the deposit, gave the names of Cobden etal as the purchasers. 
Mr Richards has since asceliained that the estate is positively bought for these 
patiies, and the purpose named. 74 
The mood of the freehold land movement in contrast was focused and inspired, 
Economy is the beginning of independence. A man who is always hanging on the 
verge of debt, is in a state not far removed from that of slavery. He is in bondage 
to others, and must accept the terms they dictate to him. He is not his own master, 
he cannot help looking servile. 75 
However, by accumulating some propeliy and engaging in a thrifty existence, 
his self respect is maintained and he can still walk tall without the fear of parish 
overseers. He is no burden to society-neither himself nor his little ones. His 
character is unimpaired, his virtue untainted; he looks forward with hope; he can 
neither be bought or sold. 76 
74 Quoted in the Freeholder's Circular No 6 Mon 2nd August 1852 
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The potential of this movement was soon realised in the cities and in 1849 the National Freehold 
Land Society was stalied with the purpose of extending the franchise and land ownership in more 
industrialised. areas. It opened with 750 members subscribing for 1,500 shares and quickly 
became the largest of all such societies. By 1852, The National boasted 9,000 members. It had 
purchased thiliy- seven estates costing over £200,000 and, of the £230,000 invested in freehold 
societies as a whole between 1851-52, The National had received £96,137.77 By 1851 it had 
purchased estates in many areas in and around London, including 32 acres in Stoke Newington, 
204 acres in Romford and 220 acres in Barnet. Its popularity led it to publish a monthly circular, 
'for the guidance of its members', which contained financial advice and a forum for discussion 
on the orientation of the movement and the various problems members encountered. In the first 
edition of The Freeholder's Circular, the objects of the National were stated as to, 'facilitate the 
acquisition of freehold land, and the erection of houses thereon, - to enable such of its members 
as are eligible, to obtain the county franchise, -and to afford to all of them a secure and profitable 
investment for money'. 78 Freehold land societies functioned as an ordinary mutual building 
society in that they were established under the Benefit Building Society Act of 1836 , 'for the 
purpose of raising a fund, out of which every Member shall receive the amount or value of his 
share to erect or purchase a dwelling-house, or dwelling houses, or other real or leasehold 
estate,.79 However they distinguished themselves by virtue of the fact that they dealt solely in the 
distribution of freehold land that had not been previously built upon. Mutuality of rights between 
Members was scrupulously attended to, both as a viliue and as a point of marketing. The 
National's circular was keen to emphasise the equal opportunity of members in the acquisition of 
plots stating that. 'lots are after a time offered, on the same terms, to all the members,.80 
77 Reported in the Freeholders Circular 1st Edition 1852 p 11 
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Furthermore, it emphasised the right of the members to choose the plots that were most suited to 
their needs, saying, 'members are enabled in a great measure to select their lots in the situations 
most convenient to themselves' .81 
However, just five years into the freehold land movement, the largest and most rapidly 
expanding society was anxious to separate itself from the political origins of the movement, both 
in telIDS of enfranchisement and in tenns of the class of persons who became members. On the 
second point The Freeholders Circular stated, 
It is not an unconml0n opinion that the object and capacity of this society are to 
deal with land and houses of the humblest pretensions, and that its machinery is 
not adopted for property of a superior class; but experience has proved that 
opinion is erroneous ........... Directors have experienced no difficulty in adapting 
the means at their disposal to the supply of the wants of all classes of the 
members. Already, on some of the estates, buildings of a superior description 
have been erected ..... several of the estates now at hand are suitable for the 
erection of detached villa-residences. 82 
Members, whilst holding equal status in the society could make different quantities of investment 
(purchase more shares) and thereby receive different rewards. 
On the first point, The National was keen to emphasise the apolitical nature of its organisation 
and to distinguish itself from the political (and short lived) publication The Freeholder. On the 
launching of The Freeholder, the Freeholders Circular stated, 
81 ibid 
We have not, either directly or indirectly, the remotest personal interest in the 
success of that publication; and it is perhaps unnecessary for us to state, that we 
shall not be in any sense, or in any degree, responsible for its 
82 ibid p5 
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contents ........... especially shall we not be identified with either the politics or the 
morals of Mr Cassell's paper (editor) .... we know nothing of party politics, class 
. . d'ffi 83 mterests, or sectanan 1 el"ences. 
Indeed it argued, morally, socially and politically, as a society that was committed to purely 
commercial concems, it, (The National) had achieved more for the lot of the common man than 
the overt political motivations of societies around James Taylor's original conception. As a large 
society, they had long since abandoned the political project that brought freehold land societies 
into existence. 
By the end of 1852 there were 130 societies, with 85,000 members subscribing to 120,000 
shares. An estimated 310 estates had been purchased divided into 19,500 allotments with paid up 
sUbscriptions of £750,000. Politically, it represented a highly successful allegiance between 
Liberal politicians and building societies and in the 1852 election Liberal candidates won 
decisive victories in the Conservative strongholds of Middlesex and East Surrey. Perhaps, 
ironically, the movement was bolstered by the adoption of its own tactics by the Conservative 
paIiy who set up the Conservative Land Society. The experience of this society was that within 
four years 1,803 shares had been taken up of which £218,158 had been paid up and it had 
allotted 22 estates sold into plots worth £150,000. 
As a politically expedient tool, the land society movement fOlmally ceased to be functional 
following the Refom1 Act of 1868. However, as one commentator noted, as early as 1853, 'the 
political idea has almost vanished from the societies; members enter without any declaration of 
political opinion, and not one in 500 cares a rush about the franchise at all'. 84 Land societies had 
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become successful economic organisations that were easily subsumed into the building society 
movement. So, for instance, marrying the status of both building society and land society, the 
Birkbeck Freehold Land Society and the Birkbeck Building Society, although legally separate 
organisations, operated from the same building and under the same management. 
The freehold land society movement graphically joined politics and property under the 
organisational tool of the building society, yet, significantly, the success of freehold land 
societies served to undermine the original conception of mutuality. Compared to the early 
building societies with memberships of around fifty, freehold land societies were huge. Some, 
like The National, numbering tens of thousands in their membership. The numbers involved 
meant that many freehold land societies offered extra shares to those with the means and desire 
to finance them. Different levels of investment by members meant the acquisition of more 
property, thus making them attractive propositions for the more moneyed c1asses.85 
However, the most important factor in reconceptualising mutuality lay in the reorganisation of 
the mutual society. The political objectives of freehold land societies meant that they had no 
reason to tenninate and membership was not limited to the founding members. This lay the 
foundations for the emergence the successor of the mutual terminating society, the 
contemporary, pelmanent building society, an organisational form that separated the role of 
borrowing member from investing member whose relationship was mediated through an outside 
entity, the incorporated building society. 
It is interesting quirk of history that whilst the liberal, free market agenda was pursued in the 
85 Evidence by Table: "Subscriptions of Members form Commencement of Society to Present 
Time" (Freeholders Circular) op cite 
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mid-1800s by bolstering the building society movement, less than a century and a half later, the 
Neo-Liberal agenda would be served by eradicating mutuality. 
Permanent Building Societies 
Early building societies, as previously noted, tended to be orientated around a small, local 
membership, meeting and often forming in local hostelries. Thus, members tended to have a 
direct acquaintance with each other. As building societies developed into larger concerns, (a 
tendency accelerated by the emergence of land societies) members would more frequently have 
no personallmowledge of each other. Whilst it is a truism that the larger the organisation the less 
likely it will be that members have a familiar relationship, it is commonly assumed that it was 
this that accounted for the demise of mutuality itself. As a Royal Commission noted, 'when, to 
use the words of the secretary of a large London society, men can 'come out of the street' and 
bon-ow ii'om the society - it can no longer be said that the element of mutuality is essential to the 
type' . 86 This assumption entirely depends on the association of social responsibility with intimate 
knowledge of the other. In contrast, this thesis maintains that the shift in member's allegiance to 
mutuality derives from the organisational form taken by building societies that began to 
dominate from the middle of the nineteenth century, a form that largely reoriented member's 
relationships, from a collective relationship with each other within a building society, to an 
individualised relationship with the building society (reconceptualised as a separate body). The 
organisational form that facilitated this shift was the permanent society, which emerged as a 
86 Fourth Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into Friendly and Benefit Building 
Societies 1974 p13 
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response to economic imperatives but whose effect was to diminish mutuality. 
The first promotion of the permanent society is generally attributed to actuary Arthur Scratchley. 
Scratchley highlighted two attributes of terminating building societies that made it imperative to 
adopt the permanent Plinciple of organisation. The first of these attributes was the general 
popularity of building societies, the second being the inadequacies of member's actuary skills. 
On the first point, he argued, 'no benefit building society has ever been started however 
ridiculous its pretensions, which has not speedily succeeded in drawing together a number of 
shareholders,.87 He estimated that by 1850, the 2000 societies that were registered under the 
1836 Act would hold a total income of £2,400,000/year. On the second point, he noted a general 
inability to calculate compound interest that led many building societies to misrepresent the 
financial benefits of membership. In his words, 'not one in twenty, or even a greater number can 
possibly realise for its members, whether investors or borrowers, the advantageous results 
.. 11 . d' 88 ongma y promIse . This problem, exacerbated by an uncritical enthusiasm for building 
societies, could be resolved by the use of a permanent system. Scratchley argued that the benefits 
of a permanent over a telminating society were, in the main that, 'the difficulty of funding 
borrowers, at any time in the course of the existence of a society is removed ........ members don't 
pay arrears if they join later and the numbers of share holders increase rather than diminish in the 
life of a building society'. 89 In contrast, a tenninating society was founded upon a fixed number 
of subscribers who paid a monthly subscription until all members had received housing and had 
paid off outstanding loans undertaken for that purpose, housing, in the main, being allocated by a 
lottery scheme. Members who wished to join after the founder members were required to. pay 
87 A. Scratchley (1848) "Industrial Investment and Emigration" 2nd edition London John W. 
Parker West Strand p7 
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higher premiums in order to equalise with the payments of earlier subscribers, that is, individual 
subscriptions were determined in line with the finite life of a tenninating society. This meant that 
if a member joined half way through the life of the tenninating society he would be required to 
pay double the premium as that paid by founding members, a sum that would obviously increase 
the later a member joined. This inhibited the desirability of late entry and, as a result, tenninating 
societies would tend to have only a small number of members. In contrast, in a pennanent 
society, the large number of members would mean that the administrative costs of setting up and 
rumling the society could be more equitably spread. Furthennore, members could withdraw their 
investment more readily and the duration of investment could be more easily ascertained. 
These stated advantages notwithstanding, it appears to be the case that the development of 
permanent societies was not the result of conscious plamling. In the 1874 Royal Commission 
Report it was noted that it was probable that pennanent societies grew organically from the 
tendency of larger terminating societies to incorporate members throughout their existence, 
creating indefinitely existing telminating societies. Thus the terminating aspect of these societies 
more correctly described the relationship of individual members to the society, rather than the 
organization per se. Put another way, 'a pennanent society is a tenninating society to every 
individual from the date at which he enters' .90 
Terminating societies operating with an increasingly unwieldy membership were experiencing 
organisational problems that the pennanent system could easily accommodate. For example, 
terminating societies tended to engage in periods of great economic activity followed by more 
fallow periods. As the commission noted, 
90 op cite Royal Commission p 14 
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it is a pretty general feature amongst terminating societies that all their activity is 
concentrated within the first few years of their existence. During these first few 
years, again, it is almost invariably the case that they resort very largely to loans, 
in order to obtain as much money as they can for the placing out; advances being 
made either on the principle of ballot, or of sale to the highest bidder .......... during 
the latter years of their existence, as repayments come in more and more, 
tem1inating societies have generally a plethora ofmoney.91 
In contrast, permanent societies operated on the more regular basis of supply and demand. 
Investments detennined the capital available for the making of loans, capital obtained either 
through deposits or through paid up shares. Thus the Commission concluded, 'that there be no 
altemation of energy and stagnation: the money has not all to be put out in the first few years: the 
demand for it increases steadily with the progress of the society,.92 
Crucially, as Scratchley had noted some years before, this was facilitated by the separation of 
members into two separate classes, borrowers and lenders, each class maintaining entirely 
distinct roles and benefits. A borrower would receive a full advance, secured on a mortgage, 
itself secured by fixed monthly repayments. Thus 'the members, who become borrowers, at once 
cease to be investors in respect of the shares on which they obtain advances', this means that 
they 'do not participate in any of the subsequent liabilities, or expenses of the society, nor 
consequently in its profits' .93 In contrast, investor members do participate in the profits made by 
the society, and this is the sole motivation to becoming members (although in practice 
individuals may be both borrowers and investors). 
The absolute mutual character of terminating societies that derived from member's equal 
91 ibid p13-14 
92 ibid 
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engagement, commitment and benefit in the organisation was necessarily undermined by the 
organisation of the permanent principle. In a terminating society members invested in order to 
borrow, this collective participation enabled them to do as a group what they could not do as 
individuals-achieve the relative independence of home ownership. This collective solution was 
embraced precisely because of the economic status of members who, as noted earlier, were 
largely composed of the better-off working class. In contrast, permanent societies distilled the 
two functions perfonned by members into two distinct roles, investor and borrower, thereby 
drawing a distinction between the benefits and responsibilities attributed to each. In the words of 
the Royal Commission, 'instead of all the members being expectant borrowers, as appears to 
have been first the case, and is still the case in some groups, the two classes of investors and 
borrowers are now distinct, the fOlmer usually outnumbering the latter and monopolising the 
profits,.94 
Investing members were drawn into the society by the prospect of expanding their own private 
capital by lending money, secured by a mOligage on propeliy, to individuals who could only 
finance such purchases by monthly payments over a number of years and who paid a premium 
on these advances. Investing members, therefore, were induced to invest by two main factors. 
Firstly, the degree to which borrowing members would pay additional moneys on their 
advancement and, secondly, upon the security of the investment, in short, the character of the 
borrower and that of the property held by mortgage. 
Mutuality remained, to the extent that all members were economically interdependent but was 
unde1111ined to the extent that the self- interest of investing members and borrowing members 
conflicted, as the role of former had become usurious in character. To be sure, some societies 
94 op cit Royal Commission p 13 
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chose to limit this tendency. For example, the Leeds Permanent Society followed a strategy of 
minimising the difference between the interest paid to its investors and the interest charged to its 
borrowers thereby circumventing the permanent's tendency to divide mutuality between 
members. Thus, as the Commission reported, 'the borrowing member stands absolutely on the 
same footing as the investing member, as respects the sharing of profits, the right of voting, 
&C,.95 
However, it was more frequently the case that the separation of the two classes of members led 
to the charging of high interest rates to borrowers; 'the mere fact that the usual recommendation 
which building societies put f01ih for themselves is the large rate of profit they give to investors, 
is clear proof of the high rate which the borrower has to pay for his money.96 Furthermore, the 
emerging oligargic tendencies of building societies meant that the borrower had little choice but 
to accept the high rates charged. In evidence to the commission, James Taylor stated that, 
'people would not come to our society if they could get their money elsewhere. If a man could 
get the money in any other way besides belonging to our society, he would never pay a £50 
premium for £500' .97 
As a result of the usurious character of the investor member under the permanent's method of 
organisation, the social class of participating members shifted from the 'industrious classes' to 
the middle classes, the latter being particularly represented in the investing class. Furthennore, 
witnesses to the Commission testified to the corrupt character of the growing domination of 
middle class membership in permanent societies, evidence which, on the face of it, the 
95 ibid pI5 
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Commission clearly disapproved, 
It is, indeed startling to hear of single advances, not only of thousands but of 
twenty of thirty thousands pounds being made by building societies, sometimes 
on the security of mills and factories; and it is roundly alleged by some witnesses 
that the working classes, by whom and for whose benefit the system was 
primarily devised, are discounted and kept away. 98 
However, the use of building society funds for these purposes seemed more the exception than 
the rule. Evidence from the Building Society Protection Society (BSPS) indicated that advances 
tended to be small and non-commercial. Their statistics drawn from 251 societies indicated that 
69,879 advances were made on the 'lower rate', (set at £300), while only 9,393 were made on 
the higher rate (advances over £300). The proportion of lower rate advances to higher rates, 
about nine to one, was however lower in London at about six to one. The BSPS nevertheless 
concluded that building societies still maintained their roots within the' industrious classes'. 
It was, however, less difficult to ignore the class divisions between the terminating system and 
the pennanent system. The commission observed that, 'whilst the smaller terminating societies 
remain very often still under the management of the working classes, or of persons very near to 
them in point of station, the larger peimanent societies at least are almost invariably under the 
direction of the middle class,.99 Furthermore, this division tended to be reflected in the class 
composition of the membership, particularly in the metropolis where, 'working men seem 
generally to f01111 only a minority in the permanent societies as compared with the middle 
classes' .100 
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Thus, the growth of the permanent system, emerging as a practical response to the general 
popularity of building societies brought with it certain characteristics that undermined the 
principle of mutuality. It separated the role of bOlTowing from investing member, which 
inevitably separated their interests. Investing members required high retu111s from a secure 
investment, thus, borrowing members would inevitably pay higher interests rates on moneys 
advanced and would be subject to assessment of their personal suitability as bOlTowers. This, 
more complex process, exacerbated by the growing size of building societies, necessitated the 
growth of professional arbiters of member's conflicting interests. Assessments as to the security 
of an investment, that is the character and financial status of a proposed bOlTower, operated 
under the ambit and determination of a wealthy, managerial strata utilising an increasingly 
homogenised and discriminatory criteria. As it tended to be the middle class that were investor 
members and the working class that were bOlTower members, by favouring the interests of 
investor, societies were favouring the interests of the middles class. This class division was 
exacerbated by the fact that the required qualified actuaries and managers were drawn from the 
middle class, particularly in respect of the largest of building societies, which were permanent 
societies. So, as the pe1manent system quickly replaced the terminating system it increasingly 
sidelined the interests of less wealthy members. 
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The Legality of Building Societies 
The Pre-legislative Position 
Building societies operated for over sixty years without any legislation specifically designed for 
their usage, their internal organisation proscribed by the members rather than by legislation. 
Despite this, most building societies organised themselves in a fairly similar manner. Although 
there were many differences in the cost of subscriptions, methods of allocating property and 
penalties for defaulting members, societies operated under a system whereby members received 
equal benefits for equal contributions and once all members had been allocated housing, the 
society was tenninated. However, the absence of legislation placed a question mark over their 
legality. Some building societies, as previously noted, registered themselves as friendly societies 
under the 1793 Act. It is unceliain if this did anything to improve their legitimacy as this 
legislation was designed for societies to raise funds to relieve poverty caused by unemployment, 
death or illness. Furthennore, the ambivalent legality of building societies was further 
exacerbated by the Bubble Act of 1720. 
The speculative nature of shares that boomed in the early part of the eighteenth century caused a 
national economic crash when the financial 'bubble' created by massive share speculation in the 
South Sea Company (purportedly operating profitably in the South Seas), finally burst. In 
response to this economic catastrophe the Bubble Act that was passed in 1720, to protect the 
South Sea Company, was retained for nearly 105 yearslOI. The Bubble Act prohibited the raising 
capital from freely transferable stock, without permission from Crown or Parliament in the fonn 
101 The directors of the South Sea Company were concemed that the general popularity of shares 
would undern1ine their market position, so a government that was entirely bound up with the 
company's fraudulent activities, were happy to pass this protectionist legislation. 
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of a Charter or an Act of Parliament. 
Problematically, building societies operated by allocating shares to its members through 
subscriptions, (shares that could be transferred in many cases) and they did so without obtaining 
a Charter or an Act of Parliament. Predictably, this question was raised in court and in 1812 the 
question of whether the Bubble Act applied to the activities of Building Societies was 
answered. I 02 In this case, the defendant sought to establish the illegitimacy of building societies 
in order to avoid his financial obligation as guarantor to a defaulting member of the Greenwich 
Union Building Society. The defense was mounted on two counts, firstly on the basis of the 
Bubble Act and secondly on the basis of restraint of trade as the building society employed 
paliicular tradesmen in the constmction of member's homes. On the first issue the defense 
argued that, 
The clubbing together of numbers of persons with transferable shares, even 
though limited, for the purpose of carrying on trade was one of tge very mischiefs 
intebded to be prevented by the Act: it is calculated to put down individual 
industry and competition which is most advantageous for the public. 103 
In response, the plaintiff argued that although the defendant was correct in stating that article 30 
of the society's constitution stated that, 'every member should have full power at all times to sell 
his shares privately and at what price he should think proper', this was subject to the proviso 
that, 'no person should be pemlitted to purchase any share until he should have been approved at 
a meeting of the said society by at least three-fourths of the members present' .104 As such, so-
called 'freely transferable shares' were subject to the approval of the majority and the comi 
102 Pratt v Hutchinson (1812) 15 East KB 51l. 
103 ibid p938 
104 ibid 
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found in favour for the plaintiff. In respect to the particular issue of restraint of trade the court 
stated that, as the employment of celiain tradesmen was subject to the approval of the 
membership, it could not constitute a subversion of market criteria. And, in respect to the broader 
issue of the legality of building societies per se, they established that the Bubble Act could only 
apply to those organisations that utilised the freely transferable share. The rules of the society 
provided for this restriction by stating that each member could sell his shares if, 
the purchase should be approved at a meeting of the society, and should on his 
admission, become a party to the original articles for there is nothing illegal per se 
in the general object or in the mode of executing it: nor is such limited power of 
transferable stock within the mischief of the Act. 105 
The decision in this case rested upon the mutuality of building societies that was, at this time, 
derived largely from their localised nature and upon member control over transferability of 
shares. In this, the decision drew from the precedent set by the judicial attitude to the Bubble Act 
and Deed of Settlement companies. 
Deed of Settlement companies operated under trustees, raising funds from individuals legally 
constructed as beneficiaries to the trust, and had became a popular method of circumventing the 
effects of the Bubble Act. A.B. Dubois argued that the Deed of Settlement Company became a 
legal device commonly utilised from the onset of statutory restrictions. lOG Members of these 
unincorporated companies agreed to be bound by the temlS of the deed that provided for the 
transferability of shares, subject to limited restrictions. The relationship between participants in 
Deed of Settlement Companies was said to exist in contract, thus, the doctrine of privity of 
105 ibid p939 
lOG A.B. Dubois (1938) The English Business Company After the Bubble Act 1720-1800, 
Columbia University. 
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contract further underpinned the non- transferable character of these investments. Likewise, 
building societies could base on argument in privity and, in addition to this, the internal 
restriction on transferability of investments meant that (in terms of the Bubble Act at least) they 
were not illegal organisations. Building societies had accidentally benefited from the successful 
attempts of larger businesses to continue trading in shares and, in so doing, their legitimacy in 
general was aclmowledged, latterly subject to the avoidance of 'illegal' activities under the 
Friendly Societies Act of 1834. However, it was not until some years later that Building 
Societies had legislation that specifically legitimated their activities. 
Legislation. 
In 1836 the Benefit Building Society Act was passed. However, although this Bill was passed to, 
'afford Encouragement and Protection to such Societies and the Property obtained therewith' / 07 
and whilst this bill acknowledged the existence of building societies amongst, 'the industrious 
classes', parliamentary records prior to 1836 indicate that there was little concern or lmowledge 
of building societies within contemporary governing bodies. The Bill was passed with no 
recorded debate and, perhaps for this reason, became subsequently renowned for the ambiguity 
of its drafting. 
Contained in nine short sections it made the following prOVlSlons. It made lawful the 
establishment of building societies and enabled them to take action against defaulting and 
fraudulent members by, 'such reasonable Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures upon the several 
107 The Benefit Building Societies Act 1936, the preamble 
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Members of any such society who shall offend any such rules,108 and exempted societies from 
the payment of stamp duty upon the transfer of shares. 109 In return for this legal protection 
societies were made subject to the laws pertaining to usury I 10 and were prohibited from investing 
in, 'any savings bank, or with the commissioners for the reduction of national debt'. III Building 
societies could now register as a specific form of fiiendly society with the Registrar for Friendly 
Societies. 
However, the modest but comprehensible provisions contained in most of the Act became 
confused by the provisions contained in section 4, when the expansion of the building society 
movement, stimulated by the freehold land movement, rapidly outgrew the intentions of the Act. 
Section 4 aimed to extend the provisions of the Friendly Society Acts of 10 GA. c.56. and 4&5 
WA.cAO of the Benefit Building Society Act. Quoted in full it stated, 
And it be further enacted, That all the Provisions of a certain Act made and passed 
in the Tenth Year of the Reign of His late majesty King George the FOUlih, 
entitled An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Friendly Societies, 
and also the Provisions of a certain other Act made and Passed in the Fourth and 
Fifth Years of the Reign of His present Majesty King William the Fourth entitled 
An Act to amend an Act of the Tenth Year of His late Majesty King George the 
FOUlih, to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Friendly Societies, so far as 
the same, or any Part thereof, may be applicable to the purpose of any Benefit 
Building Society, and to the framing, certifying, enrolling, and altering the Rules 
Thereof, shall extend and apply to such Benefit Building Society, and the Rules 
thereof, in such and the same Manner as if the Provisions of the said Acts had 
been herein expressly re-enacted. 
108 ibid section 1 
109 ibid section 8 
110 ibid section 2 
III ibid section 6 
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The vague and illogical nature of the phrase, 'so far as the same, or any part thereof left 
subsequent registrars unsure as to which parts of the two existing Friendly Societies Acts were to 
apply to building societies; the exemption from stamp duty was already expressly provided for in 
the 1836 Act. Attempts at resolution of these ambiguities in court only patily clarified the issue 
and registrars continued to adopt different definitions of its meaning. In the words of the Royal 
Commission report on Benefit Building Societies, 'the act so bristles throughout with doubts 
that, to use the words of a witness, 'almost every line of it' has had to be brought to the test of 
judicial interpretation' .112 These problems were further compounded by the passage of further 
Acts peliaining to friendly societies leaving the registrars ensure as to which Acts were to apply 
to building societies. Commissioners reported that, 
The three registrars have adopted each a different construction of the law, and 
have grounded a different practice upon it, so that if the registrar for England be 
right the registrar for Scotland must be wrong, and visa versa: the registrar for 
Scotland having indeed the merit of enforcing safety by combining the 
requirements which correspond to each conflicting construction. Hence it is 
doubted whether at the present day there is any valid registration since 1850. 113 
Fmihermore, 
The peculiarity both of the laws relating to benefit building societies and to loan 
societies is that they embody and keep alive, with respect to those bodies, certain 
provisions of old Acts relating to Friendly Societies which are extinct as to 
Friendly Societies themselves. 114 
Building societies, subject to the divergent interpretation of the registrars, operated under 
112 s.20 p9 Second Report of the Friendly Societies Commission on Friendly Societies, Pt 1 
RepOli of the Commissioners on Benefit Building Societies 
113 ibid s.19 
114 . +. 1 4 op CIt lomi 1 report p5 
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legislation that maintained many of the privileges and restrictions that friendly societies had 
ceased to enjoy. Operating under 10 geo.4.c.56.s5 building societies maintained a right of appeal 
to the justices in the event of the registrar's refusal to certify all or some of the rules submitted to 
him but friendly societies had lost this right under 18&19 Vict. C.63. The formalities required in 
order to alter or repeal rules in building societies applied generally to all, but for friendly 
societies the procedure was set in the individual rules of a society under s.25 of the 18&19 
Vict.c63 s.3. Similarly, the procedure for appointment of members to the committee in a friendly 
society was set in their patiicular rules, whereas in building societies, procedure was generally 
proscribed by section.12 of 10.Geo 4, c.56. Distribution of estates of building society members 
dying intestate could be distributed to the next of kin if the sum did not exceed £20. The sum in 
friendly societies was set at £50. 115 The Commission concluded that building societies in their 
present form were, 'nothing but a friendly society of a pattern now obsolete'. 116 In particular, 
they were concerned with the lack of regulation in the form of 'yearly returns to a public office'. 
Once registered, a building society was relatively independent, although registration itself was 
often subject to dispute. 
The Building Societies Act of 1874 sought to redress some of these disparities and to 
acknowledge the specific developments in the building society movement itself. Section 5 
distinguished and defined a tenninating society from a permanent and section 9 underlined the 
growing separation of the organisation from the members by determining that incorporation was 
the direct result of registration, so that, 
Every society now subsisting or hereafter established shall, upon receIVmg a 
certificate of incorporation under this Act, become a body corporate by its 
registered name, having perpetual success, until terminated or dissolved in 
115 18&19Victc.63 
116 op cit Fomih Report pI 0 
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maimer herein provided, and a common seal. 117 
Individualised members now had an individual relationship with a distinct entity, the building 
society. For the borrowing member this was determined over an agreed fixed period which 
would be considerably longer than that prescribed for investing members. Investing members 
retained a relationship with the society if it continued to serve their economic interests to do so. 
Cmcially, the new societies were not made up of members and indistinguishable from the 
membership, they were distinct entities that mediated the financial interests between borrowing 
and investing members. 
With the exception of those societies already in existence I 18, members of societies that failed to 
register would be personally liable for, 'every day business is carried on'. 119 Under the same 
section, officers of registered societies that exceeded amounts in loans and deposits proscribed 
by the Act would be personally liable for the amount loaned in excess of this sum. Furthermore, 
the falsification of accounts could result in a summary conviction upon complaint by the 
registrar. 
But, provided that societies were established for purposes proscribed by section 13 and the mles 
of the society were set out in the terms proscribed by section 16 (pertaining to the way in which 
funds were raised, withdrawn, the alteration of mles, aUditing, members meetings, powers of 
directors, penalties for members and the procedure for termination of the society), the registrar 
was obliged to register them. This set aside the discretion that previous registrars had exercised. 
117 Building Societies Act 1874 section 9 
118 ibid section.8 
119 ibid section 46 
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The regulation of a building society's finances was provided for in the following sections. Under 
section 15, societies could borrow money not exceeding two thirds of the amount secured by 
mortgages. And, officers in charge of money were required to give security to the society, 'in 
such sums as the society require, conditioned for rendering a just and tme account of all moneys 
received and paid by him on account of the society'. 120 Under section 31, persons receiving 
funds by false representation would be liable on summary conviction to a fine of up to £20. 
Amalgamations of societies were pennitted under section 33, if three qUaIiers of the members 
holding two thirds of the shares, voted in favour, the same number being required for the 
dissolution of a society.121 Under section 34, disputes were to resolved by arbitration and the 
decision of the arbitrator was to be final. J22 Societies were required to compile accurate annual 
accounts for its members under section 40 while under section 44, the state held the right to 
check these accounts, 'make regulations respecting the fees, if any, to be paid for the 
transmission, registration, and inspection of documents under this Act, and generally for carrying 
this Act into effect'. 
The broad aim of the Act appears to have been the provision of a framework for the regulation of 
building societies as distinct financial institutions and to facilitate the monitoring of their 
activities whilst allowing them ceIiain freedoms in their internal organisation. However, 
legislation was quite clearly intended to maintain building societies as socially useful 
organisations that facilitated the respectable activities of working people. Thus, unlike the 
commercial company, whose activities had been extensively liberated in legislation such as the 
Limited Liability Act 1855 and the Companies Act 1862, the activities of building societies were 
120 ibid section 23 
121 ibid section 32 
122 ibid section 36 
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heavily prescribed. 
However, as this thesis contends in the following chapter, the early legislation did little to control 
the activities of the directors since legislation did not counter the numerical power that larger 
societies could enjoy. With the growth in size of societies, and the emergence of a managerial 
strata, much of the freedoms incorporated in the Act were left in the hands of professional 
managers. This led to a number of notable financial scandals following the passage of the 1874 
Act and was, in pmi, responsible for the emergence of more proscriptive legislation which 
increased the powers of the registrar and required high degrees of security for moneys advanced 
to bOlTowing members. It also led to enhanced self- regulation, in the form of an empowered 
trade association for building societies which, in tum, was partly responsible for the 
centralisation of power and the emasculation of mutuality. The following century would see the 
nature of mutuality fmiher reconstituted under the influence of number of conflicting and 
complimentary factors. These factors enhanced external controls over building society activities 
in the fonn of legislation and case law, aspects of increased internal control over building society 
activities resulting from the centralisation of building society funds and the centralisation of 
policy decision emanating from the Building Society Association. 
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Chapter 2 
Fron1 Expansion to Centralisation: The Political Construction of Building Societies 
1. Introduction 
2. The Building Society Association 
3. Elitism and the Building Society Protection Society 
4. Building Societies: The Avoidance of Commercialism 
5. Depression and Laissez-faire: The Registered Company v The Building Society 
6. Conclusion 
Table A: The Growth of Building Societies from 1895-1988. 
Number of Societies Total assets in No.of Savers Borrowers 
£ Millions in 1,000s in 1,000s 
1895 * 2442 45 625 not available(na) 
1890 2,286 60 600 na 
1920 1,271 87 700 na 
1950 819 1,256 1,500 1,500 
1970 481 10,819 10,900 3.700 
1988 131 188,844 48,100 7,400 
Sources: Successive Annual Reports of Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies of BSC. 
* 1895 statistic from M.Boleat. 
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Introduction 
Following the passage of the 1874 Building Society Act, the building society movement 
continued to expand, for the most part, under the legal fmID of a pelIDanent society. Notable in 
this expansion, as Table A above indicates, was the attendant centralisation of finance and power 
within the movement, as the number of building societies decreased whilst the money invested 
and borrowed increased. This centralisation resulted from two main factors. Firstly, finance 
became centralised as building societies tended to amalgamate, smaller societies becoming less 
usual and terminating societies reaching their designated aims. Secondly, control became more 
centralised as the building society movement developed and adopted a single central advisory 
organisation, now known as the Building Society Association, which increasingly came to 
dictate policy for almost all societies. 
These developments had a fundamental effect on the nature of mutuality. Firstly, the individual 
power of a member was diminished as building societies increased in size, and the value of an 
individual vote became diluted. FurthelIDore, the centralised control exercised by the BSA meant 
that major decisions regarding local societies were taken at a national level by an increasingly 
small, but powerful group. This meant that although the 'one member one vote' aspect of 
mutuality remained, in the context of the developments outlined above it could no longer 
function as a method of empowering members. One vote, in the context of a society of 
thousands, had little effect, allowing control by the BSA to prevail unchallenged. 
The second major development in this period emerged from a governmental and judicial policy 
of constructing building societies as a social institution that existed for the worthy purpose of 
integrating the 'industrious classes' into the norms of a commodity-dominated society. To this 
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end, legislation was increasingly concerned to control the extent of the activities in which a 
building society could engage and to ensure extensive monitoring. Complimenting this 
perspective, the courts consistently treated building societies to stricter interpretations of the law 
than that applied to their commercial counterpart, the limited company. In this way, statute and 
common law operated to artificially construct the notion of mutuality as implying membership of 
a prudent and highly regulated and therefore safe financial institution 
The purpose of this chapter is to more fully examine the centralisation of power following the 
1874 Building Societies Act with reference to the Building Society Association. It will then 
assess the proposition that building societies have been subject to politically determined 
governmental intervention and in contrast to the company, they were not considered to be merely 
a commercial institution, but rather, lying somewhere between the commercial and the social. 
This will be illustrated by comparing the law pertaining to building societies in respect of its 
powers and the duties of its directors, with that pertaining to companies. Finally, this chapter will 
assess the manner in which these factors lay much of the foundation for the demutualisation of 
building societies. 
The Building Society Association 
The Building Society Association was, in a previous incarnation known as the Building Societies 
Protection Association, the latter forn1ed in 1869 whilst the former reformed with enhanced 
powers in 1936. The Building Society Association was established as a trade association for 
building societies, informing and advising its members on such issues as economic and 
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legislative changes. 
HistoriGally, the emergence of one single organisation representing the estimated 4,000 building 
societies (of hugely varying sizes) in 1869, seems to have derived from a series of events that 
threatened the privileges that building societies enjoyed over other financial organisations. The 
collective response of a number of grOlWs to these threats, (activists largely derived from the 
larger freehold land societies), led to their gradual consolidation into one organisation that began 
its life agitating for the radical refOlIDs that led to the 1874 Act, previously noted. 
The single issue that consistently exercised the societies was that of stamp duty, a problem that 
arose from the notoriously vague wording sA of the 1936 Act, which stated that the provisions of 
the Friendly Acts were to be utilised by Benefit Building Societies when applicable. 1 An earlier 
Friendly Societies Act stated that friendly societies were exempted from stamp duty on all of its 
business documents.2 The umesolved question for building societies was therefore whether or 
not they were likewise exempt. The ongoing campaigning for this privilege led to the formation 
of a number of groups. 
In his account of the campaign for stamp duty exemption, Cleary notes that a committee 
representing six Bowkett societies was formed but ceased activity after a year as it could not, at 
this point in the movement's history, gain the support of societies outside of London. More 
successful was the Building Society Institute that fonned in 1848 and could communicate to 
building society members through The National. The Institute championed a bill to amend the 
1836 Act, an issue which galvanised much support from diverse societies and persons, including 
1 Noted in chapter 1 
2 1829 Friendly Societies Act clause 37 
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the influential registrar Tidd Pratt. When, finally, the issue of applicability was resolved in the 
cOUlis3 the Institute continued to meet and 'continued to act as arbiter and advisor on matters of 
professional practice' .4 So when, in 1855, the government made one its most serious offensives 
against the building societies' exemption from stamp duty, building societies responded 
immediately, as an organisation. The particulars of this offensive were as follows. The 
government introduced an amendment to a Bill peliaining to Friendly Societies to the effect that 
building societies would have had their exemption from stamp duty removed.5 The government 
and the treasury expressed the view that building societies no longer represented the interests of 
the poor and could therefore no longer be viewed under the same tenns as friendly societies. 
Building societies, it was argued, were merely vehicles for the rich and stamp duty exemption 
was nothing short of defrauding the treasury. 
In the Binningham area, James Taylor's building societies began orgamsmg following 
infonnation from their MP, Mr Scholefield.6 Likewise, in Liverpool a number of societies 
formed the Building Society Protection Association while in London many societies organised 
under James Higham. Whether as a result of the activities of these organizations, or because of 
the intrinsic paternalism of the House of Lords, the latter struck out clause 13. However, the 
societies had seen and would continue to see the importance of political representation and the 
ease with which a central organisation could achieve this. 7 
3 Walker v Giles (1849) 18 L.J.N.S.,CP.330 
4 Cleary, J (1965) "The Building Society Movement" Elek Books p83 
5 Amendment to 1855 Friendly Societies Act clausel3 
6 Mr Scholefield had been chainnan of the Freeholdland society and had tried to have the 
offending amendment clause in the Friendly Societies Bill removed, but was defeated.(Hansard 
1855 
7 The government made several attempts to remove stamp duty exemption, namely the Money 
Bill in 1855, One of 36 resolutions from Gladstone, and Clause 10 of the Inland Revenue Bill 
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So, in 1869, after 14 years of sporadic activity from the aforementioned organisations, the 
Liverpool Association and the London group agreed to form a single permanent organisation that 
would eventually represent the whole of the building society movement. Led by the more 
powerful London groups under the chairmanship of James Higham it was named the Building 
Societies Protection Association. Its rise to being de facto central organisation of building 
societies derived from its activity in the movement for reform of building society legislation, 
activity that resulted in the passage of the 1874 Building Society Act. In this, it was aided by its 
joumal and mouth-piece, The Building Society Gazette which began publication in 1870 and 
provided a central, popular forum and mode of communication to those in the building society 
movement. 
These are the events leading up the to fOlmation of the Building Societies Protection 
Association. However, it was the values that it, and its pUblication, The Gazette came to 
represent, that modified and to a great extent destroyed the original character of mutuality. 
Elitism and the BSP A 
From its inception the Gazette testified to the unashamed elitism of the BSP A. Whether 
discussing building society management or the manner in which poorer members should be 
treated, it readily displayed just how far the building society movement was removed from the 
industrious classes that made up the majority of its membership. In a discussion on the policies 
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to be adopted when a survey was conducted for the purpose of securing an advance, the 
sensibilities of richer members were considered to be of greater importance than poorer 
members, 
So long as the operations of a Building Society are confined to the making of 
advances upon inferior property it may be a matter of little moment whether the 
privacy of the tenants is invaded by one or two eight or ten persons, visiting for 
the purpose of a survey but the case is very different when proposals are received 
upon a better class of property........ It need hardly be contended that as Building 
Societies advance to a higher class of business than was originally contemplated, 
it is impOliant to avoid everything in their working arrangements that may prove 
offensive or annoying. 8 
On the issue of the management of societies, views varied from an attempt to justify elitism on 
sound business grounds to undisguised snobbery. 
On the first point, 
As the society grew older a large proportion of such men would, in the natural 
order of things, be eliminated from its membership, and thus the management 
would fall more and more into the hands of men who lacked the necessary 
knowledge and judgment for the safe conduct of its affairs and who belong 
exclusively to the borrowing class, had nothing to lose, and to their own sanguine 
expectations, everything to gain, by a policy which appeared at one state, to 
cancel shares standing as claims against the society and to increase the assets 
available for bringing it to an early termination.9 
And on the second, 
In some few cases it is true that the rules appear to be fOlmed upon the 
8 Building Society Gazette No.IS p36 
9 p8 Directory and Handbook of Building and Freehold Land Societies (1873) London Office of 
'The Building Society Gazette' Chancery Lane 
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assumption that all men are equally qualified for the responsibilities and equally 
entitled to the dignities of office. And every shareholder is consequently permitted 
or compelled in tum to act as committee man or director; but, excepting societies 
of the smallest class, assuming rather the character of local clubs than of 
impOliant financial institutions, any such haphazard theory of management must 
be dismissed as unworthy of serious discussion. The member selected for this 
responsible office should a man of good business character, of good practical 
common sense and of sound and calm judgement. 10 
Or more succinctly, 
It is unquestionably desirable to have men of commanding social position, and of 
. fi . I 11 extensIve mancia resource. 
With the social bias of BSA policy in place, it only remained for it to consolidate and centralize 
its power to spread these policies throughout the whole of the building society movement. This 
was achieved most notably in the interventionist decades between 1939 and 1980. 
During economic depression of the 1930s the lack of demand for money led to increasingly low 
interest rates. This increased competition between building societies for bOlTowing members on 
whom they relied in order to pay high interest rates to lending members. The BSA responded to 
the impending economic ruin of many of the less competitive societies by annihilating 
competition itself. This was achieved by a policy of recommending interest rates, to which all 
member societies, were obliged to adhere. 
This policy and power continued unabated for many decades and it was not until the late 1970s 
that the BSA found itself under much scrutiny. Following two major govemment reviews, the 
BSA found itself criticised for centralising power and for engaging in oligargic policies. On the 
10 The Building Society Gazette No.18-1870 
11 BSA Gazette, No.17. Vol. 9 May 1st 1870 
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first point, the constitution of the BSA was highly undemocratic. In 1983 its membership 
consisted of representatives from the ten largest societies. Of the representatives who made up 
the membership, four were co-opted onto the council, and these were drawn from the five largest 
societies represented in the BSA. These five held 50% of all the capital of the entire industry and 
the two largest held 33% of the whole. 12 The chairnlan of the BSA was (and still is) drawn from 
the largest building society. In other words the largest societies controlled policy in respect of all 
of the others. 13 
Furthel1l1ore, the managers and directors of building societies were, in the view of many on the 
left of the political spectmm, allowed to operate with no regard to the interests of members and 
in an unchecked and self-serving fashion. For example, in Paul Barnes's book The Myth of 
Mutuality, he argued that building society managers were dominated by managerial goals like 
personal prestige, job security, status symbols and empire building. He argued that managers 
tended to focus upon, 'the non-profit goals of interest groups', and made 'investment beyond 
those required for the nornlal operation of the film'. 14 Indeed, he argued, far from being 
concerned with profit maximisation, managers viewed profit as, 'the basic constraint subject to 
which other goals may be followed'. 15 
Barnes argued that a clear example of 'non-profit goals' was the empire building practice of 
establishing mmecessarily large numbers of building society branches. In analysing the 
unjustifiably high operational costs of building societies he concluded that in opening branches, 
managers were not motivated by rational business concerns unless financially constrained to do 
12 P.Barnes (1984) "The Myth of Mutuality" Pluto Press p44 
13 All but 0.1 % of building societies were affiliated to the BSA. 
14 ibid p45 
15 ibid 
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so. 
For example, he argued, in 1978, smaller building societies l6, on average spent 76.7p per £100 of 
assets on operational costs compared to the operational costs of medium-sized societies l7 that on 
average spent 100.8p per £100 of assets on such costs, the fonner working under tighter 
budgetary constraints. Fmihennore, Barnes argued that the lack of unifonnity in spending on 
operational costs, across the board, indicated the high degree of discretionary power allowed to 
managers. 
Concurring with this view, Christopher Hird argued that there was little inducement for 
managers to encourage member's intervention as the fonner enjoyed enormous power over large 
financial institutions. 18 Furthermore, he argued, if a member's intervention became noticeable or 
effective, he or she was quickly co-opted onto the board. 
On the second point, the BSA's policy of 'advising' societies on interest rates adopted in 1939, 
created an infornlal cartel. As Barnes put it 'finns will collude to fix prices- whether in the sense 
of a fornlally constructed cartel, through an infonned agreement in a smoke- filled room or 
simply by a tacit agreement to follow the leader' .19 And, as an earlier government committee 
testified, the artificial rate of interest created by the BSA had the effect of supporting inefficient 
finns and allowing larger, more efficient films to reap super- profits.20 
16 Defined as those with less than £3,711 million of assets 
17 Defined as those with less that £14,278 million of assets 
18 C. Hird (1997) 'Stakeholding and Building Societies' New Left Review 
19 op cite Barnes p34. Barnes was reflecting the view of the 1966 command paper cited below 
20 CmD 3136 HMSO 1966 
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Furthermore, the BSA was highly protective of its powers, dealing harshly with members that 
took business decisions that it (the BSA) had not prescribed. The enforced closure of the New 
Cross Building Society in 1984, following a decision by the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies 
is a case in point. In 1974, Ted Roland became New Cross's chief executive and embarked on 
some radical departures from the standard practices 'advised' by the BSA. Firstly, the New Cross 
operated with low management costs, employing just 90 people although during the period 
between 1975 and 1983 its assets rose from £6million to £120 million.21 Secondly, three quarters 
of the society's funds were raised outside their small number of branches. Instead, sales of 
mortgages were undertaken by a mortgage marketing team and by insurance salesmen. Thirdly, 
and perhaps most significantly, in March 1993 it took advantage of the generalised sluggish 
nature of processing mOligage applications (a situation brought about because of the lack of 
inflow of funds to building societies) to put up interest rates by 2% for its larger and longer- term 
investors. This meant that it was able to increase inflows of investment and offer quick and easy 
mortgages at albeit greatly increased interest. It made this move, to its great personal advantage, 
outside the 'advice' of the BSA on the appropriate rate of interest. Fourthly, and as a result of 
the products it was able to offer, its customer base was not that of the traditional building 
societies. As the Financial Times reported, 
Few struggling first-time buyers or any other favourites of building society 
folklore appeared on their mortgage books. Their borrowers included, they claim, 
international footballers, entertainers and two MP's who were lent amounts of up 
to pounds 100,000 each, often on properties they already owned. 22 
The Building Society Association responded in this way. A member of the BSA council 
21 Financial Times: "Downfall of a Heretic: Behind the New Cross Closure: Clive Wolman 21 
Jan 1984 p24 
22 ibid 24 
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contacted the auditors of New Cross, Dearden Farrow, and advised them to more carefully 
scrutinise the 1992-3 accounts. On doing so they found certain discrepancies relating to 'special 
advances'. Under the 1962 Building Societies Act only 10% of advances may fall under this 
category, defined as advances to commercial mortgages or mortgages over £37,500. In the New 
Cross's audits it became clear that this sum had been slightly exceeded. This circumstance arose 
because a number of mortgages of £37,500 had fallen into arrears thus increasing the amounts 
owed, teclmically putting such loans into the 'special advances' category. Although this 
discrepancy arose through a gray area of law and although there was no evidence of deliberately 
flaunting Building Society regulation, the Chief registrar, Mr Bridgeton, took the unprecedented 
step of issuing orders to close the New Cross. Fmihermore, he took this decision despite recent 
precedent to the contrary. For, as the Financial Times reported, 'in 1980, the Peckham Mutual 
Building Society made special advances of nearly double the permitted level, it was let off with a 
warning,.23 
Building Societies: The Avoidance of Commercialism 
Historical accounts of the political and legal controls over building societies have proceeded 
along a trajectory that precluded contextual explanations, assessing only those factors internal to 
the building society movement itself. Whilst this approach dissects a substantial proportion of 
relevant material, it is incapable of grasping the whole whorled rose of explanation. Assessed 
comparatively, it is possible to show that building societies were treated in a manner distinct 
from their more commercial cousins. The effect and the timing of the passage of the 1894 
Building Societies Act is a good example of this differential approach. 
23 ibid 
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The purpose of this section is to set out the account of the passage of the 1894 Act given in the 
classic texts of E.lCleary and Sir Herbert Ashworth. It will then go on to contextualise this 
account by assessing the political economy at this time and by comparing the building society 
with the limited company. 
Cleary's account of the 1894 Act, like most factual accounts, begins with the Liberator Society. 
The Liberator Society was founded in 1868 and under the direction of its vice president, Robert 
Balfour, was, by 1890, the largest building society in Britain. One of the principal reasons for its 
rapid success was the social connections of Balfour, whose father was president of the 
Temperance Society. This was one of the central organisations in the non- conformist movement, 
which accounted for over half of churchgoers, in this period. As well as conveying respectable 
connotations, Balfour actively used church ministers as commissioned agents for the Liberator.24 
As Cleary notes, in the twenty-four years in which the Liberator operated it paid out £140,000 in 
commission alone.25 Fmihelmore, 'agents were well armed with persuasive literature and, in 
comparison with most societies, press adveliising was considerable' .26 
The business of the Liberator was largely characterised by large advances to a small number of 
property developers engaged in the constmction of luxury apartments and managed by Balfour. 
Its main customer was lW.Hobbs & Company, a company managed by Balfour and found, upon 
liquidation of the Liberator, to have been advanced £2,099,000 out of total advances from the 
Liberator of £3,423,000. 27 The Liberator became financially unstable when it could not raise 
24 op cit Cleary p 141 
25 ibid 
26 ibid 
27 ibidp142 
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sufficient funds to pay for the mortgages that the property companies required in order to pay for 
the properties sold, sometimes directly, by Balfour himself, at vastly inflated prices. They could 
not do this, and pay dividends from non-existent profits without borrowing still more money 
from the society. Balfour attempted to keep the Liberator afloat by raising money on existing 
mortgages by granting second or third mortgages. When one of Balfour's companies, the London 
and General Banle suspended payments and members seeking to withdraw their investments 
could not be repaid, confidence in the viability of the society swiftly dissipated. The numbers of 
anxious investors increased and the society was compulsorily wound up owing over £3,000,000. 
The Liberator's crash, according to these accounts, gave rise to the 1894 Act, which prohibited 
the granting of second mOligages and strengthened the powers of the registrar. It empowered the 
registrar to have the books of a society inspected following a number of different events; and, 
under section 4 of Act the registrar could appoint an actuary or accountant to inspect the books, 
following an application by at least ten members who had been members for at least twelve 
months proceeding the application and who had agreed to fund the costs of the inspection. 
Altematively, under section 5 (1) a registrar could order an inspection following an application 
of one tenth of the membership, the costs to be bome by the applicants or the society as a whole; 
or, the registrar could order an inspection without an application by the members if the society 
has failed to make any return required by the Building Societies Act;28 or where three members 
of the society had made a statutory declaration that persuaded the registrar that such an 
investigation was required.29 
If it appeared, after investigation, that the society would be unable to meet its obligations to its 
28 Building Societies Act 1894 section 5(5)(a) 
29 Building Societies Act 1894 section 5(5)(c)) 
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members and that, 'it would be in their benefit that it should be dissolved', the registrar could 
'award that the society be dissolved' . 30 Furthermore, the registrar could cancel the registration of 
the society if he was, 
satisfied that a certificate of incorporation had been obtained for a society under 
the Building Societies Acts by fraud or mistake, or that any such society exists for 
an illegal purpose, or has willfully after notice from the registrar violated any of 
the provisions of Building Societies Acts, or has ceased to exist.31 
Section 13 of the Act specifically prohibited advances on second mOligages and contravention of 
this prohibition would render the responsible directors, jointly and severally liable for any loss 
arising from the advance. More generally, the Act provided for a series of fines for officers of the 
society who did not conform to any rules on the retuming of documentation. 32 In addition, it 
provided that false information in any society document, willfully made would render those 
officers responsible liable for a fine of up to £50.33 Finally it stated that any official who 
received, 
any gift, bonus, commission, or benefit, shall be liable on summary conviction to 
a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, and, in default of payment, to be imprisoned 
with or without hard labour for any time not exceeding six months. 34 
These were extensive powers, designed to a great extent to counter the kind of activities that 
Balfour had engaged in. It is, however, the view of this thesis that the passage of this and other 
building society legislation cannot be explained by reference to building society history alone. 
30 Building Societies Act 1894 section 7(2) 
31 Building Societies Act 1894 section 6(1) 
32 Building Societies Act 1894 section 21 
33 Building Societies Act 1894 section 22 
34 Building Societies Act 1894 section 23 
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The government responded to the Liberator's crash with legislation that substantially increased 
the registrar's powers and introduced more punitive responses to a breach of director's duties 
when seen out of context, this would appear to be a natural response. However, when viewed in 
the context of the economy in general it is possible to see that this was not the typical 
governmental response to financial collapse generally. Indeed, the commercial world had been in 
crisis for over two decades before the passage of this Act. Britain and its European and American 
trading pminers had been in an economic slump since around 1873, and yet it had not been 
government policy to tighten controls over other constituent parts of the commercial world. 
Depression and Laissez-faire: The Registered Company v The Building Society 
Whilst historical opinion is mixed on the issue of the great depression: Karl Marx, explained it as 
a result of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall due to a shift toward capital-intensive methods 
of production away from labour-intensive methods,35 whilst others have denied there was ever an 
economic decline,36 statistics point to noticeable economic change. For example, Eric Hobsbawn 
notes that, 
21, 000 miles of American railroads collapsed into bankruptcy, Gelman share 
values fell by some 60 per cent between the peak of the boom and 1877 and-more 
to the point- almost half the blast-furnaces in the main iron producing countries of 
the world stopped.37 
35 The source of value according to social economists such as Marx, David Ricardo and Thomas 
Hodgeskin 
36 Such as S.B. Saul (1969) "The Myth of the Great Depression" 1873-1896 London 
37 Eric Hobsbawn (1975) "The Age of Capital" p46 Weidenfeld and Nicholson 
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However, far from responding to this with increased control over the commercial world, 
govermnent and judicial policy tended toward the opposite. For example, by 1897 the courts 
were extending the benefits of limited liability and corporate status to businesses that were 
effectively one man companies; involving one man who was the sole employee, sole director, 
sole secured creditor38 and virtually sole shareholder. As Lord MacNaughton famously noted, 
The company attains maturity on its bilih. There can be no period of minority- no 
interval of incapacity. I cannot understand how a body corporate thus made 
capable by statute can lose its individuality by issuing the bulle of its capital to one 
person, whether he be a subscriber to the memorandum or not. The company is at 
law a · different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; and, 
though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the way it was 
before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hand receives the profit, 
the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustees for them.39 
Furthermore, judicial attitudes to the duties owed by company directors softened throughout the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, as did the responsibilities of the company owners. Prior to 
the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act,40 companies, as previously noted were obliged to operate 
as Deed of Settlement Companies or gain an Act of Parliament or Chmier, in order to avoid the 
penalties of the Bubble Act. In Deed of Settlement Companies, directors were invariably trustees 
who held the title to the company for the beneficiaries, the shareholders. As trustees, directors 
owed a high level of care to the company and, as beneficial owners, shareholders had an interest 
in the companies assets but also (unless there was an agreement in the deed to the contrary) 
undeliook unlimited liability for the company's debts. 
The historical development of the company form, facilitated by legislation such as the Limited 
38 Later in the company's life Mr Broderip became a secured creditor. 
39 Salomon v Salomon & Co. (1897) AC 22 
40 7&8Victc.110&111 
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Liability Act 1855, continued throughout the period of economic depression. The evolution of 
the company had the effect of affording shareholders all the benefits of ownership without any of 
the responsibilities. 41 So, whilst the doctrine of separate corporate personality meant that the 
shareholder did not own the physical assets of the company, 'neither a shareholder nor a simple 
creditor of a company has any insurable interest in any particular asset of the company,42 they 
did own title to dividends and other residual rights of ownership such as voting rights. A 
shareholder remained the owner, by dint of owning a function of the company, that of making 
profits. 
This benefit (dividends) coupled with the maintenance of voting rights was now unhampered by 
the responsibility of personal liability for company debts. Likewise, now that the assets of the 
company were deemed to be owned by the company, title was vested in it and not in the 
directors. The directors could not, therefore, be capable of being trustees and so owed a lesser 
duty to the company, that of an agent. In addition to this, the judiciary translated this duty as 
being owed to the 'company', which was understood to mean shareholders as a whole43 . Making 
profits, the interests of the shareholders, was deemed to be of greater importance than the 
protection of company assets, that pOliion that protected creditors. 44 
Fmihennore in respect to the degree of care and skill a director was obliged to bring to bear upon 
41 Limited Liability Act (1855) 18 & 19 Vict c.133 
42 The view taken of shareholders ownership rights in Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd. 
[1925] AC 619. The process of separating company property from shareholder property was a 
process that began with large companies. By the end of the century this conception was regarded 
as correct regardless of the size of the company. 
43 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421 
44 As Farrar points O~lt the, "obligation to act bone fide in the interests of the company has been 
defined as an obligation to act in the interests of the shareholders." Farrar's Company Law 4th 
Edition p381 
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his duties, the judiciary were prepared to tolerate high levels of incompetence in the company 
directors. In assessing nineteenth century judgments, the comi held that the duty required from a 
director was not the common law duty of care of the reasonable man but was better described as 
an equitable duty, analogous to a trustee. In Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co. Ltd a 
director's duty was encompassed by three basic propositions.45 Firstly, a director was expected to 
exercise no greater care or skill than that expected from person of his knowledge and experience, 
a subjective test. Secondly, there was no requirement that a director should give his full time and 
attention to affairs of the company. And, thirdly, where management was properly delegated, a 
director was justified, in the absence of grounds for suspicion, in trusting an official to perform 
his duties honestly. Again, in Farrar it is noted that, 'the courts regarded directors as pleasant, if 
sometimes incompetent, amateurs who did not possess any particular executive skills and upon 
whom it would have been unreasonable to impose onerous standards of care and skill'. 46 
In contrast, the judiciary has tended toward a less liberalised attitude to the duties owed by a 
director to his building society although at first blush they may appear identical. Wurztburg, for 
example, maintains that there is no real distinct legal status for the building society director and 
that in general terms, 
The position of the directors of a building society is substantially the same as that 
of directors of an ordinary joint-stock trading company, that is to say, they are not 
trustees, but paid confidential agents, with very extensive powers selected to 
manage the affairs of the society for the benefit of themselves and other 
shareholders.47 
45 [1925] Ch 407 
46 op cit Farrar p392 
47 Wmizburg (1892) The Law Relating to Building Societies p92 2nd edition 
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Wurtzburg further argued that the description of a building society director's duties are properly 
described in the case of Faure Electric Accumulator CO,48 which in assessing the duties owed by 
a company director stated that, 
And, 
It is quite obvious that to apply to directors the strict rules of the court of chancery 
with respect to ordinary trustees might fetter their action to an extent which would 
be extremely disadvantages to the companies they represent.49 
Directors being in the position of agents50 for their company are bound, like any 
other agents, to use the same degree of diligence which persons of common 
prudence would use in their own affairs. 51 
However, although directors of building societies were similarly detached from the incorporated 
entity, the duty that they owed to the entity was greater because of the greater responsibilities 
attached to a prudential organisation. For example, in respect of liability for the payment of non 
existent profits to members by directors, the directors of building societies operated under a 
much more stringent regime. In a case bought by the Leeds Estate Building Society against one 
of its directors it was held that directors who pay dividends to themselves and shareholders out of 
illusory profits, on the basis of inaccurate balance sheets which they did not properly examine, 
were personally liable for the sums paid out and were required to recompense the society 
d· I 52 accor mg y. 
48 (1888) 40 Ch.D 
49 ibid pI5I 
50 The main reason for this description is that unlike a trustee, a manager of an incorporated 
company with a separate legal personality does not have title to company property vested in 
himself. Instead, title to company property, as previously noted, is vested in the company and no 
person involved in the company has any claim to the assets of the company until the company 
enters liquidation 
51 ibid Sir Horace Davey Q.C. 
52 Leeds Estate Building and Investment Co. v Shepherd, 36 Ch.D 787. 
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In contrast, the duty imposed on company directors was much less onerous, mainly due to the 
judicial tendency to interpret statute in a mmmer sympathetic to commercial directors. So, 
although directors during this period operated under some restrictions in respect of the payment 
of dividends, for example Clause 73 of table A stated that 'no dividend shall be payable except 
out of profits arising from the Business of the Company', this restriction was highly modified by 
the judiciary's liberal interpretation of profit. In an 1880 case, Lord J essel concluded that when 
assessing the legality of dividends, the court need not consider capital losses from previous 
years. In this case a tramway company had failed to maintain company assets, or to set aside a 
maintenance fund, notwithstanding that the articles stated that the directors should, 'before 
recommending a dividend, set aside out of the profits of the company ....... such sums as they 
think proper as a reserve fund for maintenance, repairs, depreciation, and renewals' .53 As a result 
of their failure to do so, an injunction was granted against the company's declaration of a 
dividend. In response, an action to dissolve the injunction was successfully brought to court by a 
preference shareholder where, importantly, the pertinent question for the court was not whether 
the value of the assets had diminished, or indeed whether the failure to observe the articles 
should be rectified, but, whether or not there were sufficient profits made that year to pay 
dividends. Ifthere were then a dividend could be paid. 
Likewise, in a case immediately proceeding the classic case Trevor v WhitwOlih which 
established the capital maintenance rule that a company could not buy back its own shares, the 
Court of Appeal stated that, 
it is entirely with the shareholders to decide whether the excess shall be divided 
53 Dent v London Tramways Company (1880) 16 Ch.D 344 quoted on p348 
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among them or set apart as a reserve fund for replacing assets, and the court has 
no power to intervene with their decision however foolish or imprudent it may 
be. 54 
Even in the context of the Trevor case, Lord Watson commented that, 'paid up capital may be 
diminished or lost in the course of trading, that is a result which no legislation can prevent' .55 For 
the Companies Act had made only one restriction, and that was that no dividend could be paid 
except out of profits. The protection of assets that might diminish in value in the pursuit of these 
profits was not within the ambit of the Company Acts, so, in Lee v Neutchatel Asphate Co. it 
was held that, 'there was nothing in the Companies Acts ..... to impose on the company any 
obligation to set apart a sinking fund to meet the depreciation in the value of a wasting 
product'. 56 Furtheml0re, it emphasised that the power to restore wasting assets lay not with the 
creditors, who relied on the assets as security, but with the shareholders, whose sole economic 
interest lay in dividends. The problems for creditors were further exacerbated by the court's 
failure to find an adequate definition of profit, making the funds designated available for the 
payment of dividends ultimately a movable feast. 57 This approach to accounting practice was not 
available to building societies as they were obliged to show an equal balance between liabilities 
and assets in order to adhere to the mutual principle. 
Further responsibilities placed upon building society managers included a statutory requirement 
to give security to the society for the monies they managed with their own personal funds. 
Every officer having receipt or charge of any money belonging to the society 
must, before taking upon himself the execution of his office, become bound with 
54 Lee v Neuchatel Asphate Co. (1889) 41 Ch D 1 quoted on plO 
55 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 
56 Lee v Neuchatel Asphate ibid pI 
57 Joseph Weiner (1918) "The Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: The English Cases" 
Columbia Law Review 
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one sufficient surety at the least, in a bond according to the form below or give 
the security of a guarantee society, or such .other security of a guarantee society, 
or such security as the society direct, in such sum as the society require, 
conditioned for rendering a just and true account of all moneys received and paid 
by him on account of the society, at such times as its rules appoint, or as the 
society require him to do. 58 
Failure to comply would make directors, 'clearly liable for any loss resulting from its non 
performance'. 59 As Wurtzburg noted, upon demand, all officers were to account to the board and 
pay over 'all moneys remaining in his hands; deliver all securities and effects, books, papers, and 
property of the society in his hands or custody, to such person as the society appoint'. 60 An 
officer who failed to comply with such a request could be sued by the society upon the bond or it 
could apply to the county court to make an order against him, against which there was no appeal. 
Furthermore, a dismissed officer could be ordered to retum any society property regardless of 
whether the dismissal was wrongful and against which there was no appeal. Intemal to the 
building society movement, as previously noted, the Building Society Association required its 
managers to be men of upstanding social position and to be of financial substance. 
Other extrinsic influences which contributed the greater controls placed over building society 
directors included the strict application of the ultra vires rule. For instance, the statutory object 
of a building society, that of making advances to members secured upon freehold or leasehold 
from funds raised from investing members, remained unchanged for over one hundred years. A 
society was bound to these objects and was prohibited from extending its business by making 
changes to its own rules or by any other method. 61 In POlisea Island Building Society v 
58 Building Societies Act 1874 section 23 
59 Evans v Coventry 8 De G.M. & G. 835; L.J.ChAOO 
60 Wmizburg ibid p88 
61 Murray v Scott (1884) 9 App. Cas. 519 
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Barclay,62 the society' directors made a further advance to an existing mortgagee by applying to 
an insurance company for a loan and then paying this sum to the borrowing member in 
consideration for the conveyance of the mortgaged property to the society. The society agreed to 
postpone their own mortgage to the insurance company's rights and the deeds to the mortgaged 
propeliy were deposited with the insurance company as security for the loan. The member then 
used the loan to repay part of the original mortgage. The rules of the society forbid any advance 
on an equity of redemption but authorised the directors to release part of any mortgaged property 
if it was satisfied that the remainder was sufficient security for the loan. The court held the 
transaction to be ultra vires and void. Any depmiure from the objects of a society instigated or 
allowed by the directors would be a breach of duty and would render them liable for any loss that 
might result.63 
Statutory and common-law restrictions meant that there was little room for extending the 
societies' capacity thereby limiting the situations when an ultra vires act might arise. In contrast, 
the ultra vires rule in relation to companies, though strictly applied in the early cases become 
increasingly loosened. For example, in Ashbury Railway Carriage & hon Co v Riche,64 a 
company incorporated under the Companies Act 1862 stated as its objects 'to make, sell, lend or 
hire, railway carriages, wagons plant machinery etc,.65 Whilst Clause 4 provided that 'an 
extension of the company business beyond or for other than the objects or purposes expressed or 
implied in the memorandum of association shall take place only in pursuance of a special 
resolution'. The House of Lords declared a contract to finance the construction of a Railway in 
Belgium to be ultra vires and void. FurthelIDore, it stated that ratification would have been 
62 (1894) 3 Ch.861 
63 Culleme v London and Suburban General Permanent Building Society (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 485 
64 1875 LR 7 HL 653 
65 Clause 3 of the memorandum 
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ineffective and incapable of rendering the company able to do something that wasn' t strictly in 
the ambit ofthe objects. 
Where a company is formed on the principle of having the liability of its members 
limited to the amount unpaid on their shares ...... the memorandum of association 
shall contain ..... the objects for which the proposed company is to be 
established ..... and the existence and the coming into existence, of the company is 
to be an existence and to be a coming into existence for those objects and for 
those objects alone. 66 
However, just five years later the comis began to take a more lenient view. In A-G v Great 
Eastem Railway Co. 67, a company incorporated by statute to acquire two existing railway 
companies and to construct another, wanted to hire locomotives and stock to another company. 
The court decided that this contract would not be ultra vires as it was reasonably incidental to the 
main objects. 
Later, the judiciary began to take a more lenient attitude to the construction of the objects clause. 
Whilst in an earlier case68 the comi declared that a company had failed to achieve the business 
for which it was incorporated by reason that it not attained one of the clauses (upon which all the 
other objects were said to be ancillary), by 1918 the comis accepted a clause making each 
separate object in each sub-clause an equal and independent object. 69 
66 op cit judgment p665 
67 (1880) 5 App Cas 4731 
68 Re Gennan Date Coffee Company. (1882) ch20 169 
69 Cotman v Brougham (1918) AC 514 Essequibo, was a rubber company with a long objects 
clause that ended with a clause that the objects should not be restrictively construed and that each 
paragraph should be regarded as conferring a separate and independent object. Each clause was 
held to be substantive and not subsidiary to the obj ect. It underwrote an issue of shares from an 
asphalt company. Later, when both companies were in liquidation the liquidator sought an 
application to render the transaction ultra vires. The court said that the validity of the clause 
could be upheld, it was not ultra vires and the memorandum had been conectly compiled and 
should be construed literally. 
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By the 1960s the comis went as far as to accept the validity of a subjective objects clause. In Bell 
Houses Ltd v City Wall Properties Ltd, the cOUli upheld the validity of a clause that empowered 
the plaintiff company to, 
calTY on any other trade or business whatsoever which can, in the opinion of the 
board of directors, be advantageously calTied on by the company in connection 
with or as ancillary to any of the above businesses of the general business of the 
company.70 
Fmihermore, despite judicial antipathy to companies making non-commercial payments, 
famously encompassed in the statement that, 'there shall be no cakes and ale except such as are 
required for the benefit of the company', it developed an increasingly tolerant attitude to 
gratuitous payments. 71 Firstly, the courts upheld payments that were bone fide for the benefit of 
the company and reasonably incidental to the business, where there was an express clause 
allowing the company to make gifts. In Evans v Brunner Mond & CO.72 the plaintiff, a 
shareholder, challenged the decision of the company to distribute to universities and scientific 
institutions the sum of £100,000 in furtherance of scientific education. A resolution authorising 
this distribution had been passed by an ovelwhelming majority of shareholders, however, he 
argued that the motion instituted an activity that was not incidental to the company's business 
and was not for the benefit of the company. He argued that the rightful beneficiaries of the 
money would only benefit to a very small degree whilst the cost of the gift to the company was 
very great. The cOlui, however, upheld the gift saying that as the company was, 
in constant need of a reserve of scientifically trained men for the purposes of its 
70 (1966) 1 QB 207 
71 Hutton v West Cork Ry Co. (1883) 23 Ch.D 654 
72 (1921) 1 Ch 359 
109 
business- and the business cannot be maintained if the supply of such men is 
deficient- that a deficiency is almost inevitable unless substantial inducements are 
fOlihcoming to attract men to scientific study and research men to scientific study 
and research- that the best agencies for directing these studies are well equipped 
. " 73 
ulllversl tIes. 
Later, the courts showed even greater latitude by allowing a payment that was not necessarily 
incidental to the company's business or for the benefit of the company, on the basis that non-
commercial clauses would be upheld. 74 
In all areas of commercialism, laissez fa ire was the modus operandi. As Eric Hobsbawn noted, 
'the fonnation of business companies now became both considerably easier and independent of 
bureaucratic control. ........ Commerciallaw was adapted to the prevailing atmosphere of buoyant 
business expansion'. In order to further enhance business expansionism the stringent laws 
against usury were dropped in Britain, Holland, Belgium and North Gennany between the years 
of 1854 and 1867. Likewise, 'the strict control which governments exercised over mining -
including actual operations of mines- was virtually withdrawn ...... so that.... any entrepreneur 
could claim the right to exploit any minerals he found' .75 In order to enhance a freer market in 
labour, the Master and Servant Acts were repealed in 1875 as was the 'annual bond' of the 
North76 so that, 'in between 1867 and 1875 all significant legal obstacles to trade unions and the 
right to strike were abolished with remarkably little fuss'. 77 
In contrast, as this thesis has demonstrated, the political and judicial attitude to building societies 
73 ibid p369 
74 Re Horsley & Weight Ltd (1982) 3 All ER 1045 
75 Eric Hobsbawn "The Age of Capital 1848-1875" (1975) p37 
76 Applicable to miners in the NOlih. This was replaced by a standard employment contract, 
tenninable on both sides. 
77 ibid p37 
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was quite distinctly non laissez-faire. This was partly due, as has been argued, to the desire to 
maintain and control institutions that so readily attracted the independent 'industrious classes', 
and incorporated them into mainstream society, a view consistently evidenced by the 
commIssIOners m the 1870's. Integral to this approach has been ensuring the security of 
investments in societies and much of the emphasis of building society legislation has attempted 
to achieve this. So, for example, the Building Societies Act 1939 prohibited advances made on 
securities that were not of a class specified in Part 1 of the Schedule to the Act, that is, advances 
made on freehold or leasehold 1and.78 And, under section 6 of the Act, such advances were to be 
repaid over a period not exceeding twenty-three years. Directors were under a duty to ensure that 
adequate measures had been taken to ascertain the proper valuation of property upon which a 
mOligage would be advanced and the test of competency in this case was objective. A director 
should ensure that, 
the arrangements made for assessing the adequacy of a security to be taken in 
respect of advances to be made by the society are such as may reasonably be 
expected to ensure the adequacy of any security to be so taken will be assessed by 
a competent and prudent person, experienced in matters relevant to the 
detem1ination of the valuation of that security.79 
Directors were additionally required to keep prescribed records of advances, including records of 
a competent va1uation. 80 Failure to do this would constitute a summary offence, resulting in a 
fine. 
Another area of security assurance included prOVIsIOns for maintaining mmImum reserves. 
78 BSA 1939 section 2 (1) The basic advance was set at seventy-five per cent of the value of the 
property section 2 (4) 
79 BSA 1939 section 12 (1) 
80 BSA 1939 section 12(3) 
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Larger, permanent building societies had routinely held surplus profits as reserves for the 
purpose of enhancing financial security and thus achieving trustee status under the Designation 
of Trustee Status Regulations. Ultimately these were held on trust for the owner-members 
(creditors had priority over this fund). In 1947 the Building Society Association recommended a 
5% reserve ratio and four years later a 7.5% minimum liquidity ratio. 81 In 1959, The House 
Purchase and Housing Act introduced a minimum reserve ratio of 2.5% and a minimum of 7.5% 
liquidity ratio, (assets were required to be a minimum of £0.5 million). The 1962 Building 
Society Act removed the requirement for a minimum liquid assets (still necessary to achieve 
trustee status) but stated that, 
A building society shall not invest any part of the surplus funds of a society 
except in a manner authorised by an order made under this section by the chief 
registrar with the consent of the treasury. 82 
In 1981, the Building Societies (Authorisation) Regulations made authorisation for the raising of 
funds dependant on the holding of reserves. This was compulsory for all societies but, the level 
of reserves would depend on the size of the society. All societies were obliged to hold at least 
£50,000 as reserves and those with up to £100 million of assets were required to keep 2.5% of 
this as reserves. A society with between £100 million and £500 million in assets was required to 
keep 2% of its assets as reserves. This percentage went down to 1.5% for societies with assets 
worth between £500 million and £1,000 million, with a further reduction of 0.25% for those 
societies with assets exceeding £1,000 million. 
The aim of all the above measures was to achieve one objective, the production of a prudential 
framework. However, the hoarding of reserves ultimately enabled the argument against 
81 Mark Boleat (1986) The Building Society Industry 2nd edition p146 
82 Section 58 (1) Building Societies Act 1962 
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maintaining mutual status to be submerged under the benefits of the short term gains provided by 
windfall shares, as will be suggested in chapters four and six. 
Conclusion 
It is submitted that the emergence of a commercial institution, the mutual society, that was 
unique in collecting additional controls over its activities throughout a historical period of 
liberalisation or laissez-faire, was due as much to external political control as to factors' internal 
to the building society movement itself. Early building societies ensured their insulation from the 
government's draconian anti-collectives policies by adhering to strict internal controls and a non-
provocative attitude. Success and expansion in the mid-nineteenth century led to the introduction 
of an organisational form, the permanent society, that required both responsibility and expertise 
from its officers, and those active in the movement sought controls to ensure that this happened. 
Furthermore, the permanent societies' reliance on investors, who might have no stake as a 
borrower, meant that legislative controls were sought to ensure the security of the lender-
member's investment. Significantly, this put bOITower members under scrutiny and led to 
building societies introducing rigid lending criteria with a borrower profile that excluded all but 
white middle class men. In addition to this, reserves designed to protect investors created a fund 
which could and would be used by ambitious building society directors in order to effect a 
converSIOn. 
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Chapter 4 
Neo- Liberalism and Mutuality 
1. Introduction and Political context 
2. Parliament, Policy and Mutuality: The Making of the 1986 Building Society Act 
3. The Thatcherite Approach "Building Societies: A new Framework" 
4. Conclusion. 
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Weare sending this pristine maiden, the building societies, out into the financial 
jungle where dangers abound and rapists throng. Why in any sense, loosen the 
lock on the chastity belt? Austin Mitchell MP' 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the effect of the Thatcher administration and Neo-
Liberalism generally on mutuality in building societies. It argues that the culmination of a 
number of conflicting social and political factors led to the passage of a radical and far- reaching 
piece of legislation,2 which, in itself, encapsulated these contradictions. Economically, building 
societies had developed into organisations that were criticised by the political left for being 
oligargic and by the radical or New Right for being interventionist, social and for operating 
contrary to the 'free market'. In contrast, traditional Conservatism and welfare Labourism 
favoured the social benefits offered by mutual building societies and thus favoured the protection 
of their pr~vileged and distinctive status. However, the political weight behind these perspectives 
were not evenly matched as the economic and political effects of the previous decade had laid 
the foundation for the emergence of a strong, reconstituted Conservative Party, whose ideology 
has been subsequently dubbed, the New Right or Neo-Liberalism. 
As Stuart' Hall so aptly describes, the emergence of this reconstituted Conservative party can 
itself be explained and understood by assessing the contradictions inherent in British society 
, Hansard 1985 Debate on the Building Societies Bill p945 
2 The Building Societies Act 1986 
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prior to their electoral victory.3 The two primary contradictions in British society lay in the 
demands of the market economy and in the policy responses of the Labour govenmlent. 
Engulfed in recession,a backlash to the initial post war boom, the social democratic Labour 
Party could not maintain credibility as the party of the working class whilst requiring this same 
class to confOlID to the constraints of a capitalist crisis. 
Throughout the 1970s it was Callaghan's Labour government that introduced the harsh 
monetarist policies advised by the IMF, and it was this same government that slashed spending 
on the welfare state. Ironically, when these policies were re-adopted by the new Thatcher 
government, they were heralded as responsible, innovative and liberating. But, in the hands of 
the Labour government, they were seen as treacherous and authoritarian. Labour, popularly 
viewed as the pmiy of the working class, discovered that all ideological initiatives to liken the 
interests of workers to the success of capitalism, initiatives that Hall characterises as 
'corporatist.. .. ,incorporating sections of the working class and unions into the bargain between 
state, capital and labour', floundered. 4 The contradiction within this political approach to the 
economic crisis lay, argued Hall, in Labour's inability to appear to represent the people it 
governed. Instead it appeared to betray the class it represented, who responded by participating 
in huge industrial unrest. Unjustly so, argues Hall as, 
"Labourism' - is not a homogenous political entity but a complex political 
formation. It is not the expression of the working class 'in government', but the 
principal means of the political representation of the class. 5 
However, in the context of the 1970s, Labour's policies could not convey the same clarity of 
3 Stuart Hall 'The Great Moving Right Show' 
4 ibid p24 
5 ibid p26 
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vision that the New Right and subsequently 'Thatcherism' was able to do. The New Right was 
able to capitalise upon Labour's political dilemmas by treating popular perceptions of Labour as 
an authoritarian govemment, as a reality. Ideologically, Thatcherism linked social welfare 
policies with intrusive anti-individual state activities, neatly disassociating itself from both. 
The New Right side-stepped the issue of being a party representing a particular class interest and 
instead, advanced what Hall calls a 'people to party' approach. It represented the nation, whilst 
the Labour Party represented class interests and, in so doing, had needed to create an 
interventionist and controlling state. The New Right's populist approach was encapsulated in anti 
state rhetoric such as the abolition of the 'nanny state' that both encouraged scroungers and 
stifled entrepreneurialism. In the context of interventionist Labour policies, argues Hall, this 
rhetoric was a covert and highly successful attack on Labour and social democratic politics 
generally. 
Intellectually, the New Right's rhetoric drew from the more classic miiculations of liberalism. 
Intellectuals such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and, in particular, Hayek were drawn upon as 
masters of common-sense for their reasoned antipathy to state intervention and their association 
of laissez faire policies with individual liberty and economic progress. Hayek was especially 
acute on this point, writing, as he was, in the aftermath of fascism. Hayek directly associated a 
thriving dynamic economy with a minimalist state that was underpinned by the rule of law. An 
interventionist govemment, one which controlled the economy rather than allowing a market of 
contracting individuals to operate freely, was necessarily arbitrary and discriminatory. Such a 
government could not function under a legal system whose rules were, 'fixed and announced 
beforehand', it required flexibility to respond to circumstances as they arose, unencumbered by a 
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priori legislation. 6 
Legislation passed by an interventionist government, therefore, was merely the expression of 
party politics and involved rules with a substantive content, designed to achieve a particular end. 
Under an interventionist government, individuals could not rely on a known status quo and could 
not predict the actions of their State. In order to achieve self-expression and economic growth, 
individuals required a system of pre-set, formal rules under which all, including government, 
were subject. With such a system individuals could, 'predict actions of the state which may 
affect these plans' 7 and only under these conditions could a free market operate. For Hayek, it 
was only the rule of law that could prevent government undennining individual property rights 
and suppressing individual effort, two key elements of the allegedly entrepreneurial spirit much 
vaunted in the 1980s. 
A society of individuals pursuing their own economic objectives within 'fonnal and generalised' 
rules, gave rise to what Hayek called a 'spontaneous order', or what Adam Smith similarly 
called 'the invisible hand of the market'. And, later in, Lmv, Legislation and Liberty,8 Hayek 
expanded his theory on the dynamic character of spontaneous order, justifying it on the basis that 
as individuals possessed better local infonnation than the state and possessed a self-interest in 
making use of it, an economy based on individual self-interest, a free market, would be bound to 
thrive. Individuals possessed the most accurate knowledge of their own circumstances, local 
resources and potential for growth and profit making. And, unlike the State, it was the individual 
who had access to the most precise and up to date 'decentralised' and 'fragmented' lmowledge, 
and it was the individual who had the greatest self-interest in making use of this lmowledge 
6 F. Hayek (1976) Road to Serfdom p56 London. Routledge, Kegan and Paul. 
7 ibid 
8 F.Hayek (1979) Law Legislation and Liberty 
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toward the fmiherance of his own enrichment and ultimately the enrichment of society as a 
whole. 
Centralised planning, however, stymied the intrinsic power of the individual, disabling him from 
taking full advantage of his unique position. 'Hence the familiar fact that the more the state 
plans .... the more difficult planning becomes for the individual,.9 According to Hayek, a planned 
economy, although dressed up as creating the greater human good, encouraged discrimination, 
and suppressed creativity and freedom, a perspective on which the New Right hungrily fed. 
Thatcher's govemment drew from this language of liberty and identified its attainment with the 
restriction and reduction of the machinations of the state. 
Individual private property was central to the New Right's attack on post war welfarism. In an 
ingenious conjunction of its anti-state welfare ideology and that of individual private property, 
council houses were sold to their occupants, taken from council control and transformed into the 
private property of former council house tenants. 
Philosophically, the orientation of the rule of law around the protection of private property, 
maintained by liberal thinkers from Locke to Hayek, is justified on the basis that these individual 
rights act as a buffer against the intervention of the state. Freedom, fOlmal equality and private 
propeliyare, for liberals, intrinsically connected by, ' ....... recalling the link ...... between having 
a propeliy in one's person and being a free man'. 10 It is the freedom of the individual to sell 
their personal skills and strengths in the market for a price determined by market forces that is 
the stmiing point for the ascendance of private property. Thus, 
9 F Hayek (1944) The Road to serfdom p57 
10 Gray, J (1995) "Liberalism" p58 Open University Press 
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having this most basic right in my own person seems to entail having the most 
basic of liberal freedoms- contractual liberty, liberty of occupation, association 
and movement and so on- and it is compromised whenever these freedoms are 
abridged. The connection between property and the basic liberties is in these cases 
constitutive and not just instmmental. ll 
For modem liberal thinkers it is the subservience of private property rights in person and things 
to the dictates of collectivism and the state that create a situation where, 
... we move away from private property to communal or collective institutions, 
(and) the practical knowledge available to society is diluted or attenuated. 12 
Under collectivism, the individual is constrained by the values of others. The result according to 
Grey is that, 'Communal systems of ownership embody a bias against risk and novelty- a fact 
which may go far to explain the technological stagnation of the world's socialist economies,.13 
The New Right, therefore, were adverse to the notion that private industry should be constrained 
by public or non economic criteria. Interference with the spontaneous order of the market was 
akin to socialism and all its accompanying evils. Thus, when the Committee to Review the 
Functioning of Financial Institutions appointed under the premiership of James Callaghan but 
published in 1980 under the govemment of Margaret Thatcher, noted that, 'criticism (of 
company policy) by small-scale shareholders or by financial joumalists constrained as it is by the 
laws of libel, can frequently be ignored', 14 the New Right's response was to do nothing. Instead 
of introducing policies that would redress this balance of power, its response was to allow the 
II ibid p63 
12 ibid 
13 ibid p65 
14 "Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions" (1980) p249 
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market, in this case majority- shareholders, to retain its hegemony. Likewise, the Bullock 
RepOli's recommendation of shareholder and employee representation on the board of directors 
in order to kerb, ' the substantial degree of independence from outside control,15 they enjoyed, 
was legislatively expressed in the toothless section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 which states 
that, 'directors of a company are to have regard in the perfonnance of their functions .... the 
interests of the company's employees in general, as well as the interests of its members'. 
Labour's vision of the company as an inclusive and socially responsible institution driven by 
concerns other than profit, was not shared by the New Right and, problematically, these were the 
very principles upon which mutuality was based. Historically, the mutual building societywas an 
institution that been, in many ways, socially engineered in order to reify the rewards of thrift and 
hard work to working people. In the, albeit partisan, words of Sir Herbert AshwOlih, fonner 
chainnan of the Nationwide Building Society, 'they are admirable institutions which have made 
a significant contribution to the welfare of the people of this country by fostering saving and 
promoting home ownership' .16 No mention of profitability here. 
The Conservative Party wished to portray itself as a non- interventionist government presiding 
over a free market which emphasised individualism and the regressive nature of welfarism, and 
in so doing it reasserted nineteenth century liberal philosophy. Yet, within the new Conservative 
administration's classic reconstruction of the liberal notion of a social order based on the desires 
and choices of isolated abstract individuals, lay an internal contradiction. Whilst freeing the 
market from what were mainly welfare spending constraints relied on liberal justifications, 
overcoming the inevitable social fallout required the more controlling elements of classically 
15 The Bullock RepOli 
16 H.Ashworth (1980)'Building Societies Story' preface. London. Franey 
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conservative ideologies. The 'Salisbury Review', intellectual mouthpiece of the Conservative 
Party, consistently reflected this contradiction. The New Right embraced liberalism to the extent 
that it could be detached from its association with moral libertarianism or modernism. 
hl Nonnan Barry's piece of July 1987, this contradiction is justified on the basis of the internal 
inadequacy of liberal philosophy itself. Liberalism, he argued, relied on a subjectivist 
understanding of social reality. Whether, (taking the broad spectrum of liberal thinking) the 
notion 'human nature' was constructed on given precepts or based on empirical data, it was 
given and immutable. Therefore, he argued, any society that emerged from the interaction of 
these a priori human natures was beyond criticism as it merely reflected the unrepressed will of 
separate individuals. Such, 'a subjectivist epistemology justifies any form of political order, 
provided that it can be said to emerge from human choice,.17 ill contrast, he argued, the 
conservative philosopher possesses an objective understanding of social realty, 
The structure of a political order is not something designed or chosen but 
something 'given' (or perhaps more accurately, received); it is a 'form of life' 
which contains within itself the values which sustain a social order. 18 
As society is a given, an entity which emerges from accumulated traditions and beliefs, it is not 
possible for an individual to fully analyse it let alone reduce it to merely the accumulation of 
individual desires, it is 'metaphysically impossible to stand outside this pre-existing order and 
appraise it from the perspective, say, of the market or of sUbjective choice' .19 
17 Norman Barry (1989) "Conservatism, Liberalism and Modernism" A Reply to Anthony 
O'Hare p22 July 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
122 
A conservative, argues Barry, understands that the free market is insufficient to maintain order or 
to provide even the most basic ethical guidance. Liberalism's cash nexus understanding of 
human behaviour is insufficient to explain or justify public or altruistic acts. The reduction of all 
human behaviour to the pursuit of individual desires becomes absurd, for example, when one 
attempts to apply it to marital or parental relationships. Liberal and free market activities, as 
popularised by Thatcherism, therefore may only operate upon traditional, often ilTational and 
invariably oppressive social institutions. As Peregrine Worsthorne, conservative journalist 
argued, a society stratified by class, which gives privileges to one strata over another, is perhaps 
not fair or meritocratic but does have the advantage of being a caring and stable society. 
In a class ridden society those who do not rise need have no sense of failure 
because they never had all that much of a chance of success. The cards were 
stacked up against them from the stmi. Little blame or shame attaches to them: 
only to the system ....... But in America, where each man is free to determine his 
own rank, there is much more cause for pride and shame and, there being no great 
class divisions keeping the successful and unsuccessful apart, the resulting 
frictions and resentments have all the additional bitterness that only proximity can 
provoke.2o 
During the 1980s, classic conservatism maintained a tentative relationship with the new 
Conservative Pmiy, a contradiction that was never resolved. So, for example, in reflecting upon 
eight years of Thatcherism, E.J.Misham lamented the huge social costs resulting from an 
economic policy based on the partial adoption of the new monetarism espoused by the Chicago 
School's Milton Friedman. Friedman advocated 'balanced budgets, rejected all direct controls, 
and even disavowed the direct use of interest rates', with the aim of, 'expanding the money 
supply by a fixed annual percent in order to maintain the broad trend of prices as real output 
increased over time' .21 The Thatcher government adopted this market policy in relation to labour 
20 P. Worsthorne. 'The Cruelty of a Classless Society' - Sunday Telegraph 31 may 1992 
21 Both quotations: E.J.Misham. "One Cheer for Mrs Thatcher's Economic Achievement" 
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but maintained some control over interest rates and the money supply in order to achieve low 
inflation. Problematically, argued Misham, this has led to a reduced and highly mobile workforce 
with the 'contrived indispensability of the private automobile', and a huge increase in crime.22 
The economic prosperity, achieved at the expense of mass unemployment, an increase in the 
budget deficit and the erosion of welfare, has merely resulted, argues Misham, in the emergence 
of cheap popular culture, 'the vulgar, the violent, the obscene, and the sexually explicit' .23 In 
ShOli, the emphasis of market ideology and the erosion of long standing social order 
(modernism) in the name of progress, 'has fostered a predominately secular and hedonistic 
society, one bereft of transcendental faith, uncertain of the distinctions between right and wrong 
and increasingly reluctant, therefore, of making moral judgments' .24 
In the same journal, Ian Crowther's piece on Thatcherism, vividly articulated the contradictions 
inherent in the New Right. He argued that capitalism is 'morally neutral' and that the historical 
coincidence of industrial capitalism with Victorian morality does not make the two natural and 
inevitable companions. This coincidence in the nineteenth century meant that the free market 
could flourish under cultural traditions emanating from different socio-economic circumstances, 
'noblesse oblige, in part from middle-class ideas of respectability, and in part from Church and 
Chapel,.25 In the absence of this or any other powerful social system, a free market society will 
merely reproduce competitive, selfish and anti-social tendencies in the non economic sphere, a 
happenstance, argued Crowther that explains the rise of violent crimes, divorce and child abuse. 
Although, at root, he blames the social democracy that proceeded Thatcherism for the 
breakdown of social structures, because the notion of 'collective responsibility fostered a 
Salisbury Review, September 1989, p14-15 
22 ibid p18 
23 ibid 
24 ibid 
25 I. Crowther (1989) p5, SR, September 1989, ' Thatcherism and the Good Life'. 
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diminished sense of personal responsibility', 26 the New Right' failed in that it did not introduce 
new moral and social systems into the vacuum. 
In Crowther's words, 
many in Mrs Thatcher's government seem so entranced by the businessman's 
ethic of profit- what is euphemistically described as the 'discipline of the 
market' - that they regard talk of any other ethic as a fornl of hypocrisy: a 
rhetorical mask for vested interests. Either that, or they do quite sincerely believe 
that non-economic ideals will somehow live on, ghost like, long after the 
extinction of the professional and public bodies that have nourished them.27 
The context, therefore, in which building societies and hence mutuality were both politically 
debated and legally reconceptualised was one characterised by a number of contradictions. The 
government of the New Right was ideologically opposed to state intervention in the 'natural' 
running of the free market. The economy, they considered, should not be guided toward social or 
policy based conclusions but should function as a mechanism for individuals to pursue self-
interest and to enjoy full reward for their industry. From this perspective, the idea that financial 
institutions or corporations should operate as social institutions, aided, directed and controlled by 
government was a total anathema. Thus, the privileges and constraints under which building 
societies operated would seem to be prime for liberalisation, introducing the mutuals to the 
norms of the free market. 
However, the govenmlent of the New Right had emerged from a party for whom the 
conservative ethos of order, social hierarchy, patronage and tradition remained. Indeed, 
26 Ibid p4 
27 ibid p5 
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'Thatcherism' itself accepted the inevitability and even the desirability of a class society, 
although it generally rejected the notion that disadvantaged sections of society should be helped. 
For the classically conservative elements of the Conservative party, a mutual building society, 
financially self-contained but assisted by legislation that existed to promote thrift and house 
purchase for the 'industrious classes', was precisely the kind of institution they would wish to 
conserve. 
Ironically, although at odds with the more traditional elements of its own party, the free market 
ethos of the New Right was, in the context of building societies, supported by leading elements 
of the Labour opposition. The latter argued that the privileges building societies enjoyed were 
assisting managers to operate in a self-serving and financially wasteful fashion. Indeed, an 
analysis of the Wilson Report, a report headed by former Prime Minister Harold Wilson and 
commenced in January 1977 under a Labour government, indicates that the language of the 
market was in greater evidence here than the subsequent Green Paper on the same subject under 
the chaimlanship of Nigel Lawson, Conservative minister of the Thatcher govemment. 
Thus, it is the contention of this thesis that it was the contrary perspectives both between and 
within the leading political parties that ultimately synthesised into the provisions of the 1986 
Building Societies Act. This Act simultaneously bolstered mutuality by loosening some of the 
constraints on their financial activities whilst facilitating conversion from a mutual society into a 
corporation dealing in financial products. 
It is to the govemment repOlis leading up to the passage of the 1986 Building Society Act that 
this thesis will now tum. The following section examines The Functioning of Financial 
Institutions (1980) or the Wilson Report, Building Societies: A New Framework (1984) and the 
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pre-legislative debate in the House of Commons. In so doing it will indicate the different policy 
perspectives whose relationship led to the 1986 Act. 
Parliament, Policy and Mutuality: The Making of the 1986 Building Society Act. 
By the early part of the Thatcher administration Labour and Liberal MPs were already putting 
forward the argument that building societies should be subject to the same market criteria as 
other financial institutions. The initial response from the Conservative front benches was, at this 
time, less than sympathetic to this view. Labour and the Liberal MPs complained about the 
BSA's 'cartel', the tax privileges enjoyed by building societies, the wasteful number of branches 
and the problem of making directors accountable. In the House of Commons Oral answer session 
of 22nd May 1980, Nigel Lawson was required to answer on all four issues.28 
On the first point, the Hon. Mr Budgen stated that the BSA operated as a cartel on interest rates 
which, he argued, had the effect of reducing the interest of investors and encouraging the growth 
of the largest societies. Nigel Lawson, far from condemning such non-market practices disagreed 
that these strategies aided larger societies, on the contrary, he argued that the suppression of 
competition provided the public mortgage interest rates at 'lower rates than might be expected,.29 
The issues of director accountability in respect of building society lending strategies, raised by 
the Hon. Mr Grimond and, in respect of the unnecessarily large number of branches, raised by 
the Hon. Mr We etch were dismissed by the Chancellor as issues that shouldn't concern 
government or legislation. The possible problems of managers pursuing their own self-interest 
28 Hansard, oral answer session 22 May 1980 
29 ibid p690 
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by engaging in mergers, was deemed to be a matter for the Registry of Friendly Societies. 
The views expressed by Labour MPs on building societies over the next five years drew upon the 
conclusions and evidence of the Labour-based Wilson Report.3o It is to this report, therefore, that 
this thesis will now tum. 
The Wilson Report: Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions 
The first meeting of the committee was held on January 1977, a progress report was published in 
December 1977 and the completed report was presented to Parliament on June 1980. The Wilson 
report began by assessing the economic significance of the building society movement. It noted 
that building societies held a significant proportion of investments, second only to banks. As 
Table 7 of the Wilson Report shows, total building society assets by the end of 1978 exceeded 
£39.9 billion3l and, as Table 8 indicates, this amount was held predominately as loans secured by 
mortgages. 32 
30 Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions. Chairman: Harold Wilson 
Cmnd 7937 (1980) 
3l Cmnd paper 7937 P41 Table 7 
32 ibid Table 8 
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Table 7 Deposit- taking institutions: numbers, assets and deposits at end 1978 
Number of 
institutions 
Total Assets 
(£bn) 
Sterling deposit 
liabilities (£bn) 
Banks in the UK 
National Savings Ban1e 
Ordinary account & 
Investment account 
Trustee Savings Banks 
Ordinary department 
New department 
Building Societies 
Finance houses (and other consumer 
credit granters)(1) (3) 
348 
1 
18 
316 
496 
219.1 
1.1 
3.6 
39.7 
2.9 
41.6 
1.8 
1.7 
3.3 
37.0 
0.5 
..................................................................................... 
TOTAL 1,179 266.4 87.1 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
(1) Figures for finance houses are at end 1976 
(2) To non-bank UK residents. 
(3) At end 1976 there were 160 finance houses and other consumer credit grantor staking 
deposits from non-financial sectors: they had total assets of £2.2 billion 
Table 8 Pattern of asset holdings of deposit-taking institutions at end 1978 
Percentage of total assets 
Ban1(s in UK NSB TSB Building 
(sterling assets Investment account new dept. Societies 
only) 
Cash and short-term assets 10 7 16 5 
Market loans 26 
Public sector securities etc. 5 92 74 13 
Loans for house purchase 2 80 
Other advances 43 3 
Other assets 13 1 7 2 
TOTAL ASSETS in £bn 75.4 1.1 3.6 39.7 
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The orientation of building societies to this form of investment, with its incumbent 'lend long 
borrow short' policy meant that they were highly susceptible to the volatile nature of both 
interest rates and inflation. To counterbalance this, the Wilson Committee reported that building 
societies relied on two dominant strategies. Firstly, building societies had increased the level of 
reserves in order to subsidise the granting of lower interest rates to borrowers when interest rates 
were high and savers were seeking higher returns. Secondly, the Building Societies Association 
operated a price setting policy for all its members. On the first point, building societies built up 
reserves through surplus created from the lending and borrowing part of the business (after the 
deduction of Imming costs and tax) together with any profits earned from their liquid assets. The 
reserves were on average 3.5% of the total assets of building societies as a whole. Table 20 of the 
Wilson RepOli showed that in 1968 £29million was held as reserves or 3.8% of total building 
society assets, in 1972 this had risen to £76 million or 3.64% and by 1978 reserves stood at £212 
million or 3.73 % of the total building society assets. This policy was one that was to have a very 
significant effect on the success of demutualisation. 
These strategies, argued the RepOli, were not sufficient to immunise building societies from the 
sharp rises in interest at the end of the 1970s. In 1979 the Building Society Association decided 
to raise its recommended mortgage rate to 15%. This, coupled with the prudential policy of 
lending only a percentage of the purchase price had the effect of excluding less wealthy first time 
buyers. The problem was exacerbated by the societies' policy of reducing this proportion of the 
purchase price on which they would lend when trying to ration funds. 
The Wilson Committee concluded that this policy, 'discriminates against those who find it 
difficult to raise the necessary deposit'. 33 And, 'because of their tradition of encouraging self-
help and thrift, they have frowned upon the concept of "low start" mortgages, believing that 
those who feel that the initial payments impose too great a burden should defer house purchase 
33 ibid p85 para 289 
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until such time as they can afford it, rather than be financed for a period by the societies 
depositors' .34 And, even more controversially, 'some have argued that it is more sensible for the 
costs to be loaded in the earlier, rather than the later, years of the loan because in this period it is 
common for both husband and wife to be employed full-time,?5 
Instead, proposed the Report, building societies should increase the flow of capital available for 
loans and offer more attractive rates of interest. This could be achieved by abandoning the policy 
of protecting weaker societies through the BSA's recommended rates system (set at a rate all 
societies could afford) and SUbjecting all societies to a competitive market. 
The only sure way of providing a competitive spur to building societies is in our 
view to end the recommended rate system, that is, to allow societies to set their 
own rates according to their circumstances and to break the present automatic link 
between the rates paid to depositors and those charged to bOlTowers.36 
The dismantling of the recommended rate system would give building societies 
greater freedom to compete with other deposit taking institutions as well as with 
themselves. 37 
Equally, the introduction of market criteria could force building societies to abandon their costly 
policy of opening branches. 
34 ibid 
35 ibid 
Greater competition between societies would cause them to examine the viability 
of their branch networks with some care, with the probable effects of promoting 
mergers-and thus reducing the number of large societies providing facilities 
nation-wide- or encouraging some degree of regional specialization, perhaps 
through an exchange of obligations or amalgamations involving smaller, 
. 11 b d .. 38 reglOna y- ase socIetIes. 
36 ibid p1l3 para 380 
37 ibid para 384 
38 ibid pIll para 376 
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Table: Building society branches, 1968-7839 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1974 1977 1978 
No. of branches 1,662 1,807 2,016 2,261 2,552 3,099 4,130 4,595 
No. of accounts per branch 4,921 5,028 5,092 5,116 5,105 5,029 5,457 5,440 
Av. balance per branch(£m) 4.67 4.79 5.03 5.39 5.70 5.98 7.80 8.06 
Av. balance per account 949 953 988 1,054 1,117 1,189 1,429 1,481 
A v. management expenses per 
year, per member(£) 4.45 4.75 5.17 5.81 6.31 7.50 11.42 12.65 
39 ibid p 11 0 Table 25 
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The solution was therefore clear and could have been lifted from the Thatcher administration 
itself, 
External pressure on the cartel results from the queue for mortgages and the 
expansion of the building societies branch networks, both of which have become 
matters of grave concern. We believe that these problems could be alleviated by 
greater competition among the societies ....... we recommend that the recommended 
rate system should be abolished.4o 
Recommendations for the pmdential regulation of building societies therefore, derived from the 
desire to subject societies to the market. Changes in pmdential regulation were deemed essential 
to oversee the changes recommended to increase competition and move away from the situation 
where, 'the weaker and more inefficient societies have to a large extent been cushioned from 
nOlIDal cOlmnercial pressures by the recommended rate system, which limits price competition 
for deposits, and by excess demand for mortgages' .41 
The system of pmdential control at this time was formally based in statute the provisions of 
which were overseen by the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies and infonnally by the Building 
Societies Association. The pertinent legislation was the 1962 BSA which, as already noted in 
chapter 3, proscribes the kind of business a society may undertake, rules of governance and rules 
pertaining to capital reserves and liquid assets. Before the registrar registers the society-and 
therefore before it can take deposits, he must be satisfied that it meets the 1962 Act's criteria. 
After this point however, the registrar's powers were considered by the report to be limited. 
40 ibid p114 
41 ibid p327 
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The Wilson Report recommended that the requirements for building society registration and 
designation should be increased and that the registrar's powers should be extended. They 
favoured the introduction of minimum liquidity or reserve ratios for those societies seeking 
designation. In respect of the Registrar's powers they recommended that, 'the Registrar should 
be given powers to promote mergers or to enforce the winding up of a society for prudential 
reasons subject to an appropriate right of appeal' .42 
The collapse of a reasonably prominent society promoted the Wilson Report to recommend a 
strengthening of accountancy procedures. In 1978 Grays Building Society collapsed losing £7 
million of assets. Grays was a medium sized, designated society whose accounts falsely showed 
assets of £ 11. 5 million. The Registrar's method of monitoring societies was through their annual 
accounts, however, in this case it fell far short of an adequate method of control. In order to 
counteract the problem of a society manager falsifying accounts in order to disguise fraudulent 
activity the committee recommended that there be a substantial increase in the number of visits 
to building societies made by the registry and that the voluntary cash flow statements should be 
compulsory. To facilitate this extended supervision, the Wilson Report recommended that a 
separate organisation should be developed in the registry dealing solely with building society 
issues. Finally, it recommended a statutory scheme of investor protection so that the protection 
afforded to depositors of societies who were members of the Building Society Association would 
be afford to those outside the Association (at that point around 100 small societies accounting for 
just under 1 % of the total of building society assets). 
As a generalised approach to reforming building societies, the report recommended that they 
should operate under the discipline of a competitive market and stricter statutory controls that 
42 ibid p332 para 1250 
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would fUliher empower the Chief Registrar. This was the report that the Neo-liberal govel11l11ent 
of Margaret Thatcher inherited, and, in the context of its much vaunted political orientation 
should have provided an ideal base on which to introduce even more far reaching measures 
toward laissez-faire market strategies. 
The Thatcherite Approach: "Building Societies: A New Framework" 
At the height of the New Right's free market policy, the govel11l11ent set into motion extensive 
legislation on building societies. The government Green Paper on the subject, Building Societies: 
A New Framework, was presented to Parliament on July 1984. In the context of the New Right's 
liberalism this repOli should have been expected to outstrip the 1980 report in its emphasis on 
competition and deregulation. Instead, however, in all but one important respect, this paper 
favoured increased structural control and accountability whilst offering some facility for building 
societies to offer some additional financial services. 
Nigel Lawson's fOlward to the paper clearly denoted govel11l11ent intention to effect a 
compromise between free market criteria and the traditional institutional role of building 
societies. The latter consideration echoing the 1871 Royal Commission's intentions to encourage 
thrift and home ownership in the 'Industrious Classes' was expressed thus, 
Our purpose is to ensure that the building societies continue primarily in their 
traditional roles-holding people's savings securely and lending for house 
purchase- while loosening the legal restraints under which they have operated for 
a century or more so that they can develop in other fields. 43 
43 Building Societies: A New Framework July 1984 p2 
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and later, 
Their primary role as specialising in the housing finance and personal savings 
markets, and their mutual constitution should remain.44 
The fonner consideration was expressed thus, 
So, by allowing the societies new powers, we can both fmiher encourage home 
ownership and look forward to fuller and freer competition for financial services 
to the great benefit of all.45 
and later, 
It is important that building societies should be competitive in attracting savings. 
Major structural changes are now taking place in the financial services 
sector.. ....... building societies will probably need to respond to a trend toward 'one 
stop' centres for financial and investment services.46 
However, this paper made clear that any change to building societies would be limited and, to the 
extent that the organisation was liberalised, it would be subject to extra scrutiny. Laissez- faire 
was not to be the policy underlining much of the proposed legislation. 
The scope for diversification should therefore be limited and subject to proper 
prudential control. Nor should it create significant conflicts of interest. 47 
The 1984 Paper noted that the statutory limits on the activities of building societies and their 
financial strategies generally had meant that societies had provided a very safe source of 
44 ibid para 1.07 
45 ibid p2 
46 ibid p4 para 1.10 
47 ibid para 1.11 
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investment for their members. This had allowed building societies to enjoy a certain latitude in 
their internal organisation. Generally, building societies held 80% of its assets as loans secured 
on a mOligage, 17-20% in liquid assets and about 1.25 % in fixed assets, usually land and offices, 
whilst its liabilities were drawn almost entirely from the deposits of individual members. This 
meant that in the absence of fraud from a borrower, or the liquid assets being translated as fixed 
assets that fell in value, building society's assets were very safe. The Green Paper also noted 
that, 'societies have been able to afford to keep the interest rates paid to their investors in line 
with market rates, despite large fluctuations, by lending on telms under which they can vary at 
short notice the rates they charge their borrowers' .48 
Thus, contrary to the Thatcherite private enterprise approach, the paper praised mutual 
organisation for requiring little profitability creating a surplus that allowed for reserves of 0.5% 
of assets per year. This in turn provided support for the 'borrow short and lend long' strategy 
which required a high propOliion of liquid assets in order to cover fluctuation in cash flow. 
Indeed, the absence of liberalisation in the building society movement was a positive boon 
according to this report. 
In general, the very limited range of activities in which the societies can engage 
on the assets side enables the societies to combine a high degree of security for 
investors with relatively low reserve ratios.49 
Fmihennore, and in contrast to the staff rationalisation proposed by the Wilson Report, this 
paper argued that building society's limited orientation meant that, 
48 ibid para 2.03(b) 
49 ibid para 2.04 
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Their specialisation also leads to relatively low management costs. Together these 
mean that they require a relatively narrow margin between the interests rates they 
pay and those they charge. 50 
Increased activities would bring increased risks, a nOlm for the 'survival of the fittest' free 
market so strongly advocated by this government but not in the context of building societies. A 
strategy, counter- balancing risk would be required. The report therefore recommended that a 
strong capital base would be required to cover possible losses. And, as societies could only build 
up reserves through realised profits and, unlike a company, could not rapidly build up capital 
reserves by a rights issue, a society's reserves, 'should be reasonably matched from the outset to 
the scale and nature ofthe risks involved'. 51 
As a gentle nod toward liberalism, the Green Paper proposed that the old Section 1 of the 
Building Societies Act, which restricted building society activities to 'raising, by the 
sUbscriptions of the members, a stock or fund for making advances to members out of the funds 
of the society upon security by way of mOligage of freehold or leasehold' 52, should be replaced 
by a new section. This section would now state that, 'the primary purpose of a building society is 
to raise funds from individual members for lending on security by mortgage of owner- occupied 
'd . I ' 53 res! entIa propeliy . 
This would allow building societies to engage in related business such as estate agency and 
Automatic Telling Machines (ATM). Prior to the passage of this Act, building societies had had 
a problem with celiain money transmissions because of a technical point. It could not guarantee 
50 ibid para 2.04 
51 p7 para 2.04 
52 ibid para 2.05 
53 BSA 1962 section (1) 
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payment, on for example cheque guarantee cards, because it would be agreeing to pay funds to a 
third party regardless as to whether there were sufficient funds in the account in question. This 
problem would be overcome by dint of the new powers to offer unsecured loans, a facility that 
would also enable the use of Automatic Telling Machines. 
The Green Paper also proposed that building societies should be empowered to offer an 
integrated house buying service, 'a package of service to house buyers, including estate agency, 
conveyancing and stmctural surveys', subj ect to any conflict of interests that may arise. 54 
Other services proposed included agency services for building societies' 'under utilised 
branches' and collecting, 'local authority rent and rates, and bills for public utilities, insurance 
broking and financial services such as arranging share purchases and general investment 
advice.55 
However, the Green Paper consistently emphasised that any liberalisation would be accompanied 
by enhanced pmdential control. Thus, the Green Paper proposed that 90% of assets (other than 
liquid assets) should be used for residential, first mortgages. Liquid assets should be kept to a 
maximum of 33.3% and at least 80% of funds should be raised by members. The paper argued 
that all assets should be classed according to their risks. 
Class 1 assets,' advances secured on first mOligage of residential propeliy to individuals who are 
owner occupiers of that propeliy,56 would have to represent 90% of commercial assets. This 
actually narrowed the restriction from previous legislation as its excluded lending to corporate 
54 op cit New Framework para 4.00 
55 ibid para 4.05 
56 ibid para 3.02 
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bodies or to non- residential propeliy. However, it argued, 99% of lending was made to owner-
occupiers and lending to corporate bodies represented a very small proportion of their business. 
Class 2 assets 'would consist of other forms of wholly secured lending,57, such as second 
mortgages on property whose first mortgage is with another lender, loans secured on non-
residential property or loans to corporate bodies or loans made over the value of the property but 
secured by a local authority indemnity under section 111 of the Housing Act 1980. 
Class 3 assets, 'unsecured lending, the ownership of land or property, and equity investment' 58 
were very risky investments and, 'would therefore be open only to societies with free reserves of 
more than £3 million. The widest powers would thus be available at present to 56 societies, 
whose total assets form over 95% of the movement as a whole,.59 
Unsecured lending was limited to a maximum £5,000 but introducing class 3 assets did allow 
societies to own property and act directly as landlords, a power that was originally curtailed 
because of the Liberator crash noted in chapter 3. Altematively they would be allowed to engage 
in land ownership through the medium of a subsidiary.:. 
In respect of engaging in equity investment in subsidiaries and associates, this power was highly 
circumscribed and entirely distinct from the judicial and statutory approach to the incorporated 
company. As the paper makes clear, 
the subsidiary route must not be regarded as a way of side-stepping prudential 
considerations or limitations upon the powers of societies themselves. A financial 
57 ibid para 3.05 
58 ibid para 3.09 
59 ibid 
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institution of the standing of a building society would take on certain moral 
obligations towards a subsidiary to which it had lent its good name, over and 
above that required by limited liability. It couldn't walk away ifit got into trouble. 
Any losses made by the subsidiary- even if the possibility is remote- would 
potentially be those of the parent building society.60 
For the incorporated company, a moral obligation to a subsidiary owed by the parent will not 
give rise to a legal obligation. This is vividly illustrated in the cases relating to corporate 
contractual guarantees. Here, creditors who hold guarantees from other members of the group 
may be able to shift the liability around the group by enforcing contractual claims. However, a 
document that may appear to be a guarantee may fall short of this and may be termed merely 
comfort letters if it not sufficiently specific. 
For example in Re Augustus Bamett & Son Ltd, Augustus Bamett had traded at a loss for some 
years. 61 As a subsidiary of Rumasa SA, its auditors had only been willing to certify their 
accounts on the basis that Rumusa provided a letter of comfort whereby it agreed to provide the 
company with financial support. Rumusa allowed these letters to be noted in the accounts. The 
last of the letters said that they would enable their subsidiary company to, 'trade for at least 12 
months at current level and also to provide such long term finance as is necessary'. From 1977-
81 Rumusa had provided Augustus with £4,000,000 of subsidy. In March 1983 the board of 
directors of Augustus Bamett were informed that they were at personal risk of fraudulent trading 
unless they could obtain funds to pay the company's current debts. The company borrowed 
money from other subsidiaries and suppliers who were reassured by the statements made by 
Rumasa. 
60 ibid para 3.20 
61 [1986] BCLC 170 
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Following a creditor's voluntary winding up in Sept 1983, liquidators commenced proceedings 
against Rumusa under s.332 Ca 1948 (s.213 IA) alleging that the support and letters given had 
induced the board to continues trade and incur debts. Rumasa applied to strike out the claim on 
the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. 
The comi held that the intent to catTY on business to defraud creditors must be proven. As there 
was no allegation that the directors of Augustus Barnett had carried on business in this way there 
was therefore no basis for asserting that Rumansa was party to defrauding creditors. 
Likewise in the more recent case of K1einwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation 
Berhad, the defendant was a PLC in Malaysia who fonned a wholly owned subsidiary in 
England to operate as a ring dealer member of the London Metal Exchange. 62 The plaintiffs were 
merchant bankers who made a loan to the subsidiary (MMC Metal Ltd) relying on a comfOli 
letter from the defendant which said, 'it is our policy to ensure that the business of the subsidiary 
is at all times in a position to meet its liabilities to', the plaintiffs. This loan facility was increased 
from £5 million to £1 0 million when the defendants supplied a second comfort letter in 
substantially the same telIDS. 
When the subsidiary went into liquidation the defendant refused to pay sums outstanding under 
the loan arrangement with the plaintiff contending that the letter had not been intended to impose 
any binding legal obligation. 
On appeal the comi held that the defendant's statement in the letter was, 'in tenns and context as 
well as on evidence, a statement of present fact and not a promise as to future conduct: and that 
62 [1986] 1 WLR 379 
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no promise as to future conduct could be implied: and that accordingly, the telms of the comfort 
letter had no contractual effect'. 63 There existed a moral responsibility but this couldn't be 
translated into a legal responsibility. These two cases follow a long line of cases where the courts 
are almost entirely unwilling to make the parent company liable for the debts of its insolvent 
subsidiary. 
In order to further safeguard the smallliberalisation noted above, the 1984 Green Paper, in line 
with the Wilson Report, stated that the supervisory controls of the Chief Registrar would have to 
be enhanced, 'if societies are to have greater powers, it follows that his function will need to be 
extended' .64 
The report proposed that the system of supervision to be applied should be more like that applied 
to the banking system although less onerous, as the restraints placed on building society'S assets 
provided a structural control on their activities. 65 
It proposed that any activity outside that proscribed for building societies would be ultra vires 
and could result in the Chief Registrar instructing the society to put plans for conversion to its 
members. A convelied society could then operate under the more liberal rules on ultra vires 
applied to companies. If conversion was not undergone the Chief Registrar could apply to the 
cOUli for an order to wind up the company or place a number of restrictions upon its activities. 
63 ibid 
64 op cit 1984 Green Paper para 2.11 
65 Under company law the company has full freedom to construct the multiple objects in the 
memorandum under Cotman v Broughham (1921), subject to the ancillary nature of powers (Re 
Introduction). FurthenTIore, a company can registrar as a general commercial company, section 
3A CA 1985, and ultra vires contracts will be enforceable s,35 and s.35A CA 1985) 
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Furthennore, a building society would now be subject to specific statutory requirements to 
protect investor's interests.66 
Historically, the paper argued, the system of supervision by the Chief Registrar had been 
reactive, as it tended to intervene only in extreme circumstances such as when investor's money 
seemed to be at risk. Under the 1960 Building Society Act, the powers of the Chief Registrar 
were encapsulated in section 48 and section 51. Section 48 empowered the Chief Registrar to 
prevent a society £i.-om taking fmiher investments, provided he has obtained the consent of the 
Treasury. This was an extreme measure as it effectively stopped a society from operating 
independently and put existing investors at risk in the short tenn. The registrar therefore had to 
strike a 'difficult balance'. 67 A Section 51 Order empowered the Chief Registrar to prohibit a 
society from advertising. 
In addition to these measures, two major legislative changes have placed positive control over 
societies by the registrar. Firstly, the House Purchase and Housing Act 1959 provided for the 
designation of building societies by the Chief Registrar. Trustees defined in the Trustees 
Investments Act 1961 could only place funds with a society that had been designated. The 
Designation Regulations made by the Treasury included, as noted in chapter 3, a m1l1unum 
percentage of reserves from 2.5%-1 %, liquidity of 7.5% and minimum assets of £10 million. 
66 The Green Paper proscribed para 2.14 as, 
"(a) to maintain reserves, and more specifically free reserves, adequate for its particular business; 
(b) to maintain liquidity adequate for its patiicular business; 
(c) to observe the limits on building society assets; 
(d) to have adequate direction and management for its business and CatTY out its duties with 
integrity and prudence; 
( e) to maintain adequate systems of internal control and inspection; and 
(f) to have adequate anangements for independent valuation of mortgaged property." 
67 Ibid p 38 
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Secondly, the Building Societies (Authorisation) Regulations 1981 required that a new society 
should satisfy the Chief Registrar that they have the necessary resources and management before 
they can take any investments. These two criteria provided useful controls over new societies but 
did little to regulate existing ones. According to the report, however, the problem with the 
Registrar's powers under section 48 was that they were not sufficiently extensive. For example, 
section 48 of the Building Society Act authorised the Chief Registrar to revoke authorisation 
provided he has given notice to the management, allowed a period for representations (from the 
management) and the Treasury has given its consent on the basis that they were satisfied that 
they could defend the decision to Parliament as being reasonable. The report considered there to 
be an excessive amount of hurdles and instead, proposed that powers under section 48 would be 
made discretionary. This would be in line with judicial thinking, which stated in the case of: 
Regina v Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies that the width ofthe Registrar's discretion should 
not be limited to existing categories. 68 The Chief Registrar's enhanced powers would be subject 
to judicial review and, 
would be shuck down by the Court if the Chief Registrar had failed to observe the 
principles of natural justice, if any of the grounds were wrong in law, and this 
materially affected his decision, ifhe could be demonstrated to be wrong on, ifhe 
took into account grounds which were not relevant to the interests of investors, or 
ignored ones that were, or ifhe appeared to have acted unreasonably.69 
In general, the main statutory powers of the Chief Registrar would be in relation to granting, 
withholding and revoking authorisation. In order for a building society to be authorised, the 
Chief Registrar would have to be satisfied that all the requirements on the board of directors 
could be complied with and that it would, in general, be capable of safeguarding its investor's 
68 ex parte New Cross building Society noted in chapter 3 
69 ibid para 30 
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interests. In order to clarify precisely the criteria by which a director's duty would be judged and 
that which he must achieve in order to protect investor's interests the paper set out a director's 
statutory duties. 70 
By prescribing very specific duties the paper hoped to provide an immediate response to a 
director's failure to meet these obligations. Explicitly, the paper noted that, 'failure of the board 
of a society to meet one or more of these requirements would be recognised as a ground for the 
Chief Registrar to exercise one of his discretionmy powers'. In addition to this the paper 
considered raising the minimum capital required from its existing level of £50,000, in order to 
provide a more secure fund for investors. 
Encapsulating the contradictions inherent in the prevailing political climate, the Green Paper 
presented its anti-thesis to the basic thesis of a restrictive approach to governance. It made a 
70 ibid p40-41 "(a) to maintain adequate reserves, and more specifically free reserves, for the 
nature of the business which the society was canying on, and particularly for its structure of 
assets and liabilities; 
(b) to maintain adequate liquidity in relation to the nature of the business it was calTying on; 
(c) to observe the upper limit of 5 per cent on the proportion of total assets represented by Class 
3 assets; 
(d) to have adequate direction and management for the types of business the society will be 
undertaking; and to calTY on that business with integrity and prudence and with those 
professional skills which are requisite for the range and scale of the societies activities. To 
comply with the First Council Credit Institutions Directive the direction of a society will have to 
be in the hands of individuals of sufficiently good repute and sufficient experience to perfornl 
their duties, and who are at least two in number; 
(e) to maintain adequate internal systems of financial control and inspection; 
(f) to have adequate alTangements for the independent valuation of mortgaged property; 
(g) to prepare and publish accounts which must be audited by professionally qualified auditors; 
(h) to satisfy the Chief Registrar that the board is canying out these requirements, and more 
generally to provide him with such infOlmation as he may consider necessary for calTying out his 
functions under to Act, whether in general or in relation to the affairs of the particular society." 
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number of proposals deliberately intended to introduce free market criteria. For example, 
building societies were specifically exempted from Restrictive Trading Practices legislation so 
that the Building Societies Association's policy of recommending interest rates was not 
challenged. In response to the abolition of "corset" controls in 1980 which led to banks taking 
(by 1985) 25% of new mortgage business, the BSA refOlmulated its interest rate policy. The 
original policy, noted in chapter 3, that had operated since 1939, consisted of two different 
agreements described by the Green Paper thus, 
(a) The recommendation of basic rates of interest to be paid on building society 
investments and charged on mortgages. 
(b) An undertaking by participating societies to give 28 days notice of variations 
from the recommended rates.7! 
On 21 October 1983, in response to the criticism of the Wilson Report, the BSA announced new 
arrangements whereby the recommended rates would be replaced by advised rates for ordinary 
shares and mOligage loans. There would be no requirement to give notice of changes, although 
there would be an informal agreement under which societies may be notified of each other's 
rates. These changes, argued the Lawson report, had introduced competition between building 
societies and it could no longer be 'assumed that the prime objective of building societies_should 
be to keep mOligage rates down'. 72 This meant that, 'the original rationale for exempting the 
building societies from the legislation,73 was removed. And, reasoned the report, if this 
exemption was removed it would allow the Director General of Fair Trading to legally challenge 
even the' advisory' function of the BSA on the basis that it was contrary to the public interest. A 
successful challenge on these grounds would result in building societies setting their own interest 
71 ibid para 6.06 
72 ibid para 6.04 
73 ibid para 6.08 
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rates without reference to the BSA, entirely sUbjecting rates to market criteria and in the Green 
Paper's view, providing, 'a greater range of choice and a better service to building society 
members ,.74 In order to further this desirable effect, the Green Paper proposed that the exemption 
from the restrictive trade practices Act should occur simultaneously with the new building 
societies legislation. 
The second aml of the introduction of market criteria had already taken place through other 
legislation, which homogenised rules relating to taxation of banks and building societies. Tax-
paying investors in building societies had previously paid a lower rate because they were paid 
interest net of a composite rate of tax. This privilege, the report stated, was already now extended 
to bank investors (from April 1985). In addition, the 1984 budget had already bought corporate 
tax down to 35% for both banks and building societies, the previous position being corporate tax 
at 52% for banks and 40% for building societies. The Lawson report approved of this approach. 
The third arm of the financial liberalisation of building societies was by far the most 
controversial as it proposed to allow building societies to change their legal status from that of a 
mutual society to that of an incorporated company. Originally recommended by the Spalding 
Report, it was not a proposal that the Green Paper seemed to embrace with much enthusiasm.75 
Indeed, it stated that although a, 'compulsory change to company status has been advocated by 
some in the past' the government' does not accept that such a change is needed'. 76 In respect of 
the increase in competitiveness mooted by the Spalding RepOli as a reason for enabling 
conversion, the Green Paper argued that societies had already faced a great deal of competition 
from other societies and various financial institutions. This competition it argued had resulted in 
74 ibid para 6.09 
75 The Future Constitution and Powers of Building Societies' (1983) Chairman John Spalding 
76 ibid para 5.29 
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the acceleration of ilmovative service for customers and restricted the costs of management. 
However, whilst arguing that conversion was mmecessary, it took the view that, 
It is wrong that a society cannot tum itself into a company if its members wish. 
The Govemment therefore intends to provide for this in new legislation. Although 
there are no signs that many societies will wish to become companies in the near 
future, this will provide greater flexibility.77 
If societies chose the conversion route, the resulting business would then be subject to the 
Companies Act and its directors would owe a fiduciary duty to the company. In addition, the new 
company would require a license from the Ban1e of England under the Ban1eing Act. Conversion 
could only take place following a vote of its members, thus in theory, demutualisation could not 
take place without considerable, active agreement from its membership. However, as a curious 
adjunct to proposals on a societies' 'Constitution and Accountability', the Green Paper sought to 
redefine the qualifications for membership in a way that considerably reduced the number of 
individuals that would be counted as voters. New govemance objectives would ensure 
orientation toward 'interested members' by removing infOlmation and rights that were 
previously held by 'uninterested members', 
(a) to improve the information available to interested members but to reduce the 
present burden on societies of circulating to members often unwanted reports and 
accounts; 
(b) to give groups of members with legitimate concern about how the society is 
being run a greater opportunity to raise points at an annual general meeting, while 
at the same time making it harder to abuse the system. 
(c) to tell members more about candidates for election to the board and to make 
more even handed elections in which candidates other than those put forward by 
the board are standing.78 
77 ibid para 5.30 
78 ibid 
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In respect of voting on resolutions, the Green Paper then went on to suggest the homogenisation 
of the lUles relating to 'qualification'. The lUles at this point stated that all members could table a 
special resolution, all members with a £1 shareholding could vote and members with £25 were 
entitled to be sent the annual accounts, the director's report and notice of the next annual general 
meeting. The commission proposed that it would be, 'more logical to have a single level of 
shareholding' which gave rights in all the aforementioned areas. 79 This generalised level was 
proposed to be a £ 100 shareholding, thus excluding thousands of small investors. 
The Bill was presented to Parliament on 4 June 1986 and was passed with little controversy on 
the majority of points. Conversion, however, caused some debate, lasting one hour and twenty 
minutes. When it eventually passed with the ayes at 229 and noes at 148, it did so by dint of a 
large govemment majority. 
Those chiefly opposed to this part of the bill were Labour MPs and more traditional 
Conservatives. In contrast to Labour's position in the 1970's80 and those evidenced by 
parliamentary questions in the early eighties, (particularly those posed by Ken Weetch M.P. for 
Ipswich), Labour in opposition did not support the free market ethos ofthe New Right. Instead, it 
favoured the protection of mutuality, and for the most part, the existing organisation of building 
societies. Likewise, old conservatism opposed the removal of building societies' traditional role 
and the removal of the mutual legal status that facilitated this continuity. It is therefore of little 
surprise that the part of the bill which referred to demutualisation evoked conflicting many views 
and ambivalence to demutualisation. In the words of Dr. McDonald MP, 
the minister is committed to allowing this process of change to take place while, 
79 ibid para 5.11 
80 such as the Wilson Committee 
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on the other, he is uncertain about its usefulness and rightness and is trying to put 
as many obstacles in its way as possible.8l 
Also reflecting this view was Mr Craigan MP who indicated that many Conservative 
backbenchers were concerned about facilitating conversion. 'I think the provision82 has been 
reintroduced because several back-benchers did not like the idea either. Treasury Ministers felt 
they had to assuage in some way their back-benchers' .83 
The minister thus identified above by Dr McDonald was Mr Stewart MP, who opened the debate 
by characterising the government's approach as a balance between introducing the free market 
into the building society industry whilst curtailing the debilitating effects of speculation. In his 
words, conversion must be based upon a 'clear support from investing and borrowing members 
and from a significant proportion of the entire membership' .84 Secondly, that conversion should 
be organised in such a way as to not 'encourage members of the public to switch their funds 
around in the market on a speculative basis hoping to make a quick profit, which has happened in 
the United States'. 85 And thirdly that, 'limits should be placed on the compensation payable to 
outgoing directors so that conversion is not a course of action taken by management in their own 
interests' . 86 
The decision to legislate on conversion at all, he argued, was based on increased choice, 'the 
possibility of conveliing into incorporated status would add to the range of types of society or 
8l op cit debate p936. Hansard. 
82 clause 9(4) 
83 op cit Hansard p941 
84 ibid p935 
85 ibid p936 
86 ibid 
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mortgage providing institution' .87 
Dr McDonald argued that the government's justification for including a conversion clause in the 
Building Society Bill was unfair in that it was based on the 1983 Spalding Report from which the 
BSA had subsequently distanced itself. The Spalding Report had said that, 
The Association considers that it is necessary to have a procedure by which a 
building society can convert to another corporate form with the agreement of its 
members, although it doubts whether many societies will wish to consider this 
. 88 
optIOn. 
But since these statements the BSA had severely modified its recommendations. Furthermore, 
argued Dr McDonald, conversion was primarily promoted by Peter Birch, the chief executive of 
the Abbey National and only subsequently followed by the Halifax because it was, 'possibly 
feeling that it must follow in the footsteps of the Abbey National' .89 
Conversion, she went on, was unnecessary from any viewpoint. The BSA had itself stated, that 
funds raised from member's savings were more than sufficient to provide funds for lending on 
housing (societies assets stood at £100 billion). Raising finance from public issue was entirely 
mmecessary. Conversion, she concluded would facilitate take-overs from banks that had no 
commitment to the provision of finance for housing. 
Concurring with this view, Christopher Hawkins MP questioned the wisdom of allowing any 
commercial organisation to own and control building societies, 'why do we want to allow 
87 ibid 
88 ibid p944 
89 ibid 945 
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companies which are not building societies to buy building societies, including those that have 
not convelied?,90 He furthered insinuated that the government was attempting to rig the voting 
patterns of members in favour of demutualisation by allowing societies to offer cash payments to 
members following conversions. Such payments, as introduced by the new subsection 4 of clause 
19 were characterised by Hawkins as 'bribes' for people to vote for conversion. It was a 
measure, he argued, that had been 'bounced in by the treasury', and despite his repeated request 
to discuss the issue, it was not discussed by any government spokesperson. 91 
However, the notion that the government were constructing a piece of legislation that was 
entirely skewed toward conversion as apparently evidenced above, was not reflected in the 
degree of member consent required. A high quorum was required for conversion. A vote of at 
least 20% of members was, as Mr Stewmi pointed out, twice the number required to pass a 
motion on mergers and given the disparate nature of members (who each held one vote) a 
difficult figure to achieve. It was in the minister's view a hurdle, 'at a level that is not prohibitive 
but celiainly demanding,.92 On the other hand, he dismissed an uncritical allegiance to mutuality 
as, a 'sentimentality' that contrasted with the government's pragmatic approach, 
Building Societies can be very large national institutions mutual organisations, or 
they can be small local or regional societies. Their needs are diverging. If the 
option of conversion under celiain circumstances had not been available, it would 
have been necessary to draft a bill that went wider as to the business that can be 
conducted by building societies as mutual societies, in order to take account of the 
realities of the situation and of the way in which the financial markets are 
d 1 . 93 eve opmg. 
90 ibid p950 
91 ibid 
92 ibid p948 
93 ibid 
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The ensuing legislation evidenced both the desire to make building societies more competitive, 
by granting them more powers, and the view of the larger societies that the building society 
movement was not homogenous and, for some, conversion was appropriate. The majority of the 
Act is concemed with the creation of new powers and freedoms for societies coupled with the 
extended prudential supervision discussed in the Green Paper. The 'principal purpose' of 
building societies is stated as the raising of funds to lend on the security of land. Reinforcing this 
principle, the 1986 Act, in contrast to the 1962 Act detelmines that 90% of a building society'S 
business must be for this purpose and furthermore that this business must relate to land for 
residential use. 
The Act, however, widened the areas where building societies may borrow. In addition to raising 
funds from investing members they may also raise moneys from non-retail funds, such as 
financial markets. However, only 20% of building society liabilities may be raised in this way, 
with at least 50% of a society's funds being raised in the form of shares. 
In general, the Act gave new powers for societies to deal in financial products. In banking, they 
could provide money transmissions, foreign exchange, overdraft facilities, credit cards, cheque 
guarantee cards and personal loans. A society could also dispense funds through automatic 
telling machines. In the area of investment, societies could act as broking agents, and provide 
personal equity plans and insurance services. As an adjunct to their primary purpose, societies 
could now offer a range of services relating to property. These included powers to operate estate 
agents, offer conveyancing and propeliy valuation services and to directly develop land and 
housing. 
The above liberties were limited, in that no unsecured loan could be above £1 0,000, ownership 
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of insurance companies was limited to 15%, land development could be only be for residential 
uses, societies could not trade in equities and no business could be conducted with non- Ee 
countries. In other words, the role of building societies as financial institutions for the industrious 
classes engaged in savings and house purchase was underlined, whilst the increased expectations 
of its members in respect of financial products such as debit and credit cards, overdrafts and' one 
stop shopping' was realized. 
In themselves these measures were a sensible and pragmatic response to modem financial 
demands and could have enhanced the building society movement whilst it continued to operate 
under mutual status. However, these extensive provisions would be overshadowed by a handful 
of sections whose aim was to achieve the opposite result, not to maintain mutuality but to 
transfer the business of a mutual society to a commercial company. 
These sections operate in this way. Sections 97-103 in conjunction with schedules 2 and 17 of 
the 1986 Act provides for the power of members to convert to pIc status from mutual status. 
Section 97 (1) states that, 'A building society in accordance with this section and other 
applicable provisions of this Act, may transfer the whole of its business to a company'. 94 
As a constraint on conversion and, as outlined by Mr Stewart in debate, the Act provides that 
there must be an investors' special resolution and a borrowing members' resolution. In order to 
convert, 20% of investing members entitled to vote must vote and, of that, 75% of investors and 
50% of borrowers entitled to vote must vote in favour of conversion. When the transfer is to an 
existing company, as opposed to one specially created for the purpose, then the percentage is 
50% of those eligible to vote on the special resolution, or the holders of 90% of share capital 
94 1986 Building Society Act section 97 
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must vote in favour. 
Under section 100 'the terms of a transfer of business by a building society to a company which 
is to be its successor may include provision for part of the funds of the society or its successor to 
be distributed among, or other rights in relation to shares in the successor conferred on, members 
of the society, in consideration of the transfer'. This payment, however, would only be made to 
'those members who held shares in the society throughout the period of two years which expired 
with the qualifying day'. 95 Characterised earlier as 'bribes', these payments would only be paid 
to those members qualified to vote on a motion on conversion. 
Following a vote in favour of conversion, application is made to the Commission for 
confirmation of transfer that will be given unless any of the criteria in subsection three of section 
98 applies. These provisions include when the Commission considers that, 
(a) some infOlmation materIal to the members vote was not available to all the 
members eligible to vote; or (b) the vote on any resolution approving the transfer 
does not represent the views of the members eligible to vote; or (c) there is a 
substantial risk that the successor will not become or, as the case may be, remain 
(an authorised institution for the purposes of the Banking Act 1987); or (d) some 
relevant requirement of this Act or the rules of the society was not complied with. 
However all the above may be disregarded by the Commission if it feels that they were not 
material factors in the members decision. 96 
Following confinnation, the stock is floated, with a percentage of free shares being given to 
members entitled to vote for conversion. All property, rights and liabilities of the building 
95 1986 Building Society Act section 100 
96 1986 Building Society Act section 98(4) 
156 
society pass onto the successor company on the vesting date specified in the transfer agreement. 
In specially formed companies, no one person will be allowed to hold more than 15% of the 
issued share capital or debentures for a period of five years, although the Bailie of England held a 
discretionary right to waive this requirement. The Bailie of England played this role as the 
regulatory supervisor of a public limited company dealing in financial products like the 
converted or demutualised building societies and will consider an application for a licence under 
the Banking Act 1979.97 The newly converted society will also be subject to the Companies Act 
1985 and will no longer operate under the Building Societies Acts. 
Conclusion 
As the above evidence suggests, the 1986 Act emerged as a manifestation of the contradictory 
political elements in the 1970s and 1980s. It facilitated greater opportunities for building 
societies to offer financial products and increased prudential control to counterbalance these 
liberties, but is known primarily for its provisions on conversion. Most building societies decided 
to avail themselves of these prOVIsIOns and now engage in business under the non-mutual 
corporate fmID. 
However, as these demutualised societies operated on a 'one member one vote' basis, it is 
submitted that notwithstanding the free market facility encompassed in the 1986 Act, conversion 
97 The regulatory role for both converted and mutual societies is now played by the Financial 
Services Association. 
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would not have been possible without the active consent of a substantial proportion of a society's 
membership. Members would decide whether they wished to retain mutuality or whether to shed 
this status and so member's appreciation of and views on mutual status were therefore crucial in 
deciding how effective section 99 would be. With this in mind, the following chapter examines 
empirical evidence on members' views on mutuality and their attitudes to conversion. It will 
examine evidence that suggests there has been a shift in attitudes to mutuality and assess whether 
this shift would affect voting habits. 
It will also assess the role of the building society director in directing and instigating conversion 
through analysis of interviews with existing building society chief executives. The factual 
evidence on actual conversions will then be assessed in chapter 6 
158 
Chapter 5 
Demutualisation: The Facts 
1. Introduction 
2. Mutuality in Doubt 
3. Testing the Water: The Demutualisation of the Abbey National Building Society 
4. Managing Demutualisation: The Directors' Role in Conversion 
5. Demutualisation Continues: 
The Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society 
The National & Provincial 
The Halifax Building Society 
The Alliance & Leicester and the Woolwich Building Society 
The Bristol & West Building Society 
Northern Rock Building Society 
6. Conclusion 
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Introduction 
The Government has created a new competitive world in financial institutions. I 
am glad to see it, because it could have done with more competition, goodness 
knows.] 
In the context of the market- based understanding of socio-political relations in the eighties and 
nineties and the facilitating aspects of the 1986 Building Society Act, mutuality was understood 
as either a hindrance or an opportunity and, above all, as something that could be dispensed with. 
The inhibitive nature of mutuality, largely a policy construct, had been progressing for many 
decades and the concerns many societies felt as a result of this were exacerbated by the 
increasing competition from banks offering mortgage facilities? Most vociferous in demanding 
greater freedoms for mutual societies were the larger societies, in particular the Abbey National 
Building Society, which was among the largest of financial institutions in the UK. 
The 1986 Building Society Act provided for the ultimate freedom desired by the Abbey, the 
ability to shed mutual status and convert into a public limited company. And, although the 
oppOliunity for members to gain financial reward through the process of demutualisation was 
anticipated prior to the passage ofthe Act, as commentators had already seen the speculative 
nature of demutualisations in the US, it was the demutualisation of the Abbey National that first 
] Mr We etch Labour MP for Ipswich Hansard 1985 Debate on Building Societies Bill p984 
2 Discussed in previous chapter 
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showed how this process could bring financial benefits to building society members in the UK. 
The possibility of financial reward encouraged 'entrepreneurial' individuals to become members 
of societies with the sole aim of putting forward a motion to convert. A successful motion would 
ultimately award them personal compensation following the sale of the society to a company. 
These individuals, outwardly despised by the building society industry, became known in the late 
1990s as 'carpet-baggers', the most famous of these being the one-time butler Michael Harden. 
As a result of these factors, the 1990s was a decade when over 80% of building society assets 
were transferred to public limited companies. Those societies who wished to remain mutual were 
therefore confronted with task of convincing their members that remaining a mutual was 
preferable to conversion with its attendant one-off financial reward and, for the most pati, this 
meant clearly atiiculating the nature, meaning and benefits of mutuality. The success of this 
particular strategy is examined in the following two chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide an account of the demutualisations facilitated by the 1986 Act and to assess the factors 
that led to this. 
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CONVERSIONS 
Bradford & Bingley BS to Bradford & Bingley PLC 4 December 2000 
Northern Rock to Northern Rock PLC 1 October 1997 
Woolwich BS to Woolwich PLC 7 July 1997 
Halifax BS to Halifax PLC 2 June 1997 
Alliance & Leicester BS to Alliance & Leicester PLC 21 April 1997 
Abbey National BS to Abbey National PLC 12 July 1989 
Transfer of Business to PLC 
Birmingham Midshires BS to Halifax PLC 18 April 1999 
Bristol & West BS to Bank ofIreland PLC 28 July 1997 
National & Provincial BS to Abbey National PLC 5 August 1996 
Cheltenham & Gloucester BS to Lloyds Bank PLC 1 August 1995 
Mutuality in Doubt: 
Despite the government's assertion that it would be unlikely that building societies would avail 
themselves of the facility to demutualise, societies began to explore the possibilities almost 
immediately after the publication of Statutory Instrument, The Building Societies (Transfer of 
Business) Regulations 1988 (No. 1153). In January 1988, the Halifax Building Society appointed 
the merchant banker NM Rothschild to study the possibility of conveliing into a public company. 
162 
In the words of a Financial Times survey, 'the Halifax is adamant that at this stage, it is only 
reviewing options, and that conversion is only one of them. Nonetheless there is a strong 
inference that the days of mutual status, at least as it has been known until now, are numbered'. 3 
In respect to the large propOliion of members required to approve demutualisation, the survey 
argued that although this used to be considered an 'insuperable hurdle', 'most now seem to 
believe that they probably will be able to do it, even if voters have to be given some sort of 
sweetener to approve the change,.4 It argued that the main obstacles to demutualisation was the 
fear that the market may become swamped by building society shares or that mergers would 
have to be completed before conversion, as legislation protected the new entity in its entirety for 
the first five years of existence. Any general hesitation by societies were based purely on the 
attempt to leam about possible pitfalls from converting societies, and not a heartfelt desire to 
preserve the traditions of mutuality; 'second tier societies that say that they see no immediate 
need to shed mutuality are assumed by others to be biding their time, perhaps in the expectation 
that, once the first wave of conversion is over, building society flotations will be quite normal,.5 
A similar repOli was commissioned by the Woolwich Building Society from Prima Europe, a 
policy research group based in London, which was published on 15 November 1988. This report 
concluded that although building societies were under increasing pressure from banks, even 
without the defensive armoury of being able to raise capital through the sale of equities or the 
ability to trade in diverse financial products, mutuality could still remain a feasible option. It 
argued that, 'the healthy rate of capital generation by societies appears sufficient to pursue a 
successful development strategy which opens up new prospects of income to counter any 
3 David Bat"chard Mar 1988 Survey of Building Societies: FT 
4 ibid 
5 ibid 
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squeeze on m01igage margins' .6 The predominant view among building societies was that wide-
scale mergers would help preserve mutuality. Reflecting this view, the chief executive of the 
Woolwich Building Society was reported as arguing that, 'the remaining societies would evolve 
into mutually owned retail banks competing with the main banks but insulating customers from 
risks such as developing- country debt'. 7 However, as the article cynically remarked, any new 
found allegiance to mutuality was probably driven by the desire for managers to retain their 
status by avoiding the consequences of take-over to which societies would be vulnerable in the 
event of conversion. 
The Leeds Pennanent Building Society commissioned a similar study from Habros but decided 
against conversion, subject to review, in 1990. In addition, the National & Provincial appointed 
JP Morgan, the US Bank, to advise it in February 1989, although a previous poll had already 
suggested that its mernbers were in favour of conversion. 
As a general assessment on mutual societies, Morgan Grenfell, the London Merchant Barue, 
published a report arguing that, 'the best long-te11l1 future of many big building societies may lie 
in shedding mutual status and joining a financial services group offering a wide range of 
products to its clients .... many of the top 20 societies will find it increasingly difficult to survive 
alone in increasingly competitive financial services market in the next decade.,8 
In short, at this point in time, the general view of the larger societies and that of their advisors 
6 quoted in 'Mutual Dilemma for Building Societies: The pressures to seek barucing status by 
flotation: FT 16 Nov 1988 
7 ibid 
8 3 April 1989 Building Societies 'May Have to Alter Status to Survive' FT David Barchard 
report published on 3 April 1989 
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was that mutual status was just one method of organising business among many, and that any 
decision to shed mutual status, or retain it, would be based on pragmatism. It was to these larger 
societies that the industry in general looked to be advocates and protectors of mutuality. 
Ironically, it was these societies that displayed very little regard for the social and moral aspects 
of mutual status that were trumpeted by the industry in the latter part of the 1990s. The notion of 
mutuality had not yet become the stuff of a moral crusade or yet crystallised as a potent enemy of 
social exclusion. Indeed, it was not until its most powerful protectors 'changed sides' and 
succumbed to conversion that itbecame so. 
Testing the Water: The Dernutualisation of the Abbey National Building Society 
The commissioning of the aforementioned reports was, in part, prompted by the announcement 
from the management of the Abbey National that they intended to demutualise the society. The 
chief executive of the Abbey National, Peter Birch, become a vociferous spokesperson for the 
demutualisation of the Abbey and, indeed, societies in general. To the Financial Times he said, 
Critics have warned of the danger of becoming a PLC. They overlook the danger 
of remaining mutual, which could involve becoming victims of squeezed margins 
and eventual decline. The temptation to equate mutuality with motherhood and 
PLC status with rapaciousness, is simplistic and wrong and insulting to both 
mutual and public limited companies'. 9 
Shedding mutual status, argued the same article, was merely another example of the tendency 
towards innovation that was intrinsic to the Abbey National tradition. In support of this 
9 Peter Birch quoted in FT 11 Feb 1989 Survey of Building Societies: In the PLC limelight-
Abbey National by Jemima Kallas 
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proposition it cited the Abbey National's initiative to build houses (in 1981 with Tower Hamlets 
LBC), its launch of the first £100 cheque guarantee card, its payment of interest on current 
accounts, its entry into the Spanish property market and the fact it was first to allow buyers to see 
the society's valuation report. Conversion was just another 'outstanding Abbey first' .10 However, 
innovations as a building society could hardly be compared with a decision to cease to be a 
building society, indeed, many Abbey members believed that demutualisation would mark the 
end of good service for members and the end of the Abbey as a socially responsible institution. 
These arguments ran contrary to the management's view and, as soon as was legislatively 
possible, they began a process that ended with the first building society conversion. In September 
1988 the company, Abbey National PIc, was registered under the directorship of Barry Ellis, 
Norman Wilkes and Ian Kinsman Treacy. As a wholly owned subsidiary of Abbey National 
Building Society, it was created with the express purpose of facilitating the conversion of the 
building society into a public limited company. Specifically clause A(1) of its objects stated that 
the company has been established, 
to enter into a transfer agreement pursuant to section 97 of the Building Societies 
Act 1986 (the BSA) with Abbey National Building Society (the "society) and, 
pursuant thereto, to assume and conduct, after the vesting day thereunder, as the 
same is defined in the BSA, the business of the society upon vesting of the 
propeliy, rights, liabilities and obligations thereof in the company pursuant to the 
said transfer agreement and the BSA, to canyon such business. 11 
Later, and in compliance with Section 288 of the Companies Act, Notice of change of directors 
was delivered for registration at Company House on the 18th February 1988, the original 
directors were to be replaced by thirteen new directors including Peter Birch and Peter Davis. In 
10 ibid 
11 memorandum of Abbey National pIc Companies House 
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March 1988, the management announced its plan to shed mutual status and a transfer agreement 
was drafted and put forward to the Abbey's membership for approval. 
In the event, and with far reaching results, the transfer agreement drawn up by the Abbey's 
management, was questioned by the Building Societies Commission on a number of points. This 
led to a resolution in court that served to smooth the path to conversion and encourage the 
practice of 'carpet-bagging'. In attempting to concretise some of the legislation that the 
commission assumed existed to preserve the integrity of mutuality, it confronted a judiciary who 
interpreted the legislation in a more liberal and effectively pro-conversion manner. 
The proposals in the transfer agreement that were problematic, related to Section 100 of the 1986 
Act. The first related to the kind of anangement to which section 100(8) related; the second as to 
whether or not the offer of shares to members who were not two year members was contrary to 
Section 100, which provided for the giving of the right to subscribe for additional shares, 'in 
priority to other subscribers', to two year members only; while the third question related to the 
issue of which members were entitled to cash distributions. 
On the issue of who qualified for cash distributions, the court held that members who were 
investors or bon-owers 'on the qualifying day and qualified to vote on the requisite shareholder's 
resolution and each borrowing member entitled to vote on the bon-owing member's resolution' .12 
would be entitled, free of charge, to an allocation of fully paid up shares in the successor 
company'. 13 Thus, membership, for the purpose of qualifying for a cash distribution, was defined 
by the cOUli in accordance with section 100(4), as somebody who was a member on the 
12 Abbey National Building Society v Building Societies Commission (1989) 5 BCC 259 at 261 
13 ibid 
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qualifying day and who remained a member continuously until the vesting day. 
In respect to the second point, the Commission submitted that the offer of additional shares 
should be limited to two year members only and to offer such shares to other members was 
unlawful under s.l 00(8). The transfer proposal, it argued, was contrary to the provision of that 
section in that, 'the member's rights to free shares are to be granted in priority to the rights to 
subscribe for the new shares confelTed on other subscribers' .14 
The court held that section 100(8) did cover those situations where there is a subscription for 
shares in the successor company and '(1) there is a subscription for shares in the successor 
company, and (2) the subscriber is bound by an obligation imposed by the transfer agreement 
itself to vest the shares so subscribed for free of charge in the members' and that 'such right is 
enforceable by each member under sec. 97(5)' .15 However, it maintained that the mischief that 
the section was designed to counter was the attainment by members (other than two year 
members), of priOlity lights in respect of a shares issue. Thus the section would be infringed if, 
'members other than two year members, are by the transfer agreement given the right to acquire 
any shares in the successor company, and such right is given to the exclusion of or in priority to 
persons who are given by the transfer agreement rights to subscribe for those or any other shares 
in the successor company'. 16 There was no such contravention, the comi concluded, if, the same 
class of members is entitled to free shares and to subscribe to the new shares, as no priority right 
is confelTed. 
The overall outcome of this decision was that short- term membership was no bar to gaining the 
14 ibid p264 
15 ibid for both quotations 
16 ibid p265 
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same personal benefits afforded to 10ng-telID membership unless long-term members were 
themselves excluded from these benefits. There was now an open door for potential carpet-
baggers. 
Conversion was approved by members on 11th April 1989 and confirmed by the Building 
Societies Commission on 6th July 1989. Given the proportion of members' votes in favour, it 
seems to have little choice but to confirm. As the Financial Times argued, 'The commission 
seems to have decided at the outset that the size of the pro-flotation vote - around 90 per cent of 
members on a 60 per cent tumout - meant the conversion had to go ahead'. 17 Thus, upon the 
admission of the share capital onto the Official list of the Stock exchange and upon authorisation 
from the Bank of England, conversion was complete and trading of shares in Abbey National pIc 
began. 
Managing Demutualisation: The Director's Role in Conversion. 
Demutualisation could not have taken place without the consent of the members and, as 
previously noted, the Building Societies Commission would have probably refused confimlation 
if the vote had not been so overwhelmingly in favour of conversion. However, in the case of the 
Abbey National, there is evidence to suggest that the conversion process was designed and 
driven by the management to such an extent that members were unable to make an objective 
judgment. In other words, the retention of mutuality as something that was still beneficial for 
members, was a view that either ignored or in some people's view, suppressed. 
177 Jun 1989 Abbey National Flotation Survives Tide Of Criticism: A regulator's report into the 
building society'S conversion procedures: FT David Barchard 
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The benefits for members of the demutualised building society were formally expressed thus, 
every qualifying saver, every qualifying borrower and every qualifying employee 
who makes a valid application for shares will be subject to the terms and 
conditions set out in Part XIV, receive at least 100 shares, whatever the demand 
for shares. 18 
And, secondly, 
every qualifying member and qualifying employee will receive 100 free shares 
and any member who is eligible as both a saver and borrower will receive 200 
shares. 19 
However, a number of Abbey National members, in their campaign to stop the demutalisation of 
the Abbey, argued that these benefits had been distorted and the management was engaged in an 
attempt to misrepresent the consequences of conversion. Organised as the Abbey National 
Members Against Flotation (AMAF), a number of pro-mutuality members claimed that the 
Abbey's directors had undermined their members' volition and control over the procedure for 
demutualisation by giving one-sided information on its effects and benefits and by suppressing 
altemative interpretations. They argued that the management had failed to heed the words of the 
Building Societies Commission when it wamed the society that it had the power to cancel 
conversion procedures if it found partiality in the ballot. In the words of Michael Bridgeman, 
It is important that the board explains to the membership the potential 
consequences of conversion, favourable or unfavourable, as objectively as 
possible .... it is not a marketing exercise.20 
18 Part 1 Key Information, registered at Companies House 1417/89 
19 ibid 
20 Speech at BSA conference 1988 quoted in R.W.Perks "The Fight to Stay Mutual" 
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AMAF argued that the directors were unable to be sufficiently objective as they were all in 
favour of conversion. To counter this bias AMAF suggested that they (AMAF) should bring the 
case to members. In pursuance of this AMAF sought to requisition a Special General Meeting. 
They obtained the signatures of 110 qualified members and provided the cheque of £5,000 
necessary to accord with Rule 32(3) of the society's rules. The requisition stated that the purpose 
of the meeting was to discuss certain resolutions relating to the impartiality of the board and 
information on demutualisation. In addition to this the requisition stated that 
... that this meeting instructs the Directors to provide facilities to AMAF to enable 
it to infonll all members of the society of the reasons why the Society should 
remain a mutual building society existing for the benefit of its members.21 
The requisition was rejected as a result of this wording. On a technical point relating to the above 
resolution and, in particular, the italicised word, they argued that to convene a meeting to discuss 
a resolution to 'instruct the director', would be contrary to the Rules of the society which, 
confer on the board the power to direct and manage the business of the Society 
and the right to exercise all powers of the society which are not, by statute or by 
the Society's Rules, required to be exercised in general meeting.22 
In ShOli, members could not instruct directors under the Rules of the Society. It is indeed 
arguable that, although acting within the properly advised letter of the Rules, there was little 
attempt to honour the spirit of a director's duty to its members. 
This approach continued in the directors' subsequent actions. R.W.Perks, member of AMAF, 
repOlied that following the failure to convene a Special General Meeting, the AMAF nominated 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
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seven candidates for election on the board in order that they might present the views against 
demutualisation at the Annual General Meeting. 23 This might have been effective action, for, as 
the Financial Times noted, 'putting up candidates will mean that AMAF can circulate its views 
to all Abbey's members in the election statement, something it has been unable to do so far'.z4 
However, Perks argued that in direct response to the nominations, the directors took the unusual 
step of postponing the AGM to the latest, legally pennissible date, 26th April 1989. At the same 
time they set the date for the SGM, the meeting in which flotation was to voted upon, for the 
11th of April, two weeks before the AGM. In addition to the timing of the meeting, the AGM 
notices that contained the pro-mutual views of the AMAF candidates were not sent out until the 
latest legally pemlissible date, in this case the 1st April. In contrast, the floatation vote papers 
were sent out from the middle of March 1989, with instructions to vote, 'immediately' .25 It is 
therefore likely, as Perks suggests, that, 'most of those intending to vote would have done so 
before receiving the AGM papers' .26 
Although the AMAF failed to halt the vote on demutualisation in the case of the Abbey National, 
their actions highlighted the problems of protecting mutuality generally. They showed that a 
partial management could, within its given powers, control discussions and access to infonnation 
on a proposed conversion. Secondly, they showed that the body empowered to oversee 
conversions, the Building Societies Commission, effectively dis empowered itself by a tautology. 
The 1986 Act confel1'ed on the Commission the power to refuse to confirm a transfer if a society 
failed to properly infOlID its membership. 
23 ibid 
24 David Bat'chard "Finance and the Family: A Change Of Habits at the Abbey" Financial Times 
p6, 17 Dec 1988 
25 op cit Parks p415 
26 ibid 
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Schedule 17 of the 1986 Act imposed, 'an obligation to issue statements (or summaries) to its 
members relation to the proposed transfer,.27 And, under section 98(3), the commission could 
refuse to confi1111 a transfer if it, 
considers that-
(a) some information material to the members' decision about the transfer was not 
made available to all the members eligible to vote; or 
(b) the vote on any resolution approving the transfer does not represent the views 
of the members eligible to vote; or 
(c) there is a substantial risk that the successor will not become or, as the case 
may be, remain (an authorised institution for the purposes of the Banking Act 
1987); or 
(d) some relevant requirement of this Act or the rules of the society was not 
fulfilled. 28 
On considering this criteria in respect of the Abbey's flotation application, the Commission 
reported among other criticisms that the Abbey had failed to keep its members properly 
infonned. The Commission argued that, 'Members could reasonably have expected to find the 
fair and balanced assessment of the consequences of the proposal. .... It did not measure up to that 
standard,.29 The same atiicle described the commission's report on the Abbey conversion as 
'stinging' in its criticism of the bias and dissembling of Abbey's Board. 
However, the Commission did not conclude that the misleading nature of the infonnation given 
to members was instrumental in their voting choice. Paradoxically, the Commission allowed the 
conversion to go ahead because of enonnity of the vote, although the vote itself was, according 
to the commission itself, based on misleading infonnation. As the Financial Times commented, 
27 s.98 Transfers of business: supplementary provisions (1) 
28 The Building Societies Act 1986 
29 Reported in the FT 7th June 1989 "Abbey National Survives Tide Of Criticism: A regulator's 
report into the building society's conversion procedures: pll 
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this decision seemed even more contrary given that the Commissioner himself had, 'warned 
specifically that he would not grant permission for conversion if it emerged that members had 
not been fully infOlmed of the disadvantages as well as the advantages'. 30 
This decision came as no surprise to financial commentators. Two months prior to the 
confilmation the Financial Times commented that, 'it would be a revolutionary move, however, 
for the commission to overrule the results of such a large ballot, and most city analysts believe 
that is unlikely' .31 
The particular reasons for the Abbey's conversion may have been self- interest. Representatives 
from the AMAF were inconclusive as to the motivation of the directors in pursuing 
demutualisation but suggest that this may have been a factor. 
The motivations of the professional managers may have included their own 
remuneration. The total remuneration of Abbey National directors increased from 
£OA million in 1986 to £0.7 million in 1988, prior to flotation; post flotation it 
increased to £1.2 million, and employee share schemes were introduced?2 
However, what was clear by the end of 1989, was that a motivated board of directors could 
persuade a sufficient number of members to vote in favour of demutualisation, and were easily a 
match for a Commission with a limited stomach for court action and a judiciary committed to 
commercialism. The factors were in place for a building society that wished to demutualise, to 
do so and with greater ease than had been apparently envisaged when the 1986 Act was drafted. 
30 ibid 
31 13 April 1989 Building Societies May Follow Abbey's Lead: The Implications of Tuesdays 
vote for stock market Flotation: FT p 25 David Barchard 
32 op cit Perks p425 
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Abbey National: Mergers in alphabetical order. 
Abbey Road BS 
BoroughBS 
Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society 
BurnleyBS 
Definite Permanent BS 
Devon & Cornwall BS 
Ebor Permanent Investment BS 
Elgin Property Investment BS 
Haslemere BS 
Haslemere & District Mutual BS 
Highgate BS 
Keighley & Craven BS 
Leeds Provincial BS 
National BS 
National & Provincial BS 
Oak Co-operative 
Provincial BS 
State (The) BS 
Swansea Thrift Permanent BS 
Uxbridge Permanent BS 
Western Suburban Permanent BS 
Westmorland Pelmanent Benefit BS 
White haven & West Cumberland BS 
(Tables correlated from information on the BSA Website) 
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Demutualisation Continues:The Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society 
The extent to which the judiciary interpreted the law on conversion was, to a certain extent, 
tested in the demutualisation of the Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society. In this case, 
the legal limits on the kinds of benefits that members could receive upon demutualisation were 
laid down, which would make the process of carpet-bagging slightly less attractive. 
The C&G began life as the Cheltenham & Gloucester Benefit and Building Investment 
Association in 1850. Following the passage of the 1874 BSA it incorporated as the Cheltenham 
and Gloucester Permanent Mutual Benefit Building Society in 1878. Following a number of 
mergers the Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society (as it was renamed in 1908) had by 
1995,230 branches and £17bn in assets. It had 825,000 shareholding members who were entitled 
to vote and 370,000 borrowing members, entitled to vote and 61,000 depositors. In 1993, it had a 
pre-tax profit of £202m and a general reserve of £864 m 
The reasons for demutualisation given by the Cheltenham & Gloucester, as expressed by its 
management, were the limitations of the 1986 Building Societies Act. The C&G were a highly 
successful society, reporting a 27 % increase in pre-tax profits, from £144.7m to £183.8m, for 
1991, the fifth year in succession that the C&G's profits had grown by more than 25%. However, 
this success gave rise to complaint from its chief executive, Mr Longhurst, who stated that, ' the 
perfonnance showed resilience in a very difficult market' .33 He went on to warn the government 
that unless it changed, 'the legal limits on the amount of the funding which building societies can 
raise on the wholesale money markets,34 he would consider conversion as the way forward for 
33 FT 14 Feb 1992 UK Company News: Cheltenham & Gloucester advances by 27% to pounds 
184m David Barchard 
34 ibid 
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the society. The limit on wholesale funding was supported by the Building Society Commission, 
which argued that to make a shift from raising funds from members to other sources would mean 
that societies would cease to operate as mutuals, (the ceiling for raising money from other 
sources was set at 40%). However, this was not a compelling issue for Mr Longhurst who 
concluded, 'we do not subscribe to the view that mutuality is the only way forward for our 
industry' .35 
The Cheltenham and Gloucester ultimately evaded the aforementioned limitations of mutuality 
by merging with Lloyds Bank. The C&G was sold to Lloyds for £1.8billion with the argument 
that, 'only by becoming part of a larger group could it gain distribution without endangering its 
enviable low cost income ratio'. 36 
Significantly, the tenllS of the initial merger deal provided for a cash payment to all members 
regardless as to whether they were 'two year members' or not. The legality of these tenns was 
tested in court in 1994 and those in the building society industry were alert to the importance of 
the decision. In a report on the Building Societies Association Conference of 1994, prior to the 
decision, the Financial Times noted that, 'the tales in the hall during the Building Societies 
Association conference were about the housing market, the savings market, technology and 
regulation. The talk in the bars and receptions, by contrast, was of next week's court case in 
which the legality of the Lloyds £ 1.8 cash bid for the Cheltenham and Gloucester building 
society will be tested'. 37 Conference speeches were underpinned by 'vigorous defenses of 
mutuality' and concern was widely expressed that speCUlative demutualisations would be the 
35 ibid 
36 FT Alison Smith 11 Nov 1995 Weekend Money: Are mutuals friendless? 
37 FT C&G case dominates behind-the-scenes talk: The Lloyds bid has focused the attention of 
BSA delegates. 20 May 1994 
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outcome of a decision that gave cash offers to members who were not 'two-year members'. The 
article reported that Mr Geoffrey Lister, BSA chairman and chief executive of Bradford and 
Bingley, told a press conference that, 'if the deal was allowed to go ahead, then the BSA would 
immediately press the govenmlent for a change in the law, in time to affect any future cash 
bids,.38 
The program for merging began thus. The directors ofC&G supported Lloyds Bank's take-over 
offer of £1.8 billion on the basis that, 
freed from the borrowing restrictions affecting building societies and with access 
to the bank's treasury, the business will be able to borrow more heavily ...... Lloyds 
Banle will make further capital available, and the business can take advantage of 
the bank's distribution strengths.39 
However, the Commission in their capacity as regulator of building societies argued that the 
proposed temlS of the take-over were unlawful. The court itself acknowledged the importance of 
the case, in the words of Sir Donald Nicholls V-C 
The disagreement raises questions of fundamental importance about the meaning 
of the statutOlY provisions. This is virgin territory, because no building society has 
yet transferred its business to an already existing institution. To resolve this 
difference of opinion without delay, C&G has bought these proceedings against 
the commission seeking a declaration.4o 
The plaintiff argued that it was within its powers under s97 (1) of the BSA 1986 to transfer its 
business to C&R a wholly owned company of a holding company owned by Lloyds Banle and 
38 ibid 
39Cheltenllam and Gloucester Building Society v Building Society Commission (1994) ChD 65 
at p66 
40 ibid p67 
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that the successor company could make cash payments of £500 to each investing and borrowing 
member and to each employee of the plaintiff. It further contended that these payments were not 
prohibited by section 100(9) of the 1986 Act which 'prevented an existing company from 
offering cash bonuses to voting members who held their shares for less than two years' .41 
It fmiher contended that the Commission did not have general powers of discretion in relation to 
a transfer agreement approved by the statutory required percentage of members, its role was 
merely to ensure compliance with statutory requirements. As such, the Commission must 
confil111 the transfer to a successor company, one specifically fonned for the purpose of carrying 
on the society's business. Altematively, if the society's business was being transferred to an 
already existing company then this transfer is a take- over but in both cases the Commission 
must be satisfied that the company will remain an authorised institution for the purposes of the 
1987 Banking Act. 
The comi outlined the possible 'mischief that may arise from these procedures', as being the 
provision of, 'a means whereby an outside institution might takeover a building society business 
by tempting members with the offer of a substantial cash bonus'. 42 Similar provisions had 
already resulted in a spate of speculative demutualisations in the United States' mutual sector. 
In order to inhibit such speculation the court noted the statutory provision for a high percentage 
of members that were obliged to vote in favour of conversion. In addition to this, it argued that 
section 100(9) provided a restriction on the pelmissive section 100(1). The latter proscribed no 
statutory authorisation for the making of payments to members in consideration of the transfer 
41 ibid 
42 ibid p69 
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outside the rules of the society in question. However, section 100(9) operated as a regulatory 
measure by restricting to whom the distributions could be made. Thus, payments to newly joined 
members who may have joined the society purely to benefit fi·om payments arising from 
demutualisation, were restricted. In other words, the court argued, the provision was designed to 
prevent carpet- bagging. 
Section 100(9) is plainly directed at restricting the cash payments a successor 
company may make to members in consideration of the transfer. The legislation 
seeks to achieve that result by making the s 100(1) power subj ect to the s 100(9) 
restriction. Whatever a successor's own constitution may provide, the terms of a 
transfer agreement cannot include a term under which the successor will make a 
cash distribution to newly joined members.43 
Such a restriction was clearly intended, the court maintained, to apply to other companies in the 
group not just to the successor company. In this case, a proposal that the parent company should 
make payments to members was derived from, ' the perceived need to side-step section 100(9) 
and offer cash bonuses to all the members, not just the two year members,.44 In telIDS of the 
preservation of mutuality, this was the most impOliant decision of the case, as potential 'carpet-
baggers' would not receive cash payments unless their membership had been of some duration. 
Other aspects of the case were dealt with in the following way. In respect of the payments to 
employees who were non- members, the court maintained that, notwithstanding the consent of 
the members, the power to distribute to non- members was not held in section 100(1) as this 
referred to distributions to members only. However, in this particular case, payment was being 
made by another company therefore powers under the Building Society Act 1986 was not 
required. The only question that remained was whether or not the transfer agreement could 
43 ibid p70 
44 ibid 
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-contain a telID that allowed a third party to make a payment to non- members. The court stated 
that it, 'could see nothing in the legislation to indicate that a third party may not join in a transfer 
agreement made between a society and its successor' .45 
On the issue of the director's power to enter into such a transaction on behalf of the society, the 
court concluded that, notwithstanding rule 30.2 of the society, the validity of the transfer was 
dependent on a members' resolution to that effect. Rule 30.2 provided that, 
No director shall vote as a director in regard to any contract, or proposal therefore, 
in which he is interested, whether directly or indirectly, or upon any matter arising 
thereof, and ifhe shall so vote his vote shall not be counted nor shall he be 
reckoned in estimating a quorum when any such contract, or proposal therefore, is 
under consideration.46 
However, the comi concluded that the benefits that the directors might acquire from the transfer 
agreement did not preclude them from voting on the resolution, provided that the members were 
properly acquainted with their personal interest benefits before voting. 
This decision clarified the law in this respect, in the words of David O'Brien, Chief Executive of 
National Provincial, 'it leaves us exactly where we were before, but it gives us a little more 
confidence that we do not have to fight in a legal environment with an obvious flaw'. 47 Sir 
Donald's bar on cash payments to members ofless than 2 years effectively precluded 27% of 
existing investors. So, as the above article concluded, 
societies with similar proportions of new members- such as Britannia and 
45 ibidp71 
46 Cheltenham and Gloucester Rule 30.2 
47 FT 'Building societies shake off fear of 'blackmail' John Gapper. 10 June 1994 
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Woolwich- will also find take-over difficult. This appears to lessen considerably 
the worst fear raised by the Lloyds/ C&G deal: that it would expose other 
societies to a fOlID of blackmail. Although boards of societies have no legal 
obligation to put offers to their members, they would be vulnerable to public 
debate of an offer.48 
However, the decision in this case would only provide very limited restrictions on the benefits of 
carpet-bagging as it could be side-stepped by delaying the transfer or by making payments in 
ordinary or preference shares. As, John Wriglesworth, building societies analyst at UBS, stated, 
many possibilities remained open to carpet- baggers because, 'Abbey National's share 
distribution for its 1989 floatation was ruled legal by the courts'. 49 An assessment that proved to 
be correct. 
48 ibid 
49 ibid 
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Cheltenham & Gloucester 
Heart of England BS 2 October 1993 
Rowel Regis to Heart of England 1 March 1989 
Kidderminster Equitable BS to Heart of England 1 March 1989 
Mid-Sussex BS to C&G 1 August 1992 
Sydemham Bs to Mid Sussex 1982 
Bedford Crown BSto C&G 20 July 1991 
POlismith BS to C&G BS 30 June 1991 
Walthamstow BS to C&G 31 October 1990 
Peckham BS to C&G 30 June 1990 
Guardian BS to C&G 16 April 1990 
Bedford BS to C&G 8 April 1990 
Bury St Edmunds to C&G 1 Jan 1989 
Bolton BS to C&G 1 October 1988 
Essex Equitable to C&G 29 February 1988 
CardiffBS to C&G 29 1 October 1987 
London Permanent BS to C&G 1 August 1987 
Colchester BS to C&G 15 May 1987 
Waltham Abbey BS to C&G 1985 
Cotswold BS to C&G 1984 
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The National & Provincial 
The National & Provincial Building Society was taken over by Abbey National PLC in August 
1996. Borrowers and savers ofless than 2 years received Abbey National shares worth £500 
whilst savers of over 2 years received shares or cash worth £750. In addition to this, 2 year 
savers received bonuses according to the amount of their account balance (5% of their balance). 
The average payout was reported to be worth £1,400.50 Qualifying members were those who had 
saved or owed at least £1 00 on April 1995 and December 31 1995 and held voting rights in the 
society. Qualifying members supported conversion in overwhelming numbers, more than 95% 
of those that voted were in favour of conversion. 
The N&P board said they were swayed by the Abbey's offer because it, 'had given its word that 
there would be no compulsory redundancies in the retail network in either organisation'? 
However, evidence would suggest that the demutualisation ofthe N&P was driven by the 
enthusiasm of its membership. As previously noted, a survey from 1988 indicated that the 
society's members were in support of conversion, a view that the success of the Abbey's share 
price can only have served to enhance. The membership in this society clearly saw their self-
interest as being served by the exchange of cash for mutual status. 
50 The Guardian April 13 1996 National & Provincial Goes Overboard For Abbey Habit" Cliff 
J ones and Mmiyn Halsall 
51 ibid 
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National & Provincial to Abbey National PLC 1997 
Hiberian BS to National & Provincial BS 1985 
Burnley BS to Provincial BS 1982 
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The Halifax Building Society 
The Halifax Building Society proposed to convert in a two-stage process. The first stage 
involved the merger of the Halifax with the Leeds Building Society in accordance with the 
provisions of section 94 of the Building Societies Act 1986 and schedule 16, effected by a 
transfer of engagements from the Leeds to the Halifax. The second stage involved the transfer of 
the merged business to Halifax pIc under the provisions of section 97 BSA 1986. The Building 
Societies Commission required that details of the merger to be circulated to members of the 
Halifax and the Leeds Building Societies should contain details of the proposed transfer of 
business to a 'successor company'. This was in accordance with paragraph 1 of schedule 16 that 
required statements to include '(t) any other matters which the commission requires in the case 
of the particular amalgamation or transfer of engagements'. The two societies agreed to these 
te1IDS and produced the telIDS under which the transfer to the successor company would take 
place. These terms gave: 
( a) a right to a fixed allocation of free shares ("the fixed share allocation") 
conferred on (i) all shareholding members who held shares to the value of £1 00 or 
more on 25 November 1994, who continue to hold shares until the completion of 
the transfer of the business to the successor company and who are eligible to vote 
on the shareholder's resolution to approve the transfer; (ii) borrowing members 
whose mOligage debt on 25 November 1994 was at least £100, who remain 
borrowing members until completion of the transfer and who are eligible to vote 
on the borrowing members' resolution to approve the transfer; and (iii) persons 
who were employees or pensioners of the Halifax or of the Leeds on 25 
November 1994; 
(b) a right to an additional variable allocation of free shares (" the variable share 
allocation") conferred upon shareholding members ("two-year shareholders") 
who have held (or are deemed to have held) shares in the Halifax for a period of 
two years expiring on a qualifying day. 52 
52 quoted in Building Societies Commission v Halifax BS [1995] 3 All ER 193 at p196 
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In the case of Building Societies Commission v Halifax Building Society [1995], the 
commission questioned the transfer document arguing that there had been an infringement of 
section 100(8) of the 1986 Act. This section, which, as previously noted, was the burden of the 
commission's case against the Abbey National, prohibited priority allocation of shares to all but 
'2 year members'. The commission did not, therefore, question the 'additional variable 
allocation of free shares to 'two-year members' but they did, however, argue that the right to 
acquire shares bestowed on other members was being given in priority to 'other subscribers' 
who, they argued were the 'investing public'. Judge Chadwick disagreed with their contention 
and described the meaning of the section thus. The words 'in priority to other subscribers' 
described and qualified the 'rights to acquire shares' subject to the restriction in section 100(8). 
The rights were given to those members in connection with the transfer. They could not 
therefore be 'investing members of the public', unless the transfer agreement proposed to offer 
shares to members of the public, which it did not. 
There was no one, who, in connection with the transfer, subscribed or who was 
entitled to subscribe to shares in the successor company other than those persons 
upon whom rights were conferred by the transfer agreement and who enjoyed the 
same rights inter se, then there could be no 'other subscribers' for the purpose of 
section 100(8) and no infringement of the restriction. 53 
The judge, therefore found for the defendants. The successor company was called Halifax PLC, 
a company that began its legal life named Listmid Ltd, a private company that was issued a 
celiificate of incorporation on 31 st March 1989. Following a special resolution, a new name, 
Halifax Loans (No 2) Limited, was certified on the 10th October 1989, and in October 1990, the 
company resolved to increase its capital from £1000 to £1,000,000, its sole shareholder, Halifax 
53 ibid p194 
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Building Society, having consented to this increase in writing. 
In accordance with section 43 CA 1985, Halifax Loans (No 2) Limited was re-registered as a 
public company under the name Halifax PIc on the 4th December 1996.54 Clause 4 of its objects 
stated that the company could, 
• enter into a transfer agreement under section 97 of the Building Societies Act 
1986 with Halifax Building Society; and, 
• under that transfer agreement to assume, on the vesting date (as defined in the 
Building Societies Act 1986), the business of Halifax Building Society; and 
• after the property, rights, liabilities and obligations of Halifax Building Society 
have passed to the Company under that agreement, to carryon that a business.55 
The chairman was H.J. Foulds and lM. Blackburn was Chief executive. Other executive 
directors included RF Boyes, JR Crosby, MH Ellis, OJ Fulwell, JA Lee and JR Miller. 
On 24th February 1997, following a members' vote in favour of conversion, transfer documents 
were lodged in Companies House. In part II of the transfer document lodged in Companies 
House in May 1997 the reasons for demutualising were stated thus, 
As the Halifax becomes a more broadly based provider of financial services and 
its income from non- traditional sources increases, the board believes its business 
will benefit from being carried on by a company under a regulatory regime which 
does not require it to be a body having as its principal purpose the making of 
loans which are secured on residential property and which are substantially 
funded by members. 
54 CH form Application by a private company for re- registration as a public company Co. Co. 
2367076 
55 Memorandum of Association of Halifax pIc. CH 
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I· I 
The transfer of assets from Halifax Building Society and the Leeds Building Society to Halifax 
plc meant that the latter was now in possession of the greater part of former building society 
assets. The conversion of the Halifax was the UK's biggest new share issue. ill January 1997 it 
was estimated that the 8million members would receive £ll.2billion in free shares.56 By May of 
the same year, due to a combination of members holding on to their shares and institutional 
investors desire to purchase them, the share price in Halifax pIc was 60% higher than had been 
predicted; 'at £7 a share, Halifax would have a market value of £17.6bn, making it the 10th 
largest stock on the FTSE 100 index and the country's fourth largest bank'. 57 
56 FT January 11 1997 "Halifax unveils UK's largest new issue" Christopher Brown-Humes 
57 ibid 
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Halifax Building Society: Mergers 
Leeds Permanent BS 1 October 1994 
Southdown BS to Leeds Permanent BS 1 April 1992 
Eastbourne Mutual BS transfer engagements to Sussex County BS which changed its name to 
Southdown BS 1 October 1990 
Mitcham and Metropolitan BS to Sussex County BS 1 April 1986 
Dorking BS to Eastbourne Mutual 1982 
Rye Benefit BS Transfer to Eastbourne Mutual BS 1981, with the additional acquisition of 
Birmingham Midshires 
HalTow BS 30 April 1987 
Hemel Hempstead 13 April 1987 
Civil Service BS 6 April 1987 
King Edward BS 15 September 1986 
Birmingham & Bridgewater Bs united with Midshires BS - Birmingham Midshires 30 June 1986 
Metrogas to Midshires 24 June 1986 
Ealing & Acton to Midshires 1984 
Severn BS to Midshires 1983 
Banner to Midshires 19821 
Liverpool BS to Midcourse 1982 
Margie BS to Midcourse 1981 
Pontardulais BS to Midshires 1981 
City & District Permanent to Metrogas 1982 
Queen Victoria Street to Metrogas 1982 
Birnlingham BS unites with Bridgewater BS to fmID Birmingham & Bridgewater 1982 
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The Demutualisation of the Woolwich Building Society and the Alliance & Leicester 
Building Society 
The hottest tips in the conversion stakes are Woolwich and Alliance & Leicester, 
both of which are likely to announce plans to become public limited companies 
early next year at the latest.58 
Woolwich Building Society 
On 6 January 1996, the Woolwich Building Society announced it would become a bank. With 
3.5 million qualifying members the estimated payout was expected to be around £500-£700, with 
larger amounts for long-tenn savers. The conversion plan was not expected to be approved until 
April 1997 , although the Woolwich executives had hinted that they would follow a similar 
conversion plan to that of the Halifax, which would give extra share distribution to high, long 
term savers. 59 
The cut- off time for qualification was 31 December 1995, thus some commentators argued that 
there could be opposition to the telms of the conversion from the 40,000 or so investors who 
opened accounts after this date.6o The number of investors in the Woolwich had greatly increased 
during 1995, following speculation about demutualisation, which led to the Society raising its 
minimum opening balance to £500. This relatively small amount, however, did little to arrest the 
enthusiasm for joining the society. Carpet-baggers would inevitably have a huge interest in a 
58 p6 Allyson Smith 11 Nov 1995 "Are Mutuals Friendless? 
59 (b) a right to an additional variable allocation of free shares (" the variable share allocation") 
conferred upon shareholding members ("two-year shareholders") who have held (or are deemed 
to have held) shares in the Halifax for a period of two years expiring on a qualifying day.' 
(quoted in Building Societies Commission v Halifax BS [1995] 3 All ER 193 at p196 
60 13 January 1996 Financial Times "Weekend Money (personal Finance): Woolwich converts, 
who will be next?- Martin MacConnol" 
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society whose assets were valued in 1995 at £26.69 billion, making it the third richest mutual 
building society after the Halifax's £92.77 billion and the Nationwide's £35.74 billion. 
It was chiefly size that led Peter Robinson, Woolwich's Chief Executive, to conclude that the 
society's best interests would be served by demutualisation. In the wake of the Woolwich's 
conversion, he argued, there remained a place for small, regionally based societies who dealt in a 
small number of financial products. However, this was not a route that the larger societies could 
afford to pursue, 'large players could not rely on organic growth alone to maintain their relative 
positions, and would need to merge or make acquisitions to do so' .61 As the Financial Times 
noted, this was becoming a popular view among the upper echelons of the building society 
movement. 
Despite the merger aml0unced last week between Stroud & Swindon and City & 
Metropoliton- much smaller societies- few in the sector would disagree with his 
view that the traditional merger between large societies is no longer an option. 
The argument is that savers and borrowers want deals that enable them to realise 
the value of their membership, as a flotation or take-over would do, and a merger 
would not. 62 
61 FT Alison Smith 12 Jan 1996 UK Company News: How the building of banks has altered the 
VIew. 
62 ibid 
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Woolwich Buildinf;! Society: Merf;!ers 
Town & Country BS 2 June 1992 
Woolwich Equitable 6 June 1990 
Gateway BS to Woolwich Equitable 31 June 1988 
Propeliy Owners BS to Woolwich Equitable 1 December 1986 
Grangemoth BS to Woolwich Equitable 1983 
Nolih Kent BS to Woolwich 1985 
Lord Grosvenor Bs to Woolwich 1984 
New Cross to Woolwich 1982 
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The Alliance & Leicester 
Peter White, Chief Executive of Alliance & Leicester, personifies a predicament. 
While the A&L has not said that it intends to become a bank, it remains high on 
the list of those mmoured to do so. White is due to become chairman of the 
Building Societies Association next May. But perhaps even as he begins his year 
in office, A&L will be on its way out of the sector. 63 
In response to the demutualisation of the C&G and the value of assts believed to be distributable 
to members, Peter White said that it was important to continue the strategy the group had been 
developing. Ultimately, he continued this strategy with the same degree of commitment to 
mutuality as Mike Blackburn, chief executive of Halifax Building Society, who said back in 
1994, 'the last five years results have clearly demonstrated our ability to compete effectively as a 
mutual with the best in the financial services industty'. 64 
On the 31 January 1996, the A&L announced its intention to float on the stock market and its 
Chairman, Simon Everard, estimated that the flotation would value the company at between 
£2.5 and £3 billion, making it the fourth largest building society to shed its mutual status. The 
reason given for conversion was stated thus, 'as a substantially capitalised, publicly-listed 
financial services group, the Alliance & Leicester will be able to compete across a wide range of 
personal and corporate financial services market'.65 The cut- off period was 31December 1995 so 
'speculators who joined up between January 1 and 14 when the society closed its share 
accounts- will be barred'. 66 This was arguably a very short, almost token cut-off period and 
63 FT Allyson Smith 9 Aug 1995 management: Firming up the Foundations- The trade 
associations representing building societies 
64 FT Alison Smith 22 April 1994 Lloyds/ Cheltenham & Gloucester: Rest of Sector given 
something to think about 
65 31 Jan 1996 City: Millions Banle On Shares Bonanza As Alliance Goes Public: Press 
Association Philip Thornton and Nick Hudson 
66 ibid 
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merely excluded the less organised carpet- baggers as the Alliance & Leicester was one of the 
first societies to admit an interest in conversion. As the Financial Times noted as far back as 
1989, 'at present only two societies, National & Provincial and Alliance & Leicester, admit to 
considering incorporation, compared with about half a dozen this time last year' .67 
Alliance & Leicester 
Alliance BS united with Leicester BS to fi-om Alliance & Leicester 1985 
Boston & Skirbeck transfer to Leicester BS 1984 
Bristol & West Building Society 
On April 14 1996 the Bank ofIreland announced its plans for a £700 million takeover of the 
Bristol & West Building Society. It spent just one week refusing to accept new savers on their 
share account in order to stem the rabid flow of potential carpet-baggers responding to takeover 
rumours in the press. Alex Brummer, prompted by news of the takeover, wrote that the, 'history 
of encouraging prudence and sound money has been wasted in a few years by a Conservative 
administration insensitive to the movement and apparently hell-bent on creating a group of 
financial behemoths able to run roughshod over stakeholders, whether investors or employees'. 68 
However, 'the movement', at least within the membership of the Bristol & West, seemed more 
67 FT Davis Bm'chard 3 May 1989 Seeking Survival In Demanding Times: The Problems which 
deregulation pose for UK Building Societies 
68 Alex Brummer "Tories Build on Mutual Bonanza" The Observer April 14 1996 
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than willing to avail themselves of the legislation of the insensitive Conservative administration. 
When the Bristol & West held a special meeting at the Royal Bath and West of England Society 
Showground in Shepton Mallett in order to seek member's approval of the proposed merger with 
the Bank: of Ireland group, the Glasgow Herald reported that members had, 'voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of the proposed combination' with 84% of its members voting on the 
ballot.69 This percentage represented 600,000 of the Bristol and West's membership, of which 
96% voted in favour. 70 The differential rewards for members upon merger meant that savers 
received £1,000 in cash and borrowers received 250 preference shares estimated to be worth £1 
each. Two- year members, defined by the board as savers who were members from the end of 
1994 and who had at least £1 00 invested on April 1996 and December 31 1996, would receive a 
cash payment of £500.71 However, the more meager rewards for borrowing members did little to 
deter their enthusiasm for the telms of the merger. 
The demutualisation of the Bristol & West, like that of the N&P seems to have been driven by 
the enthusiasm of the membership. The management, displaying none of the vigorous 
detemlination of the Abbey's management, maintained a luke-warm and pragmatic approach to 
the demutualisation process, commending it when they were clear that little would change in the 
society'S intemal organisation. Thus, the board advocated merger following the, 'Banle of 
Ireland's promise to retain existing staff and management, and preserve B&W as a separate 
company with its own branch network'. 72 
The management had made some attempt to inhibit the swamping of its membership with carpet-
69 The Glasgow Herald April 16 1997 "Support for conversions" 
70 John Givens, "Members in the Street Opting to Take the Windfall and Run" (repOlied in The 
Guardian April 19 1997, 
71 Krishna Guha "Savers Strike it Rich" FT March 1 1997 
72 ibid 
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baggers by closing its doors to new savers wishing to open share accounts. Despite this, the 
membership of the Bristol & West, like the other converting societies before it, saw their self-
interest as being served by the exchange of mutual status for cash. 
Bristol & West 
Chesthunt BS 30 December 1991 
Aid to Thrift BS to Chesthunt 11 July 1988 
Thift BS to Chesthunt 13 April 1987 
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Northern Rock 
The conversion in 1997 ofNOlihern Rock Building Society was approached in a measured and 
uncontroversial manner. Managing director Chris Sharp described it thus, 'the route to 
conversion is hard work but we are making good progress. Watch this space,.73 A stockbroker, 
Hoare Govett Corporate Finance, was appointed a year before the stock was floated and 
Northern Rock's members were keen to conveli, and of those borrowing and investing members 
who voted in the ballot for demutualisation, 97% were in favour. Conversion gave 500 fi-ee 
shares to its members that were, at the time of voting, estimated to be worth between £1300 and 
£1475, with the Society itself being valued at around £1250 million. Its chairman, Robert 
Dickenson, was repOlied as saying that the society was, 'extremely pleased' that so many 
members took part in the vote and that the conversion proposals received such overwhelming 
backing,.74 Northern Rock Building Society would not conveli into a banle until October 1997 
whereupon all members would receive 500 shares. 
Following the ballot, Northern Rock am10unced a 27 percent decline in pre- tax profits to £62.9 
million. The cost of conversion was reported to be over £9 million and the amount lent following 
the ballot fell fi-om £l.lbillion to £794million.75 But, Northern Rock's executives were 
extremely keen to retain their position and thus avoid being taken over. Executive director David 
Baker, stated, 'we hope that our performance for shareholders will ensure our continued 
independence' .76 So, for this reason, coupled with the problem of fluctuating profits leading up 
73 Colin Tapping quote fi'om The Northern Echo July 24, 1996, "Record-Breaking Rock Stays 
On Flotation Track" 
74 The Glasgow Herald April 16 1997 "Support for conversions" 
75 Caroline Merrell). "Northern Rock Float Costs £9 million" The Times July 24 1997 
76 ibid 
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to conversion, the society decided to hold only one auction for their shares. In contrast, the 
Halifax, Alliance and Leicester and the Woolwich building societies all held at least three 
auctions, despite evidence that auctions tended to cause sharp fluctuations in share prices with 
large differences between the price at auction and the price on the market. Northern Rock 
attempted to avoid the possibility of price manipulation by holding one auction the day before 
the listing of its stock on the market, disclosing the price just before trading began.77 By 
September 27th the windfall accruing to members 500 shares was estimated to be worth about 
£2,100.78 Following floatation on the market the windfalls were worth £2,300, with the share 
value peaking at 470p, far in excess to the 295p predicted in conversion documents sent to the 
society's members in February 1997. 
The membership had little desire to retain any ownership rights in Northern Rock PLC and most 
members preferred to cash- in their shares, 43 % of members selling at the auction. 
Commentators attributed this to the mentality of the North East of England. Adam Applegarth, 
Executive Director was repOlied as saying, 'Geordies prefer cash'. 79 Yet, as the evidence above 
indicates, Geordies may love cash but so did the vast majority of the building societies 
movement membership in 1997. 
77 FT September 2 1997 "NOlihern Rock plans one auction of shares: Single sale intended to 
avoid sharp fluctuation in prices" 
78 FT September 27 "More than 43% to cash Northern Rock shares" Christopher Brown-Humes 
79 The Times October 4 1997 "The Floating of the Rock" Caroline Merrell 
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Northern Rock 
North of England BS- 1994 
Surrey BS-1993 
Lancastrian BS- 1992 
Wi shaw Investments-1987 
United Kingdom BS-1987 
Hartlepool & District BS- 1985 
Manchester Unity of Odd Fellows- 1985 
South Shields Sun Permanent Bs-1985 
Masselburgh BS- 1983 
Blyth & Morpeth BS- 1982 
Kilmarnock BS- 1982 
Shields & Washington BS- 1982 
Pioneer BS-1981 
StockpOli & County Permanent BS- 1981 
Lancashire BS- 1980 
Walker & Byker Industrial Permanent BS- 1980 
NOlihern Counties BS and Rock Pelmanent Merged to form Northern Rock-1965 
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Conclusion: 
The conversion of the Abbey National Building Society could have operated as a salutary 
experience for those who wished to preserve mutuality, leading to a pro-active campaign to 
inhibit conversions. Instead, as the Abbey National continued to be successful8o, mainly due to 
the buoyancy of the mortgage lending business, so larger building societies continued to consider 
conversion a viable option. And, despite the ample time available between the Abbey National's 
conversion and the huge spate of conversions in 1997, little was done either by Parliament or by 
those heading the building society industry, to protect, or promote mutuality. In particular, 
members' appreciation of mutuality did not increase, on the contrary, members voted in 
ovelwhelming numbers for the conversion of their society, with votes in favour being almost 
unanimous in the ballot for the Bristol and West merger and the Northern Rock conversion. 
Furthennore, it had become clear from the judicial decisions noted, that the Building Society Act 
1986 held precious few protections against conversion when such large majorities of members 
were in favour of demutualisation. Conversion remained popular even in the absence of the 
spectacular rewards offered by conversions like the Halifax conversion, as the modest amounts 
accming to Bristol & West bOlTowers testify. Mutuality had been neglected and now it was 
scorned, its preservation would depend on a transfonnation in executive, judicial, governmental 
and, paliicularly, membership attitude toward it. It is to a study of these attitudes that this thesis 
will now address itself. 
80 The Abbey National entry into the state agency business had actually resulted in losses 
according to a report in 1994. 
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Public Attitudes to Mutuality 
As shown in the previous chapter, 1997 saw a huge decrease in building society assets as the 
largest societies, Northern Rock, Bristol and West, the Woolwich, Alliance & Leicester and, 
most significantly, the Halifax converted into PLCs. 1 The 1997 Building Society Association's 
Annual Conference in Brighton reflected this abrupt change of fortunes, with much discussion 
about the need to adopt more convincing strategies to maintain member loyalty to societies in 
their existing legal fonn and, in pmiicular, to thwart carpet-baggers. Interviews with delegates 
during the conference displayed an even greater sense of urgency and frustration that too little 
was being done, too late, to save the movement from being swallowed up by the corporate fonn. 2 
On the conference floor there was much discussion on the need to curb carpet-bagging, largely 
considered to be the greatest threat to the preservation of building societies. Dr Geoffrey 
Fitchew, Chief Registrar of the Building Society Commission, argued that the passage of the 
1997 Building Society Act had gone some considerable way toward the protection of mutuality 
as, to a large extent, its more permissive regime allowed societies to construct their own powers 
under their rules and memorandum. Though ShDli on specifics, Dr Fitchew called for a general 
demonstration of the benefits of mutuality. 
I The Bristol & West transferred its interests to the Bank ofIreland. 
2 The writer undeliook a number of infDlmal interviews with chief executives at the 1997 BSA 
Conference. 
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In addition to this, two outside speakers argued in favour of mutuality and outlined the methods 
by which members could be persuaded to concur with these views. 
Sheila McKeclmie, Chief Executive of the Consumer Association, stated that there were 
considerable benefits for the consumer, both as members of mutual societies and as consumers, 
in an environment where mutuals existed as part of the competition for financial services. 
Demutualised societies, she argued, suffered by introducing an additional stakeholder - the 
shareholder - who demanded a large proportion of profit. Ms McKechnie went on to cite the 
Abbey National as an example of a demutualised society that paid out 40% of its profits as 
shareholder dividends and had closed branches to cut costs and enhance profits, effectively, 
'excluding customers' . 3 She further argued that 'they, (public limited companies) are hindered 
from offering competitive lending and borrowing packages to customers ...... mutuals do not 
offer dividends to their members therefore they were able to offer more competitive rates than 
banks'. 4 To illustrate this latter point, Ms McKechnie outlined a study undertaken by the 
Consumer Association, which revealed that mortgages offered by High Street building societies 
were, on average, £1,600 cheaper than banks when summed over a 5-year period. Mortgages 
from smaller societies were even cheaper. 
Dr Beard from the Henley Centre proffered a study undertaken on awareness and understanding 
of mutual status and concluded that mutual societies needed 'new packaging' that focused less 
on ownership and more on the benefit of investing and borrowing from a mutual. In his view 
there had been a general shift in public values over the last 10 years and a reorientation toward 
community values, placing collective before individual interests. However, the reverse was true 
3 BSA conference 1997 
4 ibid 
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when acting as consumers; here concerns were 'individualistic, demanding and self-interested,5. 
There was, he argued, a fall in trust and faith in traditional institutions due to the visible 
'fallibility of the expeli' and a 'decline in deference'. This gave 'new opportunities for outsiders' 
diminishing the traditional barriers to entry and therefore providing more access for women and 
ethnic groups. 
In terms of strategic advice, Dr Beard argued that building societies should dispel their 'old 
fashioned' image in favour of 'the more desirable image of tradition or heritage'. He fmiher 
advised societies to, 'enhance employer flexibility, acknowledge the fact that the consumer 
considers profit to be both acceptable and desirable, create innovative products and develop a 
relationship between consumers and producers,6. The first and last of these points could be 
neatly encompassed in the concept of mutuality, which is both traditional and highlights 
relationships within a mutual society. Mutuality, then, could be viewed as good 'product'. 
In another session, Jolm Heaps, Deputy Chair ofthe BSA and Chief Executive of the Britannia 
discussed what he called the, 'virtuous circle of mutuality'. Increased profitability would 
increase member's 'profits', which would increase the number of satisfied customers which 
would mean more business and increased profitability and so on. Based on the results from focus 
groups and questiOlmaires, the Britannia had constructed a 'members loyalty scheme' whereby 
members would receive a 'point' for every pound paid on their mortgage, a scheme he 
recommended to other societies. 
Elsewhere, at the conference, delegates discussed the importance of emphasising the difference 
5 ibid 
6 ibid 
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between a mutual society and a PLC. The Abbey National, many argued, had continued its 
success as a mortgage lender as it had continued to look like and act like a mutual building 
society, To outside observers, the only difference in the Abbey National following conversion 
was that its members had received a cash bonus. As demutualisation appeared desirable a mutual 
society could only avoid conversion by leaming to underline the distinct nature of mutuality and 
its benefits over the corporate form. In the words of Jolm Cheele, executive of Kent Reliance 
Building Society, 
Members of societies were unaware of their rights, management has been too 
distant from the membership. Now they are becoming aware of their rights, they 
wish to exercise them for financial gain, and who can blame them - a company 
appears to them to be no different fl:om building society. 7 
The key theme of the 1997 conference, Shaping up for the Future, was the necessity to find and 
exercise strategies to articulate the nature and benefits of mutuality. By this method, member's 
active support of mutuality could work as a bulwark against the activities of carpet-baggers, How 
successful these strategies were is assessed in the following survey. 
The following surveys were conducted in Brighton, London and Canterbury, during July and 
August of 1997, and again in the same locations and during the same period three years later. 8 In 
each case, the survey was undertaken in a busy commercial area on streets with a substantial 
building society presence.9 The surveys were undertaken on weekdays and, in total, fifty 
questiOlmaires were taken in each location and on each occasion. The complete study involved a 
7 John Cheele in interview at the 1997 BSA conference. 
8 These locations were selected for the convenience of the writer who lives and works in these 
areas 
9 Canterbury: High Street 
Brighton: Westem Road 
London: Camden High Street 
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, , 
total of 300 questionnaires. 
The survey was designed to assess individual's knowledge of building society's mutual status 
and their allegiance to their own building society. The surveys were taken three years apart in 
order to assess how successful building societies had been in promoting the meaning and 
desirability of mutual status. 
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The questiomlaire was first tested on a small focus group of six people in order to address any 
problems such as repetition or contradictions. The questionnaire proceeded as follows. 
1. Are you a member of a building society? 
2. What do you understand by mutuality? 
3. If your building society proposed becoming a bank, how would you vote? 
4. Why would you vote this way? 
Problems: 
Question 1: Are you a member of a building society? 
This seemingly uncontroversial question was confused by the way in which many people 
consider building societies to be building societies whether or not they possess the letters pIc 
after their name. This became problematic when the interviewer came to question 3. "If your 
building society proposed becoming a pIc how would you vote?"; as a number replied that the 
motion to convert had already taken place. However, ifthe interviewer had attempted to clarify 
the situation by for instance asking the question, "are you a member of a mutual building 
society?" this would have rendered the survey and in patiicular question 2 redundant as it would 
have alelied the interviewee to the notion of mutuality and would probably have necessitated 
explanation of the term itself. Conversely, some interviewees replied 'no' because they belonged 
to a building society that had demutualised. 
The phrase, "are you a member of a building society" could be retained if the connecting 
questions were refined. Whether the answer was "yes" or "no", the interviewer would have a 
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correlating question. If the answer was yes, but the society had already voted to demutualise, the 
interviewer could move onto a appropriate question. These changes would be incorporated in a 
new question four which would contain three parts. 
4. (a) If answer to question 1 was 'yes, I am a member of a building society' then ask, "has your 
society voted on the issue of becoming a plc?" 
(i) If the answer is 'yes, my building has voted to become a plc', then ask "How did you vote?" 
1. Voted in favour. 
2. Voted against. 
3. Did not vote. 
4. (a)(ii) If the answer is 'no, my building society has not voted on the issue of becoming a plc', 
then ask "If your Building Society proposed becoming a pIc how would you vote?" 
1. In favour of becoming a plc 
2. Against becoming a pIc 
3. Would not vote 
4. (b) If answer to question 1 was 'no, I am not a member of a building society' then ask 
"If you were a member how would you vote?" 
1. In favour of becoming a pIc 
2. Against becoming a plc 
3. Would not vote. 
Question 4(b) allowed the survey to gauge the opinions of the general public who were not 
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members of a building society. 
2. What do you understand by mutuality? 
In this form, the question appeared disconcertingly intellectual and seemed to require an accurate 
definition from the interviewee or nothing at all. It therefore failed to engage in what the 
interviewees actually did understand about mutuality. It emerged that the term 'mutual' in some 
form was familiar in different ways to different interviewees. Some understood the term 
mutuality as it stood, but others only made sense of it when it was accompanied by the term 
mutual status. Other responded to the accompanying term 'demutualisation'. 
Question 2 was henceforth refOlIDulated to include the additional phrases 'mutual status' and 
'demutualisation'. Secondly, this question was followed by the more open question, 'what do 
you understand by this telID', thereby allowing interviewees to free associate those concepts that 
they cOlmected with mutuality. This was now contained in question 3. For those interviewees 
who did not understand these tenns, the interviewer fully explained the nature of conversion 
until an understanding was reached. 
3. !fyour building society proposed becoming a pic, how would you vote? 
This question was now subsumed in the new question 4. 
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4. Why would you vote this way? . 
Responses to the question were often twofold because although the general response was a vote 
in favour of demutualisation, this was, in the case of the focus group, entirely guided by the 
prospect of 'windfall shares '. The accompanying response to this answer was one of regret and a 
clear view that mutual building societies that were not pIes were a good thing. As the purpose 
was to assess public knowledge and allegiance to mutuality it was preferable to organize 
questions in such a way as to allow views on mutuality to be separated from views on financial 
reward (which followed a vote to shed mutual status). Thus, two additional questions were put at 
the end of the survey. Firstly, "Do you think that organisations with mutual status are worth 
preserving?", and, secondly, "Why do you think this?" (question 5 and 6 respectively) 
In general, the survey was reconstructed in order to accommodate the problems identified by the 
focus group and to allow interviewees that had an opinion on building societies, and of building 
societies becoming pIes, to be incorporated, notwithstanding that they were not members of a 
building society. The survey also allowed for some clarification of the telID mutuality to be 
included. 10 
10 The full survey is held in appendix 2 
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1997 Survey 
The condensed results contained in the following tables are expressed in percentages of either the 
whole surveyor the category that was being asked that particular question. Not all interviewees 
were asked same question. For example, interviewees that replied that they were not members of 
a building society would not then be asked how they would vote within their building society, 
but were instead asked how they would vote if they were members of building societies. 
Question 1: Are you or have you ever been a member of a building society? 
Q1 membership 
% YES 
% NO 
Canterbury Brighton London 
76 84 72 
24 16 28 I 
---_ .. ----_.. _.- -_. -- - - - ----- _. 
percentage o(all interviewees 
Occasionally, interviewees answered 'don't know, this was recorded as 'no'. 
Question 2: Have you heard the term mutuality, demutualisation or mutual status in the 
context of building societies? 
Q2 knowledge 
% YES 
% NO 
Canterbury 
68 
32 
Brighton 
84 
16 
percentage o(all interviewees 
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London 
80 
20 
Question 3: What do you understand by mutuality? 
---------
Q3 understanding Canterbury Brighton London 
nothing 16 0 16 
no shareholders 52 68 52 
borrowers & lenders 0 32 28 
non profit making 40 16 12 
run for members 36 16 28 
owned by members 28 56 28 
members voted 28 32 40 
one man one vote 4 0 0 
________ I 
- --
-----
percentage o[particular category 
This question invited the interviewees to talk about their general understanding of mutuality or 
mutual status allowing the interviewer to note down the many points that were made. These 
discussions were later categorised under the nine different headings noted above. Generally 
interviewees had more than one notion of mutuality and it is these that are noted. Only those who 
did not respond in the affirmative to Question 2 were not asked this or any other question. 
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Question 4: How would you/did you vote in a motion to demutualise? 
4( a) (i) "Yes I am a member of a building society" 
Affil111ative, building society has voted to demutualise 
Q4(a)(i) voting Canterbury Brighton 
~ 
-
~ 
voted in favour 20 24 
voted against 0 8 
- --
~ 
_. -- .- ._.-
did not vote 16 16 
-
number of interviewees eighteen twentyfour 
percentage o[all interviews 
Q4(a)(i) voting Canterbury Brighton 
voted in favour 56 50 
---
--
voted against o 17 
did not vote 44 33 
number of interviewees eighteen twentyfour 
percentage of given category 
214 
London 
24 
4 
12 
twenty 
London 
60 
10 
30 
twenty 
Question 4(a) (ii) Negative, building society has not voted to demutualise 
--_ .. _- --_._--------- -- --- ---
Q4(a)(i) voting Canterbury Brighton 
would vote in favour 70 56 75 
would vote against 20 22 25 
would not vote 10 33 0 
number of interviewees twnety eighteen sixteen 
percentage shown orcategOJY 4 (a)(ii) 
4(b) (Hypothetical) "I am not a member of a building society" "How would you vote" 
.-- --
Q4(b) hypothetical voting Canterbury Brighton 
would vote in favour 16 4 
would vote against 4 4 
would not vote 4 8 
number of interviewees twelve eight 
percentages oral! interviews 
Q4(b) hypothetical voting Canterbury Brighton 
would vote in favour 67 25 
would vote against 17 25 
would not vote 17 50 
number of interviewees twelve eight 
--------
-- - -_. --
percentage shown orcategorv 4(b) 
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London 
12 
8 
8 
fourteen 
---- -- --- .. _-
London 
43 
29 
29 
fourteen 
Question 5: Do you think that organisations with mutual status are worth preserving? 
# 
- .- ----_. -_. --
Q5 worth preserving? Canterbury Brighton London 
YES% 36 48 36 
NO% 32 36 44 
_ .. --
Response V'om those who were members of building societies, expressed as a percentage of all 
the interviews 
On average 40% ofthose interviewed thought that mutuality was worth preserving and 37.3% of 
those interviewed thought it was not worth preserving. 
Question 6: Why do you think that mutual status is worth preserving? 
Q6 why preserve mutuality? 
traditional 
competition 
cheaper mortgages 
democratic 
personal service 
good for small savers 
I
i total number in the affirmative 
-- --- - ---.-
Canterbury 
8 
16 
24 
o 
8 
8 
eighteen 
Brighton 
8 
24 
36 
4 
4 
12 
twentyfour 
percentages of all interviews 
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London 
8 
20 
20 
8 
4 
12 
eighteen 
_____ ._ .. _______ I 
06 why preserve mutuality? Canterbury Brighton 
traditional 22 17 
competition 44 50 
cheaper mortgages 67 75 
democratic 0 8 
personal service 22 8 
good for small savers 22 25 
total number in the affirmative eighteen twentyfour 
~- ----
percentage ofthis categ0 111 
Mutuality is not worth preserving: Reasons 
06 why end mutuality? 
slow & old fashioned 
uncompetative 
indifferent to organisational form 
total number in the negative 
Canterbury 
24 
12 
4 
sixteen 
Brighton 
16 
20 
81 
eighteen 
percentages orall interviews 
~-~ ~ - ---.--~ - ~~ --- ~- ---
06 why end mutuality? Canterbury Brighton 
slow & old fashioned 38 44 
uncompetative 12 33 
indifferent to organisational form 50 22 
total number in the negative sixteen eighteen 
---- --- ~--
percentage shown as a proportion ofthis categOlJl 
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London 
22 
56 
56 
22 
11 
33 
eighteen 
London 
24 
16 
12 
twentytwo 
London 
55 
18 
27 
twentytwo 
Conclusion: 
Perhaps because of the proximity of the interviews to building society branches, or perhaps 
because the surveys were conducted during a weekday (when building societies would be open 
all day), in all three cities, a large percentage of those interviewed were members of building 
societies. Indeed, in all three cities over three quarters of those interviewed owned a building 
society account. In addition to this, a high percentage of the sample had some cognizance of at 
least one of the tenns 'mutuality', 'demutualisation' or 'mutual status' in the context of building 
societies. The smallest percentage was in Canterbury at 68% of all those interviewed, the highest 
being Brighton at 86%. The questionnaires therefore signified that a high percentage of the 
sample were cOlmected to building societies (average 77.3%) and lor had some recognition of the 
aforementioned terms (average 77.3%). 
The results of Question 3 indicated that mutuality was understood in telms of its difference to the 
corporate form. A highly visible characteristic of companies is the existence of shares and 
shareholders; the most common understanding interviewees had of mutuality was that it meant 
an absence of these two corporate features. Thus, 57.3% of those interviewed understood 
mutuality as meaning an absence of shareholders and by implication, shares. 
The second most popular understanding of mutuality, on average held by 37.3% of interviewees, 
was that a society was owned by its members. This was a significant number, given that it has 
been argued that one of the major factors in the move to demutualise was members' alienation 
from their building society because it appeared to be just another large, faceless financial 
organisation. On closer examination, it emerged that this particular insight was, ironically, 
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derived from the process of demutualisation itself. The logic of this was that ifmembers of 
demutualising building societies were receiving 'windfall shares', gratis, then they were being 
recompensed for the value of ownership of a part of that organisation. 
The educative nature of the highly publicised demutualisations was further apparent in the third 
most popular understanding of mutuality, the fact that members voted. The notion of voting is an 
issue that has been highly published in the context of demutualisation where member's votes are 
pivotal to demutualisation in the context of section 97 of the Building Societies Act 1986. 
The answers to Questions 3 and 4 provide the greatest insight into how successful mutual 
societies have been in promoting the unique and desirable qualities of mutuality. The notion that 
building societies were "non profit making" was understood by an average of22.7% of those 
asked. This obviously strikes at the core of the message that building societies wished to 
communicate ie that building societies had a social function and that membership of a mutual 
was a rational choice. This, coupled with the fact that 27% ofthose asked understood mutuality 
as meaning that the organisation was lUn for the benefit of members indicated that at least 25% 
of the interviewees thought that mutuality held positive benefits for members. 
A sizeable 20% of those interviewed thought that mutuality meant that there were both 
borrowers and savers within the organisation. This indicated a more sophisticated understanding 
of mutuality but did not, of itself, indicate whether this was considered a positive or negative 
attribute of mutuality. 
Question 4(a) related to those interviewees that were members of building societies that had 
voted to demutualise. In Canterbury, this accounted for 36% of those interviewed, in Brighton, 
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48%, and in London, 40%; in total 41 % of all those interviewed and 46% of those who continued 
to be interviewed after question 2. Of this category, 36% did not vote at all, 55% claimed to have 
voted in favour of demutualisation, whilst only 9% claimed to have voted against the motion to 
demutualise. As a percentage of all interviews, 22.7% voted in favour, 3 % voted against and 
14,6% did not vote at all. In other words only three people in the total survey for 1997 chose to 
vote against this motion despite the fact that 34 people thought of building societies as non profit 
making and 40 people thought they were run for the benefit of members. Notwithstanding that 
this category represented only 46% of those who continued to be interviewed, there was still a 
considerable discrepancy between an articulate and positive view of mutuality and an active 
attempt (in the fonTI of a vote) to maintain the mutual status of the societies concerned. 
Question 4(a)(ii) related to those interviewees who were members of a building society that had 
not yet voted to demutualise. The numbers here were surprisingly high given the number of 
building societies that had demutualised by this date (approximately 60% of building society 
assets); Question 4(a)(ii) accounted for 36% ofthe total survey and 40.3% of those who 
continued to be interviewed after Question 2. The first thing to note about these interviews is that 
only a very small percentage of interviewees said that they would not vote in a motion to 
demutualise (5% of all interviews) therefore the percentages of individuals voting for or against 
demutualisation are greater than in Question 4(a)(i), although, as voting behaviour in general 
suggest more people intend to vote than actually succeed in doing so. This notwithstanding, a 
huge 66.7% of those in this category said that they would vote in favour of demutualisation, 
representing 24% of all interviews taken. Only 14% of this category said that they would vote 
against the motion, just 8% of all interviews. 
Question 4(b) asked the hypothetical question, "How would you vote?", and accounted for 
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22.7% of all interviewees. 32% of this category said they would not vote in a motion, a much 
higher percentage than for question 4(a)(ii) but was sti11lower than those answering Question 
4(a). 
The most popular view by this group was that they would vote in favour of demutualisation, 
(45%) which accounts for 10.7% of the whole survey. Only 23.7% of this group said they would 
vote against the motion, a number representing 5% of all those interviewed. 
Thus we can see that the majority of individuals would vote or had already voted in favour of 
demutualisation vote and in this hypothetical vote 65.7% have voted. As, 75% of investors and 
50% ofbonowers are required to vote in favour of a resolution to convert to a pIc.; in this 
hypothetical vote, 74.1 % would vote in favour, and, given a reasonable percentage ofbonowers 
voting this would most celiainly allow conversion to take place. 
------- ----
voted in favour voted against did not vote 
category 4(a) 14.7 4 22.7 
category 4(a)(i) 24 8 5 
category 4(b) 10.7 5 7 
total 48.70% 17% 34.70% 
------------ --- -----
To the question, 'Do you think that organisations with mutual status are worth preserving, on 
average 40% of those interviewed replied in the affirmative but 37.3% of those interviewed 
thought it was not worth preserving. Although nearly half would vote to end the mutual status 
and 34.7% were not sufficiently concerned to vote (a total of 83.4%), a significant proportion 
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thought that, at least in theory, mutuality was worth preserving. This would suggest two things. 
Firstly, that mutuality was not sufficiently important for members or hypothetical members to 
actively preserve it, and secondly, it was not sufficiently important for members to forego the 
financial rewards accruing to them upon demutualisation. 
In the study as a whole, the reasons for supporting mutuality were as follows. 
- -- -- --- -- ---
average % of study average % of category 
traditional 8 30 
competition 20 50 
cheaper mortgages 27 66 
democratic 3 10 
personal service 5 14 
good for small savers 11 27 
% in the affirmative 40 
--.----,----
NB Interviewees often gave more than one response. It is the responses that are recorded. 
Clearly, the most positive reasons for maintaining mutual status were that their existence 
maintained competition in the financial market and that they provided cheap mortgages. This 
indicates a very pragmatic approach to mutual status, mutual societies ensured cheaper financial 
products by firstly providing them and secondly forcing competitors to follow suit. Yet, it was 
riot necessary that all mutual societies remained (hence many of these interviewees had already 
voted to demutualise) just that enough remained to enable competition. The sorts of things that 
the BSA were anxious to promote, such as the 'personal touch', scored very low on the survey, 
the latter three categories accounting for only 6.3% of responses. That mutual societies were 
'traditional', was not of great significance to interviewees. The preservation of mutual societies 
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per se, in the eyes of the sample would have to be justified by observable benefits. 
The results of Question 6 in respect to those not wanting to preserve the mutual status of building 
societies were indicative of societies' collective failure to promote a modem commercial image. 
It also indicates a failure by societies to address their critics, as societies continued to be 
perceived as possessing overcautious and often prejudicial attitudes to potential borrowers. 
slow & old fashioned 
uncompetitive 
indifferent to organisational form 
% in the negative 
average % of study 
17 
16 
8 
37 
average % of category 
46 
21 
33 
percentages as total of whole survey and of particular categoOJ 
To summarise the conclusions of this first study, we can see that the very act of demutualisation 
by societies, particularly large societies such as the Halifax, had served to educate members on 
some of the attributes of mutuality. Previous studies suggested that knowledge of the attributes 
of mutuality were still very unfOlmed. 11 However, an enhanced insight into the nature of 
mutuality did not result in a direct commitment to its preservation when he benefits of 
conversion for members were so immediate and tangible. 
II Henley Centre op cit 
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2000 Survey 
Question 1: Are or have you ever been a member of a building society? 
membership Canterbury Brighton London 
YES 72% 64% 56% 
~ 
NO 28% 36% 44% 
percentage of all interviews 
Again, if interviewees answered 'don't know' this was recorded as 'no'. 
The number of interviewees who were members of building societies in 2000 were slightly down 
on the figures from 1997, although the vacinity in which the interviews were undertaken had 
been shown in the previous survey drew a 'large propOliion of building society members. 
2. Have you heard the term mutuality, demutualisation or mutual status in the context of building 
societies? 
knowledge Canterbury Brighton London 
-~ -
YES 88% 88% 88% 
NO 12% 12% 12% 
percentage of all interviews 
In all three cities, more interviewees in the 2000 study had some acquaintance with these terms 
than the previous 1997 interviewees. In Canterbury 20% more interviewees had knowledge of 
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these tenTIs, in Brighton this figure was up 5% and in London there was an increase of 8%, 
indicating that either or both the effOlis of building societies and the media to elucidate the 
notion of mutuality had been successful. 
Question 3 "What do you understand by mutuality? 
- .. _- ----- ------ ---------- ------ -----
Q3 understanding Canterbury Brighton London 
nothing 4% 0 4% 
no shareholders 56% 68% 76% 
borrowers & lenders 16% 24% 16% 
non profit making 56% 52% 40% 
run for members 36.00% 52% 48% 
owned by members 44% 40% 32% 
members voted 28% 24% 12% 
one man one vote 0% 0% 0% 
-- ------
lJercentaze ofa ziven vote 
This question invited the interviewees to talk about their general understanding of mutuality or 
mutual status allowing the interviewer to note down the many points that were made. These 
discussions were later categorised under the nine different headings that were constructed in the 
first 1997 survey. Generally interviewees had more than one notion of mutuality and it is these 
that are noted. Only those who did not respond in the affirmative to question 2 were not asked 
this question. 
Like the 1997 study, the most popular understanding of mutuality in the context of building 
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societies was that there were no shareholders, in 1997 this accounted for 57.3% of interviews. In 
2000, this accounted for exactly two third of all those interviewed. Less popular was the view 
that mutuality indicted a financial institution that encompassed both borrowers and lenders, 
standing at 18.6%, it had dropped by 4%. Likewise, the fact that members voted was only noted 
in 21.3% of interviews in 2000 compared to 33.3% in 1997. 
The significant shift occurred in the two answers that were previously identified as being the 
most significant in term of indicating an appreciation of mutuality as something beneficial, 
answers three and four. 49.3% of interviewees said that mutuality meant that the organisation 
was non profit making, an increase of nearly 27% from 1997 and 45.3% thought that mutuality 
indicated an organisation that was run for the benefit of its members, an increase of nearly 19% 
from the previous survey. It appeared therefore that the interviewees increasingly considered that 
mutuality was something with positive attributes and one that perhaps should be maintained. 
Question 4: Are you a member of a building society and if so has it voted on the issue of 
becomig a pIc? 
4.(a) "Yes I am a member of a building society" 
Q4(a) voting Canterbury Brighton London 
voted in favour 16% 20% 8%1 
voted against 8% 4% 0% 
did not vote 20% 28% 24% 
number of interviewees twenty two twentysix sixteen 
percenta;ze of all interviews 
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Q4(a) voting Canterbury Brighton London 
voted in favour 36 39 25 
voted against 18% 8% 0 
did not vote 46% 54% 75% 
number of interviewees twenty two twentysix sixteen 
-- ._-
percentage or given category 
Question 4(a) (ii) How would you vote? 
Q4(a)(i) voting Canterbury Brighton London 
would vote in favour 12 8% 12 
would vote against 8 4 8 
would not vote 8 o 4% 
number of interviewees fourteen six twelve 
percentage orall interviews 
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Q4(a)(i) voting 
would 'vOte in fa'vOur 
would 'vOte against 
would not 'vOte 
number of interviewees 
Canterbury Brighton 
43 67 
29 33 
29 o 
fourteen six 
-------
percentage orgiven category 
London 
twelve 
50 
33 
17 
4(b) (Hypothetical) "I am not a member of a building society" "How would you vote" 
--
-
- -- -- ---- -- --- --- --- -- -- ---
Q4(b) hypothetical voting Canterbury Brighton London 
would 'vOte in favour 16 16 20 
would 'vOte against 12 16 16 
would not 'vOte 0 4 8 
number of interviewees fourteen nine eleven 
- - - - - ----
percentages orall interviews 
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Q4(b) hypothetical voting Canterbury Brighton London 
would vote in favour 57 44 46 
would vote against 42 441 36 
would not vote 0 11 18 
number of interviewees fourteen eighteen twentytwo 
percentage shown ofcategorv 4(b) 
The significance of question five is that it indicates an increasing aversion to voting in favour of 
demutualisation. For those who belonged to building societies that had not yet chosen to 
demutualise, 31. 7% (on average) said that they would vote against such a motion. As 85% (on 
average) said that they would vote, the 'no' vote would represent 37.3% of the total. If the 
majority of voters were investors, this would be insufficient to allow conversion. In contrast, in 
1997, only 22.3% would vote against a motion to demutualise. 
5. Do you think that organisations with mutual status are worth preserving? 
Q5 worth preserving? Canterbury Brighton London 
YES% 52 60 40 
NO% 20 36 32 
percentage of all inten1iews 
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On average 5l. 7% of those interviewed thought that mutuality was worth preserving and 29.3% 
of those interviewed thought it was not worth preserving. 
6.Why do you think that mutual status is worth preserving? 
Those in the Affirmative. 
- -- --- --- ----
Q6 why preserve mutuality? Canterbury Brighton London 
traditional 8 0 4 
competition 28 36 28 
cheaper mortgages 40 36 40 
democratic 12 24 16 
personal service 20 24 8 
good for small savers 24 32 20 
total number in the affirmative twentysix thrity twenty 
-------- -
percentage oral! interviews 
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Q6 why preserve mutuality? Canterbury Brighton London 
traditional 15 0 10 
competition 54 60 70 
cheaper mortgages 76 60 100 
democratic 24 46 40 I: 
personal service 38 46 20 
good for small savers 46 62 50 
- .. ~.- ----~ ~.-
total number in the affirmative twentysix thirty twenty 
percentage of group in favour of mutual societies 
Mutuality is not worth preserving: Reasons 
Q6 why end mutuality? Canterbury Brighton London 
-
- ----- ._-
-_. 
slow & old fashioned 12 28 24 
uncompetative 20 24 24 
indifferent to organisational form 0 8 12 
total number in the negative ten eighteen sixteen 
oercenta}Zes ofal! interviews 
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Q6 why end mutuality? Canterbury Brighton London 
slow & old fashioned 60 78 75 
uncompetative 100 67 75 
indifferent to organisational form 0 22 38 
total number in the negative te1 eighteen sixteen 
-----
percentage shown as a proportion ofthis categOlJ! 
Conclusion: 
The second survey indicates a greater overall understanding of the organisational form of the 
mutual society. In addition to this, mutuality is increasingly viewed as a positive attribute of a 
business organization and one that is worth preserving. This indicates that the supporters of 
mutual building societies have been more successful in communicating the meaning and benefits 
of mutuality to the public at large and that previous conversions have had an educative effect. 
Problematically, however, this increased appreciation has not translated itself into an intention to 
vote against a motion to demutualise, should it arise, so long as the short- telID financial benefits 
to members continue to be offered as part of the conversion package. 
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Chapter 7 
New Labour: Mutuality v New Mutualism 
1. Introduction: The 'Third Way' and New Labour: The Contemporary Context for Mutuality 
2. Financial Exclusion: What it was and the role of the mutual society 
3. The membership and mutuality 
i. The Nationwide Building Society 
ii. The Bradford and Bingley Building Society 
4. Centralisation and The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
5. Conclusion 
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Introduction: The 'Third Way' and New Labour: The Contemporary Context for Mutuality 
The final context to date in which the concept of mutuality has found itself is within a set of 
policies dominated by the politics of New Labour, popularly described as the 'third way' or less 
conU110nly as 'concem, or stakeholder capitalism'. In tIns chapter it will be argued that the 
politics of New Labour is primarily cOl1U11itted to a market economy that necessarily 
extinguishes social instihltions like the mutual society on the altar of market criteria. This point 
is amply demonstrated by an examination of the Financial Markets and Services Act 2000 and by 
New Labour's general unwillingness to take measures to protect mutuality. Conversely, New 
Labour's politics shy from the rhetoric of the fi:ee market, preferring instead the rhetoric of 
inclusion and mutualism. The latter tendency is likely to cause confusion in respect of the 
underlying pro- market orientation of the present administration and instill a belief that under a 
Labour government, mutual organizations are likely to be safe. 
In order to understand the political perspective of New Labour, this chapter begins by outlining 
the thoughts of its de facto architects, the authors of the three most influential books on the 
subject, oft quoted and praised by the upper echelons of the government. These are, in 
descending importance, Anthony Gidden's, The Third Way, Will Hutton' s The State We're In 
and Charles Leadbetter' s, Living On Thin Air. 
As the 'third way' politics of New Labour may be understood as the outcome of a reaction 
against old style socialism (a broad umbrella containing the 'far left' and the Labour Party of the 
1970s) and the neoliberal politics ofThatcherism, its emergence may be described dialectically. 
As a dialectical process it can be viewed as the synthesis emerging from neo-liberalism, the anti-
thesis of the thesis, socialism. It is perhaps then, a little ironic that the generally acknowledged 
architect of the political notion of 'the third way', Anthony Giddens, began his influential book, 
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of the same name with a perfunctory debunking of Marxist thought, which, he argued, failed to 
appreciate the resilience and innovation of capitalism.' 
Third Way politics, as articulated by Giddens, may be summarized as an attempt to connect the 
social welfare principles of socialism with a strong national market operating in a global context. 
Giddens constructed this model tlu·ough a critique of socialism and neo-liberalism and concluded 
that whilst both schools of thought were flawed, modern society and the consciousness of the 
populace generally remained entrenched in celiain elements of both. For example, he argued, the 
individualism of the 1980s had left a residual aversion to many of the activities of the welfare 
state. During this decade, in pmiicular, the welfare state had been criticized by the right for being 
undemocratic and for suppressing personallibeliy, criticisms that had a powerful appeal because 
they were, in part, true. Giddens himself described the welfare state as being 'bureaucratic, 
alienating and inefficient'.2 
However, he notes, these tenacious notions of individualism have not led to a cOlTesponding 
aversion to the making of welfare claims. Neither has it affected the population's moral affinity to 
the 'socialist' principle of providing for the vulnerable. At first blush, he rightly argued it might 
appear that these two perspectives, individualism and socialism, were incompatible. However, 
Third Way politics could encapsulate both perspectives and these two seemingly irreconcilable 
positions could co-habit in a world where increased individual liberty was coupled with increased 
individual responsibility; 'Having abandoned collectivism, third way politics looks for a new 
relationship betwe~n the individual and the community, a redefinition of rights and obligations'. 3 
Expanding individualism would mean expanding individual obligations. Thus, he argued, a 
consciousness must be nmiured which allowed for a responsible, mature individualism. So, in 
, Anthony Giddens (1998) "The Third Way" Polity Press 
2 ibid pl13 
3 ibid p64 
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respect of the welfare state, 'third way politics sees these problems not as a signal to dismantle the 
welfare state, but as part of the reason to reconstruct it' .4 
Third Way politics identified the role of the state, not in the minimalist style of the neo-libera1's 
Hayekian vision, nor in the intervention vision of the socialists. Instead, the role of the state was to 
promote the market whilst maintaining a more generalized prosperity through some limited 
govemment intervention in its activities. 
Classical social democracy thought of wealth creation as almost incidental to its 
basic concems with economic security and redistribution. The neoliberals placed 
competition and the generating of wealth much more to the forefront. Third way 
politics also gives very strong emphasis to these qualities, which have an urgent 
importance given the nature of the global market place. They will not be 
developed, however, if individuals are abandoned to sink or swim in an economic 
whirlpool. Govenm1ent has an essential role to play in investing in the human 
resources and infrastructure needed to develop an entrepreneurial culture.5 
Third Way politics deployed a 'social investment state', which aimed to create a 'new mixed 
economy' that would comprise a, 'synergy between public and private sectors, utilizing the 
dynamism of markets but with the public interest in mind, .6 
In third way politics, the balanced combination of public and private sectors was important for a 
number of reasons. An overly dominant market tended to perpetuate inequality, as evidenced by 
the great differentials in meritocratic societies such as the US, the UK and New Zealand. 
However, an overly public, welfare economy tended to create a 'dependency culture'. In third way 
politics, the key to moving toward greater equality in a modem society was the elimination of 
social exclusion. Third way politics viewed, 'equality as inclusion and inequality as exclusion,.7 
4 ibid p113 
5 ibid p99 
6 ibid plOO 
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Inclusion refers in its broadest sense to citizenship, to the civil and political rights 
and obligations that all members of a society should have, not just formally, but as 
a reality of their lives. It also refers to 0ppOliunities and to involvement in public 
space. In a society where work remains central to self- esteem and standard of 
living, access to work is one main context of opportunity. Education is another, 
and would be so even if it weren't so important for the employment possibilities 
to which it is relevant. 8 
Social exclusion, argued Giddens, refelTed both to the experience ofthe poor and that of the very 
rich. The latter, of course, choose to be excluded, a situation known in sociological terms as 'the 
revolt of the elites', but both have a negative impact on society as a whole. This form of social 
exclusion occurs, argues Giddens, in a social world where the old class concepts have dissolved 
and where traditional methods of production, such as manufacturing, had been replaced by new 
methods, such as infOlmation technology. Rich and poor are increasingly polarized, but the 
concepts traditionally used by sociologists to understand this have become outmoded. 
In order to counteract the many fOlms of social exclusion which perpetuated inequality, third way 
politics would construct an 'inclusive society', utlilising the ingredients of, 'equality as inclusion, 
limited meritocracy, renewal of public space (civic liberalism) beyond the work society, positive 
welfare and a social investment state,.9 The trend toward a socially excluding society could be 
reversed through a ' civic liberalism' which encourages a political and economic commitment 
from the richer elements of society to the poorer. Furthermore, a private solution could be found to 
public welfare programs if the middle classes possessed a self-interest in maintaining the welfare 
state. This self-interest could be satisfied by improving the services offered by the welfare state, 
elevating welfare from a 'safety net' for the poor into a series of high quality services, which all 
classes could enjoy. Indeed, he argued, 'where, 'welfare' assumes only a negative connotation and 
it is targeted largely at the poor, as has tended to happen in the US, the results are divisive' .10 
7 ibid pI02 
8 ibid pI03 
9 ibid piOS 
10 ibid pI08 
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Thus, third way politics seeks encourage the market economy, whilst ensuring that its tendency 
toward social division is tempered by some limited state intervention to encourage socially 
responsible and community sensitive commerce. In this way, third way politics accommodates 
aspirations for individual freedom by making that freedom dependent on a commitment to certain 
social obligations. In the context of the welfare state, the freedom of individuals to enjoy its 
benefits should be tempered by their obligation to pay for its continual improvement, and to limit 
personal claims to state benefits, education and healthcare by taking a more responsible attitude to 
work, childcare and healthy living. In the context of artificial legal individuals, such as the 
company, the individual freedom to operate in the market must be tempered with social 
obligations to communities and the environment. 
The notion of the 'socially responsible business' was also discussed at length by another writer 
with the 'ear' of the Government, Will Hutton, former editor of the ObsenJer newspaper. His 
version of third way politics was discussed under the concept of 'stakeholder capitalism' in his 
briefly impOliant book, The State We're In. 11 In this treatise he argued for the encouragement of 
the socially responsible corporation in which the interests of all 'stakeholders' were negotiated. 
These' stakeholders' would include, consumers, employees, creditors and local communities, as 
well as the well-established interests of shareholders. This approach would encourage a 
commitment fl.-om all those concerned with the corporation and would give them a reason to 
pursue the prosperity of the business, an outcome clearly popular with business owners. Hutton's 
more radical message, however, was that business should not be run purely for the purpose of 
creating profit. The interests of shareholder's dividend, was only one of the interests that business 
should ideally pursue. Shareholders were just one among many stakeholders and should take their 
place among a myriad of other priorities. 
Hutton's socially responsive business held clear socialist undertones, yet in spite of this, 
'stakeholder capitalism' remained a buzz phrase of New Labour for many years, although the 
11 Will Hutton (1996) "The State We're In.'' London. Jonathan Cape 
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policies were not pursued. The 'pluralist approach' to the company akin to stakeholding was 
abandoned at the end of the nineties in favour of 'enlightened shareholder value', an idea much 
more akin to third way politics. The latter notions have retained their popularity with the policies 
of New Labour together with the occasional ideological garnish such as that presented by Charles 
Leadbeater in his book, Living on Thin Air: The New Economy. 12 
Like Giddens, Leadbeater argued that the old class system had disappeared and, with it, traditional 
methods of retaining social order. However, unlike Giddens, Leadbetter attempts to understand 
this in terms of the material basis of social order. The economy, he argued, has shifted from 
industrial production to a 'knowledge based economy', but has done so whilst attempting to retain 
the institutions of social order that maintained and described the older economy. So, despite 
moving into a knowledge-based economy with all its potential democratic and safe connotations, 
individuals were experiencing their life as fraught with increasing anxiety. However, he argued, 
this sense of anxiety and powerlessness was not a personal failing but an institutional failing. 
Whilst the economy has undergone huge changes, the institutions that contained and sustained the 
economy had not. Indeed, the institutions that exist today were, in all their major characteristics, 
institutions designed to meet the needs of industrial Victorian England. 
The nineteenth century was revolutionary because the Victorians matched their 
scientific and technological innovations with radical institutional innovations: the 
extension of democracy, the creation of local government, the birth of modem 
savings and insurance schemes, the development of a professional civil service, 
the rise of trade unions and the emergence of the research based university. We 
live with the institutions the nineteenth century handed down to us. Our highly 
uneven capacity for ilIDovation is the fundamental source of our unease. Weare 
scientific and technological revolutionaries, but political and institutional 
conservatives. 13 
The 'new economy', which to a greater extent is viewed as developing naturally and organically, 
required new institutions to be artificially created through government policy. Thus, the market 
12 Charles Leadbeater (1999) 'Living on Thin Air: The New Economy' (Viking Press.) 
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itself demands third way politics in order that it may continue to prosper. New Labour's attempt to 
reorganize welfare, work and social order is not so much autonomous political policy as a 
sensitive response to the requirements of the new 'lmowledge based economy'. Little wonder then 
that Tony Blair is cited on the back cover as saying, 'Charles Leadbetter is an extraordinarily 
interesting thinker. His book raises critical questions for Britain's future. I lmow it will be widely 
read and debated' .14 
. The stated challenge of the New Labour government with their commitment to third way politics 
was to reconstruct a social order appropriate to the demands of a new economy. They would create 
this new social order tlu-ough one single method, the eradication of social exclusion. Social 
exclusion, however, was a many-headed beast and the head that faced mutual building societies 
was that of 'financial exclusion'. Indeed, those business organizations that made money through 
dealing with financial products were charged with the specific duty of combating this form of 
social exclusion. 
Financial exclusion: What it was and the role of the mutual society 
The Building Societies Association's Almual Conference of 1999 invited the cabinet minister 
Stephen Timms to speak on Government policy in respect of mutuality and building societies. Mr 
Timms took the 0ppOliunity to discuss and define financial exclusion and to expand on the role of 
mutual societies in its eradication. 
13 ibid preface 
14 'b'd 1 1 cover page 
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In his speech, Stephen Timms outlined the Government's vision of linking welfare reform and the 
financial services industry in measures to tackle financial exclusion. He argued that this 
connection presented a 'business opportunity and a challenge to the financial services industry' .15 
It represented, he contended, a rational response to the demands of the new economy of the 
1990's, (an economy that differed from the industrial economy of the sixties and seventies and the 
service-based economy of the eighties). This new economy consisted of, 'strong, knowledge-
based companies ready to take on the global economy by properly harnessing the know-how, the 
creativity, the expertise of all of our people' .16 It would, therefore, depend upon, 'imaginative and 
effective partnerships with you (the building society industry) and others' .17 
Welfare policy was, argued Mr Timms, geared toward dealing with the problem of increased 
spending on welfare coupled with a corresponding increase in social welfare problems. The 
knock-on effect of this combination, he argued, was the emergence of a culture of dependency 
where, 
One in five children live in a household where nobody works and over 2.3 million 
children live in a household dependent on income support .... and who know 
nothing other than benefit dependency as a way of getting by.18 
Some children have, 'never known what it is for somebody at home to go to work every day, their 
mothers and fathers will have experienced the same and if we do nothing their children will be in 
the same position as well' .19 These groups were, he stated, condemned to social exclusion and 
suffered from the greatest health problems and were the most likely to be the victims and 
perpetrators of crime. 
15 Conference Speech. BSA Allliual Conference 1999 
16 ibid 
17 ibid 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
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Because of this social exclusion, the Govenuuent was appealing to financial organisations on the 
'grounds of enlightened commercial self-interest' .20 Building societies were, he argued, in a 
position to draw the financially excluded into its ambit, thereby profiting from an extended market 
of a potential 1.5 million households who lacked any financial products and a fmiher 4.4 million 
who were on the margins of financial services provision. 21 
Drawing upon the GovenID1ent paper, Bringing Britain Together, Mr TinID1s indicated how those 
excluded from mainstream financial products were likely to pay excessive amounts to receive any 
kind of financial product. For example, a simple loan made to somebody to whom banks would 
not lend would be likely to be subject to extortionate interest rates. 22 
They can use licensed money lenders who can charge APRs of between 100% and 
500% depending on the size and length of the loan, and for some people even that 
option isn't open because licensed lenders are reluctant to lend cash on a high 
crime estate, the alternative for that group will be unlicensed money lenders who 
can charge really extOliionate rates of interest. One example cited in recent 
research where a pensioner couple who paid £250 interest on a £500 loan taken 
out for twenty weeks. 23 
Furthermore, he argued, the number of those excluded from quite basic financial facilities was 
quite high. Research sponsored by the British Bankers Association suggested there could be 
20 ibid 
21 ibid As repOlied by the Joseph Roundtree Foundation 
22 Bringing Britain Together. The Association has responded to the consultation exercise 
organised by the Treasury Policy Action Team developing a strategy to increase access to 
financial services to people living in poor neighbourhoods. The Action Team repOlied to the Prime 
Minister in July 
23 The Report of pat 14 suggested that high crime areas will be serviced by money lenders but 
that their interest rates were likely to be even higher and they would seek security' for an 
advance such as a benefit book or a passpOli. P14 
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between 12% and 18% of households without a current account. 24 A large percentage of these 
were people of working age of whom 30% had accounts but closed them after becoming 
unemployed and a further 30% had never had one. This research showed that this group was 
predominantly poor with limited employment opportunities. A situation that was further 
constricted by having no baIUC account, since an estimated 80% of those in work were paid by 
A.c.T., those with no accounts were fmiher alienated from the financial exchange process. 
Furthermore, those with bank accounts could enjoy cheaper methods of paying bills such as 
payment through Direct Debit. As cash became a more archaic method of exchange, those who 
had no barucing facilities faced increased isolation. 
The task required from building societies was to reduce this kind of financial exclusion by 
providing innovative ways to increase financial access whilst continuing to pursue the interests of 
existing society members. In Mr Timms' words, 
there must surely be mainstream commercial oppOliunities here. We do 
understand, in commercial telms, that widening access has. its problems, 
providing comprehensive services with little prospect of a retUl11 is not on your 
agenda and neither should it be. But equally, in an increasingly cashless society, 
those who are 'unbanked' will have a growing need for barucing services. 25 
As well as lacking banking facilties, poorer households were often excluded from house and life 
insurance policies. If these were taken out they tended to lapse, and in crime-ridden areas (which 
tended to be poor), home insurance policies were too expensive. Research by the Rowntree Trust 
showed that only one in five families in the low-income band possessed house insurance. 
24 The figures depend on the researcher in question. Research published by the British Bankers 
Association (BBA) indicates that between 6 percent and 9 percent of individuals- about 2.5-3.5 
million adults- have neither a current or a savings account, depending on the data source used: and 
estimates of the proportion of individuals without current accounts vary between 14.5 and 23 
percent. Research undertaken by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found that in 14 percent of 
households, no one had a current account". P42 pat14 
25 op cit BSA speech 
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Finally, many people were excluded from an occupational pension because their working life was 
characterised by low and intermittent earnings. To counter this, the government proposed the 
introduction of 'Stakeholder Pensions', designed for those earning around £9,000 to £20,000 a 
year and who were likely to experience periods of unemployment. Mr Timms enjoined the BSA's 
delegates to provide support for such a scheme saying, 
your industry has a great stmy to tell in the contribution that it's made to ensuring 
that pensioners have shared in the growing prosperity of Britain. Help us now take 
this one step fmiher by ensuring that all working people can access first class, top 
quality, second tier pension provision.26 
He concluded by stating that building societies could playa part in the regeneration of poor areas 
by providing access to capital or just, 'advice and understanding'. Branch closures, though 
understandable in economic terms, tended to exacerbate the problem but, he suggested, building 
societies could continue to provide' a local presence but with access to centrally provided 
expertise and facilities'. 27 In addition to this, he suggested that building societies could provide 
advice and support for the credit unions that were now best situate.d to provide services to the 
poorer areas. This could be the new role for, in Mr Timms' words, 'new mutualism' . 
New mutualism, as described by New Labour representatives broadly describes a commercially 
sympathetic form of business that considers the interests oflocal communities. However, this 
version of mutuality does not see as its core the preservation of mutual status. Mutualism is an 
attitude rather than a specific fmm of organization and new mutualism does not depend on there 
being a mutual society. 
However, as a series of interviews taken with the chief executives of the remaining mutual 
societies suggests, old style mutual organisation remains central to their understanding of their 
building society and, in many cases, is viewed as a direct route toward the incorporation of the 
26 ibid 
27 ibid 
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socially excluded. 28 That is, building societies may attend to the socially and financially excluded 
if they can continue to operate as a mutual organization. Without this particular status, they argue, 
the interests of dividends and short- telmism will prevail. 
For example, Martin Armstrong, chief executive of Norwich and Peterborough Building Society 
stated that the essence of mutuality was the absence of external shareholders whose sole interest in 
the business was dividends. Because of this, as a mutual society, 
we can do things for our customers a PLC couldn't do. Primarily, keeping open 
branches in small communities in rural areas where their towns are dying and 
their communities are dying because major organisations are pulling out because 
they can't make enough profit. We need to make a profit at a branch to keep it in 
existence but it doesn't have to be the absolute maximization in terms of use of 
capital.29 
FUlihernlore, a mutual organisation allowed customers who were also owners to have a direct 
effect on the running of the business. 
I think, my view is that the majority of our shareholders contribute very positively 
to us because they are our customers. They are loyal to us, they appreciate what 
we do for them, they tell us if we don't do it right and we try and put it right and 
our whole raison d'etre is customer service and we believe that what we're there 
for. 3o 
In his view, this method of organisation brought in 'customer service' before such a concept had 
caught on in any other industry. 
Likewise, Greg Williamson chief executive of the Shepton Building Society specifically drew the 
connection between mutuality and the protection of those who are, or who could be in danger of 
being financially excluded in the future. 
28 Series of interviews with chief executives undeliaken by the writer during the BSA 
Conference 1999. Questions asked set out in appendix 3. 
29 Ibid Mmiin Anllstrong, chief executive ofNOlwich and Peterborough Building Society 
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Mutuality means to me being able to look after our existing customers our 
existing communities, its not just about being able to offer the cheapest products 
or the most expensive shares. It's about looking our customers, after people that 
can't use the Internet, that can't get to the ballie that need local branches.3 ! 
In Greg Williamson's view, modern ballieing methods were entirely unsuitable for small 
communities with an ageing demography. Branch ballieing and the individual services offered by 
mutual societies were the only suitable method for ensuring the inclusion of the local population. 
Gorden Wells, chief executive of Melton Mowbray Society, likewise said that, 
Mutuality (to me) has always meant, basically, a membership based club, an 
organisation belonging to the members. In an organisation like the Melton, which 
is a small market town, the origination of the society has always been based on 
that tradition of belonging to the members of the community of Melton Mowbray 
district, and the society has continued in that vein without merger, based upon 
serving the community in the East Midlands, in which we operate. So, I see it 
very much as delivering to members financial services in the traditional building 
society mould.32 
Roger Hollick, chief executive of the Derbyshire Building Society and one of the most 
experienced executives, having worked in mutual societies since 1963, including 23 years as chief 
executive of the Woolwich Building Society, also took the view that mutuality was a concept 
entirely bound up with 'social inclusion' . Fmihennore, he argued, both the investing and non-
investing public viewed building societies in this way. 
30 ibid 
3! ibid Greg Williamson chief executive of the Shepton Building Society 
32 ibid Gorden Wells, chief executive of Melton Mowbray Society 
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I do actually believe it is right that an organisation like ours is owned by the 
community and we've carried out research and we've said to non- customers, (say 
they've been customers ofthe Abbey National), 'how do you feel about the 
Derbyshire Building society being taken over'. And people have said to us, 'we 
wouldn't like that'. So the researcher says 'but you aren't even a customer', to 
which the reply is, 'ah, but it's our society'. So there's a relationship with 
something that carries the county name operating in the East Midlands.33 
The chairman of the Holmesdale Building Society, Joe Parker and chief executive Ian Booth, both 
viewed mutuality in the context of their society as something that had a social benefit because 
theirs was, 
a small local society giving members good efficient service and understanding 
members needs .... not running business for profit but running a business for 
member's benefit. 34 
Ian Booth demonstrated that their building society acted directly to counter social exclusion by 
attempting to be sensitive to customer's problems and to respond to them in caring and responsible 
manner. 
People in trouble and everybody gets into trouble at some point in their life need 
consideration. We haven't evicted anyone in three years and that was done on 
agreement. Poor chap was in great trouble and we actually gave money back to 
him and arranged social housing for him at the same time because that's what a 
local society can do. We go and see them when they can't pay and we try to find a 
way to help them. And that is mutuality in practice which of course is extremely 
difficult for large societies?5 
Furthermore, 
Being small and local, members talk to us. Members are our shareholders and 
that's the point. We work for them by giving them good rates and considerate 
33 ibid Roger Hollick, chief executive of the Derbyshire Building Society 
34 ibid Chairman of the Holmesdale Building Society, Joe Parker and Ian Booth 
35 ibid Ian Booth chief executive of the Holmesdale Building Society 
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service, we don't work just to make a profit to send away and that's what you do 
with a PLC. You send the profit out and to those shareholders it's just a business 
and that is contrary to what we do as local society.36 
Jon Macpherson, chief executive of the Ilkestone Permanent, described himself as passionate 
about the mutual system and considered its protection to be a political act. For him, mutuality 
designated, 
a business owned by members who own the mutual benefit of it, the benefits of 
saving for savers. It's run in the interest of those members who actually own the 
business .... mutuality is the purest fOlm of ownership, I think that a demutualised 
organisation is a pIc and it exists for no purpose other than to maximise profit. No 
pIc exists for any other purpose, its only their marketing departments that tell you 
that they do . There is no other function in their life other than maximising their 
profit that is not the purpose of a building society. My society is not run to 
maximise profits, it's run to make sufficient profits for the security of our 
customers. My main driving force is to give the best service to customers and to 
balance the interest ofthe investor. 37 
Some delegates at the 1999 BSA conference were more circumspect in their assessment of 
mutuality. Although most agreed it was worth preserving, many considered it to be merely an 
effective method of organising ownership and profit sharing and did not draw the cOlmection 
between mutuality and 'financial inclusion' . For example, Peter Philips, chainnan of the 
Principality Building Society since 1991, stated that mutuality simply meant, 'an organisation that 
receives its funds £i'om its members and does all its business with its members'. 38 Similarly, Peter 
Rowley, chief executive of the Darlington Building Society, argued that mutuality meant, 
'conml0n ownership, whereby the customers by vit1ue of their qualifying membership of the 
institution have a share in the ownership of it'. 39 Rob Cairnes, chief executive of the Furness 
Building Society thought that, 'mutuality is giving the best deal to the customer in telms of low 
36 ibid Chairman Joe Parker 
37 ibid Jon Macpherson, chief executive of the Ilkestone Pelmanent 
38 ibid Peter Philips, chairman of the Principality Building Society 
39 ibid Peter Rowley, chief executive of the Darlington Building Society 
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mortgage rates and high savings rates so that customers mutually benefit' .40 And, David Robelis, 
chief executive of the Monmouthshire Building Society, saw mutuality as denoting a, 'business 
being run for the benefit of all the stakeholders and balancing the interests of all the stakeholders 
as equitably as you can' .41 
Interestingly, the 'white lmight' of mutuality, Brian Davis, then chairman of the Building Society 
Association and chief executive Nationwide Building Society saw the benefits of mutuality in 
purely commercial tenns, saying, 
There are three benefits to mutuality one is clearly that there is a pricing benefit 
which you can translate in the high street. But I think it's much more than that 
because as a management team, we're much more focused on our customers since 
we don't have an external audience to worry about. And, thirdly, we operate as a 
competitive force in the high street we present another way of doing business and, 
in general terms, a nicer way of doing business.42 
However, the mutual system in his view brought different attributes to business that were not 
necessarily superior attributes and that operating business as a PLC was not necessarily a bad 
thing. 
a mutual organisation has a different stmcture where, as it happens, it is the 
customers who're asking those questions and are pushing you and have to elect 
you and everything else. So, in many ways, you have a similar discipline to 
shareholders, it's just a different type of stmcture that has the advantage that it has 
one single audience. So the disadvantage, and I've worked for a PLC for sixteen 
years, and the disadvantage is that you have to have two ears. I mean that you 
have to be listening in two different directions. In some ways we have to be more 
focused and it's clearly easier. There's nothing wrong with a PLC anymore than a 
patinership or any other fonn of ownership, it's just different. 43 
40 ibid Rob Cairnes, chief executive of the Furness Building Society 
41 ibid David Roberts, chief executive of the Monmouthshire Building Society 
42 ibid Brian Davis, then chairman of the Building Society Association and chief executive 
Nationwide Building Society 
43 ibid 
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Likewise, John Herd chainnan of the Dunfermline Building Society saw mutuality as a fOlm that 
made good business sense for all 'stakeholders'. 
Mutuality probably benefits the whole, that is the borrowing members and the 
lending members who're often the same people and also the staffwho are very 
important stakeholders as well. So we have three different constituencies all of 
whom benefit from the fact that over the years we have accumulated a very 
considerable fee capital which does not cost us any money. That allows us to 
price our products really competitively on both sides of the book.44 
Similarly, Rory Matheson, chief executive of the Scottish Building Society for 14 years said of 
mutuality that, 
members own the business and the organisation works for the direct benefit of the 
members, there's not a third party unlike the pic model where you have outside 
shareholders as well as your direct customers. Its a simpler set up in that sense 
and I think its works well and has worked well for the last 150years, first fOlmed 
in 1848, so its lasted that long.45 
In contrast to this view, Nigel Baige, chief executive of the Chelsea Building Society, argued that 
although mutuality had existed for many decades it had undergone many historical developments. 
It was, however, something that was worth preserving, 
Mutuality has changed over the last 100 years, what it means really now is that a 
mutual is just different from a pIc. The structure means that the major difference 
is that a building society doesn't have to pay dividends to shareholders whereas a 
pic does because the shareholders actually own the equity whereas in a building 
society the shareholders don't own the equity which gives building societies a 
44ibid John Herd chainnan of the Dunfennline Building Society 
45 ibid Rory Matheson, chief executive of the Scottish Building Society 
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margin of advantage over a pIc, that is the major difference and that really is the 
defining difference between a pIc and a building society.46 
David Cullum, Chief Executive of the Manchester Building Society thought that now many of the 
building society's organizational problems had been addressed that the mutual system had many 
advantages over the company fonn. 
Mutuality gives us one more advantage in running a business than companies 
because we don't have to pay dividends. I think mutuality has been used as an 
excuse for societies not being as efficient as they could have been in the past, if 
you go back ten or fifteen years when there was a caliel. Now the combination of 
mutuality and competition has meant that most of us are pretty efficient because 
we have the big advantage that we don't pay dividends.47 
Dr Haydn Ward, chairman of the National Counties Building Society viewed mutuality as a 
method of constructing an organisation, 'where the customers of the building society are 
effectively also the owners and share in the benefits of ownership'. 48 Whilst David Hayward, chief 
executive of the Lambeth Building Society, saw mutuality as a method of balancing the interests 
of the various owners. 
Mutuality is treating all the customers as fairly as possible, relative to their 
relationship to the society. Yes, you'll never get it absolutely perfect when you 
balance the interests of bOlTowers to savers, new customers to old customers but 
what you've got to do is to try to treat everyone fairly and hopefully look after 
them all. 49 
On the other end of the opinion scale, Jolm Goodfellow, chief executive of the Skipton Building 
Society, saw little added value in mutuality saying, 
46 ibid Nigel Baige, chief executive of the Chelsea Building Society 
47 ibid David Cullum, Chief Executive of the Manchester Building Society 
48 ibid Dr Haydn Ward, chailman of the National Counties Building Society 
49 ibid David Hayward, chief executive of the Lambeth Building Society 
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structurally, there isn't much difference (between a mutual society and a pIe) 
apart from in mutuals it's one man, one vote, (a bit like the slogan of the Labour 
party) and pIes of course is one vote one share, you get bigger share voting blocks 
than you do in a mutual. But apart from that, there is little difference between 
them.50 
Combining the two positions, John Beswarick, finance director of the Derbyshire Building 
Society, argued that mutuality worked in two ways. Firstly, it made commercial sense, and, 
secondly, it supported local cOlmmmities as it gave, 
added value to both borrowers and investors by trying to take a balanced view 
between the conflicting demands of those two constituencies and also trying to 
take a longer view and, in particular, for regional societies and possibly local 
societies, adding particular value in supporting their communities. 51 
Finally, Kevin Hurst, chief executive of the Nottingham Imperial Building Society, pointed out 
that although mutuality was a positive concept, it was not unproblematic. For example, mutuality 
had a tendency to disempower those involved in the society that were not members, thus 
effectively empowering groups of members that had conflicting self-interests. 
Quite simply, there is no other stakeholder in the business other than those who 
buy its services. The difference between the mutuality that we have and the 
mutuality that exists in, say, an insurance company, is that we have two 
diametrically opposed groups of people. We have a group of customers on the 
liability side of the balance sheet who would cut their throats if they were asked 
by customers on the assets side of the balance sheets for a change in their rates. It 
is not like the co-op where you go and shop and patiake in the profits of the 
institution you 've just shopped at. It is a group of people who want one rate of 
interest and a group of people who want another and therefore the mutuality is 
merely expressed in the fact that no-one else patiakes in that process in terms of 
taking the profit from it, other than the people that run that process and I happen 
to believe that we are just as impOliant as the members because at the end of the 
50 ibid John Goodfellow, chief executive of the Skipton Building Society 
51 ibid John Beswarick. finance director of the Derbyshire Building Society 
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day I believe that if you said to your bonowers would you take a qualter of a 
percent increase in your rates so that I can pay more to my savers, they would tell 
me where to go. So, I would say in that dichotomy then, I interpret my mutuality 
in that the customers have to be satisfied with the price and service basis, but I 
also have a group of people that organise this and have to be looked after just as 
much. 52 
The range of perspectives expressed by the chief executives of mutual societies were, in the main, 
indicative of the size of society in question. That is, a larger society such as the Nationwide has 
tended to couch its defense of mutuality in the language of commercial self-interest. Its members 
are perhaps less inclined to view themselves as a community connected to other members and are, 
instead, seeking a 'good deal' as individuals. In contrast, smaller societies such as the Ilkestone or 
the Shepton are more inclined to associate a defense of mutuality with community and locality, 
rather than conunercialism. In other words, a society's defense of its mutual status will play to its 
long suit. 
Whilst the strategies may differ, societies clearly agreed that the introduction of shareholders into 
the equation would have a negative impact on their ability to engage in any other activity than the 
production of dividends. Community concerns and methods of promoting financial inclusion 
could not develop in the context of shareholders interests. Thus, central to addressing the problem 
of financial exclusion lies the maintenance of a mutual organization. It is perhaps ironic then, that 
the very tlu·eat of demutualisation has lead many building societies to resort to strategies that 
exclude many people from membership, thereby financially excluding them. For example, in order 
to alTest the tide of carpet-baggers from becoming investing members on the basis of a fairly small 
deposit, some building societies have introduced a high minimum deposit that effectively excludes 
genuine new members that have a low income. Whilst such measures might deter casual carpet-
bagging it also deters poorer potential members. In the words of Andrew Messenger, Chief 
Executive of the West Bromwich Building Society, 
52 Kevin Hurst, chief executive of the Nottingham Imperial Building Society 
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You ask for help of Building Societies so that we can help you to help the 
financially excluded. Building Societies were formed for that very reason and in 
our case over one hundred and fifty years ago, and our founding principles were 
to help the local poor to better themselves through home ownership. We also do a 
great deal in the communities, spending over a half a million pounds each year all 
aimed at young people, helping them to better themselves. And yet all of this is 
under threat because of the carpet- baggers. I'll give you a good example from our 
own experience. We have had to re-increase the minimum balance to £5,000 
because of carpet bagging, that means that we cannot provide an ISA, we cannot 
help the financially excluded. 53 
Other anti-carpet-bagging strategies have been specifically excluded by Government policy. For 
example, a number of societies offered low deposit accounts with no voting rights, so that new 
members seeking a motion and vote in favour of conversion would be thwarted. However, the 
1997 Building Societies Act, 'ruled this out' .54 The same report stated that, 'the building societies 
want the Government to introduce further legislation, to deal with the underlying pressure for 
them to conveli in other ways. In the meantime, people seeking to open small savings accounts 
have fewer options than previously'. 55 However, this report did not itself recommend any 
measures to thwmi carpet-bagging, instead it stated that building societies and banks should offer 
more basic low stmi up accounts ignoring the fundamental problems for a mutual society that 
partakes in such an activity. 
In a similar vein, Govemment policy has tended to minimalise issues that building societies have 
viewed as central to mutuality, that of branch closures. Building societies have fairly consistently 
argued that conversion leads to branch closures, which in tum has a detrimental effect on local 
communities so, the Building Society Association funded research into the connection between 
conversion and branch closure which concluded that, 
53 Andrew Messenger, Chief Executive of the West Bromwich Building Society in question to 
Stephen Timms BSA Conference 1999 
54 p50 Access to financial Services, Report of Pat 14 HM Treasury November 1999, National 
Strategy For Neighbourhood Renewal 
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building societies were more likely than banks to maintain their branch network. 
Societies were less likely than banks or conveliors to close braches in more 
socially deprived location. In contrast, banks and building societies that have 
convelied to pIc status were more aggressive in closing branches. Conveliors 
were most likely to close branches in deprived communities and least likely to 
open branches in such places. 56 
In specific figures, over the period between 1995-98, societies that had convelied closed 11.4% of 
their branches, 282 in all, whereas the remaining mutual societies closed 8.9% or 224 branches. 
Yet, however significant the BSA felt this analysis to be, the Government policy has been to 
minimize it. The Government RepOli on financial exclusion, whilst acknowledging the fact that a 
number of organisations considered closures to be highly important, did not agree that closures 
had a significant effect on financial exclusion. 
On the first point it said, 
shrinkage of bank and building society branch networks, especially withdrawal 
from low income areas, has often been blamed for contributing to financial 
exclusion. The Banking Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU), the Campaign for 
Community Banking and the Citizen Organising Foundation all emphasized this 
factor in their responses to the public consultation exercise. The Commission for 
Racial Equality pointed out that ethnic minority communities are frequently 
among those whose location in relatively deprived areas limits access.57 
Yet on the second point it said, 
The relationship between branch closures and financial exclusion is far from 
straightfOlward. Following many years of expansion, the total number of bank 
and building society branches peaked out in the 1980 and has been declining ever 
since as institutions sought to contain their administrative costs. BBA figures 
55 ibidp50-51 
56 IN Marshall, R Willis, S Raybould, R Richardson M Coombes "The Contribution of British 
Building Societies to Financial Inclusion" p2- Centre for Urban and Regional Development 
Studies- published on BSA Website 
57 Access to financial Services, RepOli of Pat 14 HM Treasury November 1999, National Strategy 
For Neighbourhood Renewal P47 para4.22 
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show that, taking major British banking groups and building societies together, 
about one in four branches went between 1988 and 1998. But the proportion of 
adults with any kind of account grew from 90%-94% over the same 
period.(AP ACS Year book of Payment statistics 1999) This was a slower growth 
rate than in previous decades; but judging by the figures for current account 
ownership published by the OFT, the increase was particularly significant for 
people in social classes D and E. Research into why people do not have bank 
accounts indicates that only a tiny percentage say it is because of the lack of a 
nearby bank branch: the BBA suggests under 1 per cent of those without a current 
account. 58 
The report felt that closures were somewhat mediated by use of ATMs (only 46% of adults used 
these in 1990 compared to 68% in 1998). FurthemlOre, the remaining branches were located near 
popular working areas and train stations so they were highly utilized and customers also took 
advantage of telephone banking. 
Paradoxically, while maintaining a network of local building society branches is not viewed as 
impOliant in the delivery of financial inclusion, New Labour has been keen to stress the 
importance oflocal Post Office branches in doing so. In a meeting titled, "Banks and post offices-
delivering financial inclusion?" at the Labour Party Conference 2000, delegates and speakers 
agreed on the impOliance of local branches in the delivery of financial inclusion. However, the 
branches in question here were the 18,000 post office outlets upon whose continued preservation 
the delegates congratulated themselves.59 
Speaking first, Ed Sweeny from the UNIFI, stated, 
Over recent years there has been a huge increase in branch closure which has had 
a degenerative affect on the local economy, with shops and businesses closing or 
relocating, as well as stopping people being able to access banking services. There 
are huge social costs of no community banking". Indeed, far from other forms of 
58 ibid Para 4.23 
59 Labour Patiy Conference "Banks and post offices- delivering financial inclusion?" Wed 27 
September with UNIFIICWU 
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banking picking up the slack, "on- line banking had not been picked up by smaller 
customers. 60 
Furthelmore, he contended, in contrast to the fate of these local communities, banks had been 
making huge profits. From 1987-99 the profits from the banking sector were, 25% higher than all 
of British industry combined. Therefore, although hitherto banks had been mmecessarily 
dismissive of 'community banking' and similar schemes and had failed to promote their basic 
baIlie accounts, they should now be forcibly persuaded to support the universal barneing system 
proposed by the Labour Party. 
Likewise, Marlene Winfield (Head of Policy and Strategy, National Consumer Council), argued 
that barnes were mmecessarily profitable, and furthermore, they were seeking to rid themselves of 
their poorer, less profitable customers, arguing that only a small propOliion of customers were 
profitable. This, she argued, would exacerbate the problem of financial exclusion, as already 14% 
of the population was without a ClllTent account. In order to counter this, she stated, barnes would 
need to be coerced into taking a more socially responsible attitude to their customers. This could 
be achieved through pressure from the barnes' larger institutional shareholders such as pension 
funds, who were in any case required to report on their ethical investment policy. The Post Office, 
with one of the largest pension funds, would seem well placed to exeli some pressure on barnes to 
engage in the joint project of 'Universal Barneing'. 
The combination of the Post Office and barnes working together would combine the reassuring 
environment of the former with the facilities and experience of the latter. It would help rehabilitate 
the' greedy' image of barnes by making them look like, 'good corporate citizens'. 61 However, 
banks needed financial incentives, which, the chainnan of the meeting stated that the Treasury 
would not provide, 'the Treasury is not keen to fund tlns project and prefers the barnes to fund,.62 
60 ibid 
61 Marlene Winfield (Head of Policy and Strategy, National Consumer Council) 
62 ibid 
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Thus, the speakers concluded, financial exclusion needed to be tackled by having more local 
branches, possessed of a less corporate and therefore less intimidating image than ordinary banks. 
In addition to this, these outlets needed to have an organisational structure and personnel 
experienced in providing financial services. While the speakers wanted this to be provided by a 
hybrid of the post office and the ban1e, what they were describing already existed in the form of a 
mutual building society. 
Yet, ironically, it has been government policy under both the Labour and the Conservative Party to 
close 'wasteful' building society branches. The old Labour government set up a Commission 
which recommended more branch closures, while its members argued in Parliamentary debates in 
the 1970s against the large quantity of high street branches.63 After that, the Conservative 
govenllnent passed legislation that would make societies, 'market efficient' and more like banks, 
reflecting an era dominated by free market rhetoric. And finally, in the 'third way' era this 
legislation has remained intact and New Labour seem unwilling to protect societies from carpet-
bagging, the unforeseen consequence of the freedom to demutualise. 
Perversely, when the writer put to the panel of speakers that 'old' Labour's policy on building 
society branch closure seemed to run contrary to the present policy on financial inclusion, the 
chairmen denied that the party had ever possessed such policies. When it was put to the panel that 
there are dozens of references to branch closures recorded in Hansard, often by the MP for 
Ipswich, Ken Weetch, the chair replied, 
Ken We etch was a back bencher and not representative of the Labour 
Party ..... building society branch closures were contrary to Labour Party policy. 
The old building society account holders are not the individuals that fall under the 
social exclusion criteria, it is not relevant to preserve this fmm of ban1eing. 64 
63 see chapter 4 
64 Chair of meeting 
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New Labour's concept of 'New Mutualism' seems to be rich in rhetoric and short of substance. 
New mutualism is a concept that sidesteps the legal concept and definite method of organization 
that is mutuality, whilst claiming for itself the moral and social connotations of a mutual society. 
Thus far, the evidence would suggest that whilst New Labour is aligned to the notion of new 
mutualism it seems unwilling to connect this concept to mutuality in the context of building 
societies and has shown little commitment to the protection of societies from the threat of 
demutualisation. 
Govemmental politics are one of the primary factors in the construction of mutuality. Another 
vital factor is the views of the members of mutual building societies: how far are they committed 
to retaining mutuality in the 'New Labour' era? It is this issue that this chapter will now address. 
The Membership and Mutuality 
As the empirical evidence suggests, the membership of mutual building societies have, following 
the mass demutualisations in 1997, become much more aware of the meaning of mutuality and, to 
a certain degree, have come to view mutuality as a positive attribute in a financial institution. 
Likewise, management in building societies have become more inclined to articulate the 
attractions of mutuality and of the reasons why such a legal construct is worth preserving. 
However, this commitment is most tangibly demonstrated by the actions of members and 
management when a motion for demutualisation arises. Yet within the membership and 
management of building societies evidence suggests a diversity of attitudes. This is vividly 
demonstrated by the oft proposed and as yet unsuccessful conversion campaigns centered around 
the Nationwide Building Society and the successful conversion of the Bradford and Bingley 
Building Society in 1999. It is to these two examples that this discussion will now tum. 
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The Nationwide Building Society: The Mutual of Mutuals 
The Nationwide Building Society was the primary target of arch carpet-bagger, 'that butler' 
Michael Hardem. However, the society proved to be his nemesis as it has consistently repelled 
attempts to initiate a conversion and possessed a board of directors so committed to mutual status 
that the erstwhile butler himself was finally persuaded that mutuality was a quality worth saving in 
a building society. His campaign to demutualise the Nationwide was only nan'owly defeated in 
1997, but it was defeated in the year when most of the major conversions were aefected and when 
financial pundits were putting the value of 'free shares' at around £2,000. Commentators argued 
that the vote in favour of the five official and pro-mutuality candidates captured the spirit of an 
age that had just given a landslide victory to New Labour in the 1997 election. 
The swing of sentiment milTors that which swept the Labour patiy to power 
earlier this year. The collective values still espoused by Labour, albeit in a 
watered down form, are reflected in the ideal of mutuality, in which customers 
rather than shareholders benefit from the organisation's surplus.65 
Subsequent attempts by carpet-baggers to gain a vote in favour of conversion have been even 
more decisively in favour of mutuality. Michael Harden's campaigns were succeeded by the 
campaigns of another pro-conversion society member, Andrew Muir, who, after standing 
unsuccessfully for a place on the board of the Nationwide in 1998, retumed to mount another even 
less successful campaign at the 2001 kumal Meeting. Commenting on the outcome ofthe 
directorial ballot, the BSA issued this press release, 
The members of Nationwide have made it quite clear that they see the vast 
benefits of keeping the society mutual, run by mutual directors. Andy Muir, who 
argued in favour of conveliing Nationwide to a pic, received around 400,000 
votes fewer than when he stood for the board in 1998. All the existing directors, 
who also stood for election in 1998, have seen increase in their votes. There is 
65 FT July 24 "Mutuality respect beats get-rich ethic" Jonathan Gutlu'ie 
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clear evidence of Nationwide members appreciating the benefits that their society 
has brought to them. 66 
The continued preservation of mutual status in the Nationwide chiefly arises fl.-om the commitment 
of its management who inspired the membership to take the campaign personally. Its chief 
executive until 2000, Brian Davis, was a leading spokesperson for the benefits of mutuality and 
embraced the media to espouse a vigorous defense of mutuality. Furthermore, the management 
organized positively to preserve mutuality. One of its most significant methods was the 
establishment of the 'Nationwide Foundation' in November 1997. This charity, funded by profits 
fl.-om the Nationwide Building Society, stated its preferred areas of support as being for 'volunteer 
programmes' and 'rural regeneration'. However, the subtext of this charity was the way that it was 
organized, for all those who wished to open an account in the Nationwide Building Society could 
not opt out of membership of the foundation and members of the foundation were deemed to have 
'agreed' to assign to the foundation, 'any future conversion payments,.67 This has applied since 
the foundation was established. Thus, whilst new members accounting for over 2 million votes, 
may vote in favour of conversion, they will not personally benefit from any windfall payments. 68 
However, while this strategy may have hithelio contributed to the pro-mutual campaign there is a 
danger that the Nationwide may still be 'hoist by its own petard'. For, having made the moral 
argument for mutuality and cOlmected it to social considerations, it might seem logical for the 
socially conscious member to vote in favour of conversion in order that the charity may receive 
the windfall payments! Society member Andy Naughton - Doe mounted a pro-conversion 
campaign which involved attempting to become a director of the Nationwide Foundation in order 
to persuade new members to vote for conversion in order to fimd the charity. When the 
Foundation refused to let him stand for election he said, 'the trustees have missed out on an 
66 Press Release Adrian Coles 18 July 2001 BSA website 
67 Information fi"om The Nationwide Foundation website 
68 number of new members as of 200 1 
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amazing 0ppoliunity to receive a £1 billion windfall. They are clutching at straws to find a way to 
bar members having this opportunity to vote for somebody with an altemative view' .69 
The members of Nationwide Building Society will vote on a pro- conversion motion in July 2002, 
but, at the time of completing this thesis, the outcome was unknown. However, what is clear fi'om 
the failures of the many campaigns to effect the society's conversion is that the combination of 
pro-active and pro-mutuality management and the conscious suppOli of its membership ensured 
the preservation of mutuality. The next example discussed, the demutualisation of the Bradford & 
Bingley Building Society indicates that a failure to take affirmative action will enhance a tendency 
to conversion. And, if mutuality is indeed the 'pristine maiden' suggested by Austin Mitchell MP 
then the action or inaction of the Bradford and Bingley's board is a bad case of 'faint heart never 
won fair lady' . 
Bradford & Bingley: The Mutual Conversion. 
The directors of the Bradford and Bingley, as loyal advocates of the preservation of mutuality, 
astonished many by their almost ovemight conversion to the benefits of a public limited status. h1 
the words of Kevin Hurst of the Nottingham hnperial Building Society, 'this was a surprise and 
huge disappointment to many of us in the business. There seems to no justification for it in telms 
of membership demands or in terms of benefits to the society. It says a lot that Mr Rodrigous is 
not present at the conference today' .70 
69 Quoted in the Sunday Express April 28 2002 
70 Kevin Hurst of the Nottingham Imperial Building Society at the BSA Conference 1999 
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The management of the Bradford & Bingley had hithelio mounted a vocal and practical defense of 
mutuality, albeit less vigorous than that of the Nationwide. Following the shedding of mutual 
status by the Cheltenham & Gloucester back in 1994, the then chief executive, J olm 
Wriggleworth, expressed concern that societies were failing to make a convincing an argument in 
favour of mutuality, 'our members would vote for conversion for two quid. We have to show 
them the benefits of mutuality'. 71 Therefore, in an immediate response to news of the huge 
bonuses paid to some members of the C&G, the Bradford and Bingley mmounced a mortgage rate 
cut of 0.25% and stated its intentions to, 'give back profits of at least £50m a year to savers and 
bOlTowers, .72 This response was perhaps too little and too late, despite the constant warnings by 
the BSA to make very tangible the benefits of mutuality to their members. For example, in May 
1994, the Financial Times reported that, 
Building Societies were yesterday encouraged by their regulator to use their 
surpluses to give dividends, better services and better prices to their members. Ms 
Rosalind Gilmore, who chairs the Building Society commission, said that with the 
housing market recovering and provisions for bad and doubtful debts falling, she 
could see no reason why societies should not nalTOW their margins and reward 
b . 1 73 mem ers 111 ot ler ways. 
Later, management support for mutuality dwindled and, by April 1999, the board of the Bradford 
& Bingley amlollllced its intention to put a vote for conversion to its members. The directors 
claimed to have changed their minds about conversion after 62% of voting members at an 
informal vote said they wanted their society to become a bank. This transition in thinking was a 
seemingly simple process. In the words of Clu'istopher Rodrigues, group chief executive, 'as a 
mutual, we gave benefits tlu'ough better rates. As a pIc, we will give benefits tlU'ough greater 
product choice and dividends to shareholders'. 74 
71 FT 25 Jan 1996 Bradford & Bingley cuts mOligage rate to 7.24% Roger Taylor 
72 ibid 
73 FT Allyson Smith 20 May 1994 Societies Urged to Pay dividends 
74 Jun 3 2000 Money Go Round: Bradford members weigh up windfalls: Nona Montagu- Smith 
Daily Telegraph 
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Initially, the directors portrayed themselves as the neutral arbiters of member's wishes, (a stance 
which delegates of the 1999 conference considered to be duplicitous in the extreme). Later, 
however, they embarked on a number of strategies that seemed to suggest a very pro- conversion 
stance. In October of 1999, the Bradford & Bingley announced plans to cut or move 385 jobs, 
which included closing two branches in Leamington Spa that employed 275 staff. Save Our 
Building Societies, (SOBS) the pro mutuality pressure group, said the move was driven by the 
conversion process, 'it indicates an attempt by Bradford and Bingley to slim down in preparation 
for the attempt to convCli to PLC status next year,.75 The society denied this saying it was trying 
to 'cut costs in the face of continuing competition' .76 
In addition to this, in the following month the directors announced that members of the building 
society would all benefit from free shares as 'equals'. That is, all of its three million members, 
including those who had recently joined would receive a windfall estimated at around £1000. 
Critics argued that the board of the Bradford & Bingley had, 
arranged a flat windfall to encourage as many members as possible to vote for 
conversion, as carpetbaggers with a minimum £ 100 balance now have a huge 
incentive. Under some previous building society conversions, pay-outs varied 
according to how long people had been members and the size of their accounts.77 
Again, chief executive Christopher Rodrigues justified the scheme as impartial, 'the flat scheme is 
the fairest. It gives the greatest number of shares to the greatest number of people'. 78 
The pro-mutual campaign group (SOBS) sought to stop the vote in favour of demutualisation by 
putting motions forward to that effect in the following AGM. A number of popUlist papers took a 
pmiisan position in favour of mutuality. For example the Mirror declared, 'if you're a voting 
75 8 Oct 1999 Companies and Finance: UK: Bradford and Bingley staff move James Mackintosh 
76 ibid 
77 17 Nov 1999 City: B&B goes for equality in windfalls: The Daily Telegraph Simon English 
78 ibid 
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member- membership lists are now closed- do yourself a favour and veto the conversion plan next 
year, especially if you have a mortgage with another provider'. 79 
However, SOBS failed to get the 500 signatures necessary to put forward their 7 resolutions 
against the conversion at the AGM and the following statement was made by a Bradford & 
Bingley spokesperson. 'We informed SOBS today that it had not gathered the necessary 500 
signatures to put forward any resolutions to the society's AGM. Following out members' vote in 
favour of conversion we are now backing the conversion route ourselves and we believe this 
summer's vote will be more heavily in favour of conversion'. 80 
However, the previous informal ballot was passed only in respect of investing members and it was 
widely expected that bon-owing members would vote against conversion, as over 60% had voted 
against the motion. 81 Furthermore, by the year 2000, the society's bon-owing rate looked set to 
continue with its series of rises, reversing the previous agenda outlined earlier of John 
WriggleswOlih. The board appeared to be aligning itself with the numerically greater and more 
recently acquired investor members. As Christopher Rodrigues put it, 'the reason for our rate 
changes was simple: we need to be able to pay dividend to our shareholders and invest for the 
future. We intend to stay competitive as a plc,.82 
The view that conversion would be rej ected by bon-owing members was underpinned by stock 
market news of falling share prices in the largest converted building societies such as the Abbey 
National, Halifax, NOlihern Rock and the Woolwich and, in general, the pro-mutuality lobby was 
very confident. For example, the Sunday Herald, reporting on the BSA Conference of 1999 said, 
79 1 Dec 1999 Y2 keep loyal To Our Mutual Friends: Their Survival Benefits Us All: Daily 
Mirror John Husband 
80 .4 Jan 2000 Money: Pro-Mutual Lobby Group Fails to Get 500 Signatures: Press Association 
Mark Athelion 
81 April 1999, although as noted the total number of voting members were in favour of conversion 
(BSA Newsletter May 1999) 
82 Mr Rodrigues: (Jun 3 2000 Money Go Round: Bradford members weigh up windfalls: Nona 
Montagu-Smith Daily Telegraph 
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'the mood of the conference was more buoyant than for some time, several societies have 
successfully dispelled raiders, the truth is that carpet-baggers are no longer the major threat. 
Societies have leamt the hard way how to deal with them' . 83 
However, in the event, the motion in favour of conversion was overwhelming. With a high 
tumout, (70% of savers and 53.5% ofbolTowers), 94.5% of savers (1,505,000 votes) and 89.5% of 
borrowers (20,000 votes) voted in favour. Chainnan of the Society, Lindsay Mackinlay said of the 
vote, 
The Board is delighted that so many members participated in this impOliant and 
historic vote which clears the way for Bradford and Bingley to an independent 
pIc. Based on this clear mandate we can now proceed to float on the stock market 
we are on course to complete the flotation in December. 84 
83 11 lun 2000 Small Change: Sunday Herald Teresa Hunter 
84 statistics and quote from website http: // production.investis.com 
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Bradford & Bingley: Mergers 
Bexhill on Sea BS 29 November 1993 
Leamington Spa BS 1 July 1991 
Hampshire BS 17 June 1991 
Hendon BS 18 March 1991 
Louth Mapleworth & Sutton BS 26 November 1990 
Sheffield BS 15 June 1990 
Chilterns BS 5 October 1987 
Stanley BS 3 February 1986 
FOlTesters BS 1985 
H .. ernian BS 1985 
Merseyside Bs 1985 
Clapham Pennanent BS 1984 
Dover & Folkestone BS 1984 
Glamorgan BS 1984 
Horsham 1983 
Housing and General 1983 
Padiham BS 1983 
Stockport Mersey BS 1983 
United Provinces 1983 
Hemis of Oak & Enfield 1982 
Saddleworth BS 1982 
Swansea BS 1982 
Target BS 1982 
Hyde BS 1981 
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Centralisation and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
Through its many historical developments, mutuality has remained an organizationally distinct 
business form. The new mutualism outlined by New Labour is essentially a mission statement that 
could be adopted by any form of business and, as such, sidesteps the necessity to preserve the 
distinct nature of mutuality. In this final section we will examine another aspect of New Labour's 
tendency to diminish the uniqueness of a mutual building society, this time in the arena of 
regulation. Tllis has been achieved through the passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, which has, in effect, introduced a single system of regulations and regulator for both mutual 
and convelied building societies. 
The overall purpose of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) was to create a 
single system of regulation of financial services to be performed by one single regulator, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Prior to the implementation of the provisions of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, the systems of vetting and registration fell broadly into two 
categories: those operated by the Self Regulatory Organisations ('SRO's) (1. Securities and 
Futures Authority, The Investment Management Regulatory Organisation and the Personal 
Investment Authority) and those operated by the statutory regulators for banking insurance and 
building and friendly societies. In general, the SROs applied vetting and registration procedures to 
senior management and to individuals dealing with consumers or their assets. 
The first financial institutions to be regulated by the FSA were banks when the passage of the 
Banking Act 1998 trans felTed the regulation of banking from the Bank of England to the FSA. 
Two years later the FSMA 2000 transfelTed the regulation of building societies to the FSA and 
away from the Registrar of Building Societies. The two Acts now mean that the FSA is 
responsible for the regulation of investment business, friendly societies, credit unions, insurance 
companies and the Lloyds insurance market. And so, when the Act came into force in November 
2001, it abolished the Building Societies Commission, the Friendly Societies Commission and the 
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Registry of Friendly Societies, together with other regulators such as the Insurance Directorate of 
the Treasury and the self-regulating organisations the PIA, IMRA and the SF A. 
The change in regulator has also initiated a change in the criteria used to regulate. Prior to the 
FSMA 2000, the statutory regulators applied notification and vetting requirements to senior 
management and to certain specified positions. These positions were defined in terms of job title 
or reporting lines and in the main individuals did not require approval from the regulator before 
taking up positions. There was no provision for disciplinary action, although an individual could 
be found not 'fit and proper' and, therefore prohibited from continuing in the post. 
The implementation of FSMA 2000 has initiated a shift in this aspect of the regulatory process 
with the introduction of what is known as the 'authorised persons regime'. This regime puts senior 
management of firms at the forefront in ensuring that effective governance structures are operated, 
and that they are accountable for their actions, a principle reinforced by section 2(3)(b) of the 
FSMA, which states that in discharging its general functions the FSA must have regard to the 
responsibilities of those who manage the affairs of 'authorised persons'. 
The Authorised Persons Regime 
Briefly stated, the FSMA 2000, insists that authorised persons have ensured that those that act on 
its behalf in respect of 'regulated activities' have met the objective standards set out in the 
legislation and supporting documentation. Those individuals are then deemed to be 'approved 
persons' and it remains an ongoing compliance responsibility of the authorised person to ensure 
that the approved person continues to meet those standards. 
An authorised person is defined under s31(2) of the Act as, 'a person who is authorised for the 
purposes of this act'. That is, a person who has 'permission to carryon one or more regulated 
activities,.85 
85 FSMA 2000 s.31(1)(a) 
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A person may apply for permission from the Financial Services Authority to carryon regulated 
activities if they are, 'an individual, a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated 
association,.86 
The legislative base for the' Approved Persons' regime is to be found in Part V of the FSMA 2000 
in patiicular section 59(1) which provides that: 
An authorised person ("A") must take reasonable care to ensure that no person 
performs a controlled function under an arrangement entered into by A in relation 
to the carrying on by A of a regulated activity, unless the Authority approves the 
perfonnance by that person of the controlled function to which the arrangement 
relates. 
The operation of section 59(1) revolves around an individual performing what is described as a 
controlled function. A controlled function is defined by section 59(3) of the FSMA 2000, as 'a 
function of a description specified in the rules', which is supplemented by section 59(4) which 
provides that: 
The Authority may specify a description of function under subsection (3) only if, 
in relation to the carrying on of a regulated activity by an authorised person, it is 
satisfied that the first, second, or third condition is met. 
These conditions are described in subsection (5), (6) and (7) respectively of the FSMA 2000. The 
first condition is that the function is likely to enable the person responsible for its performance to 
exercise a significant influence on the conduct of the authorised person's affairs, so far as relating 
to the regulated activity. The second condition is that the function will involve the person 
performing it in dealing with the customers of the authorised person in a manner substantially 
86 FSMA 2000 Section 40(1) 
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connected with the carrying on of the regulated activity. The third condition is that the function 
will involve the person performing it in dealing with property of customers of the authorised 
person in a manner substantially connected with the carrying on of the regulated activity. 87 
Under this regime it is the kind of controlled function in which an individual is engaged that 
determines the level of care to be exercised by the approved person. This cuts across all kinds of 
organizations and does not, therefore, distinguish a mutual society from any other form of 
organisation. It is the type of controlled function alone that determines the level of care required.88 
The significant influence functions are subdivided into four functions, namely the governing 
functions, the required functions, the systems and control functions, and the significant 
management functions. Whether a function is likely to result in the person responsible for its 
performance exercising significant influence on the conduct of the firm's affairs is a question of 
fact in each case. This means that the management of all organizations dealing with financial 
products are obliged to confOlID to the same criteria relating to the scope of their duty to the 
organization whether they are a building society or a bank, effectively flattening the differentials 
in the management of mutual building societies and converted societies.89 
87 A customer is defined in section 59(11) as a, "a person who is using, or who is or maybe 
contemplating using, any of the services provided by the authorised person." 
88 The FSA provides practical guidance on controlled functions, in particular Chapter 10 of the 
Supervision Manual 
88 The governing functions include the Director Function, the chief executive function, the partner 
function, the Directors of an Unincorporated Association Function, the Small Friendly Society 
Function and the Sole Trader Function. 'Required Functions', include the Apportionment and 
Oversight Function, the EEA Investment Business Oversight Function, the Compliance Oversight 
Function, the Money Laundering Reporting Function and the Appointed Actuary Function. 
The Systems and Controls Function includes the Finance Function, the Risk Assessment Function 
and the Internal Audit Function. The Significant Management Function includes, Designated 
Investment Business Function, Other Business Operations Function, Insurance Underwriting 
Function, Financial Resources Function and Settlements Function. 
Finally, the Customer Functions include, the Investment Adviser Function, the Investment 
Adviser (Trainee) Function, the Corporate Finance Adviser Function, the Pension Transfer 
Specialist Function, Adviser on Syndicate Participation at Lloyds Function, the Customer 
Trading Function and the Investment Management Function. If an individual performs a function 
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It should also be noted that the regulatory powers of the FSA are extensive and that it possesses 
the statutory teeth to ensure compliance. The FSA will grant an application under section 60 only 
if it satisfied that the person in respect of whom the application is made (" the candidate") is a fit 
and proper person to perf 01111 the function to which the application relates.9o In addition to 
assessing fitness and propriety, the FSA possess powers to ensure ongoing compliance with these 
criteria and may withdraw an approval given under section 59 if it considers that the person in 
respect of whom it was given is not a fit and proper person to perform the function to which the 
approval relates. 91 A further and greater sanction is that of a prohibition order, prohibiting the 
individual from perf01111ing a specified function, or all functions, if it appears to the FSA that an 
individual is not a fit and proper person to perform functions in relation to a regulated activity 
carried on by an authorised person. 92 
An approved person is guided in his conduct by seven principles issued by the FSA. The first four 
principles apply to all individuals registered under the regime. The last three only apply to senior 
managers. 93 The rationale behind the Statement of Principles and the Code of Practice is the 
production of homogenized standards of conduct for those dealing with financial services. Central 
to this method of regulation is the ability to hold identifiable individuals accountable for failing to 
meet appropriate standards of prudent and sensible management and compliance with the finn's 
intemal control and compliance procedures. 94 Crucially, it regulates on the basis of individual 
responsibility rather than the type of organisation to which that individual belongs. 
which does not fall under those headings, his finn need not seek the approval of the FSA on the 
question of whether he is fit and proper under section 59 of the FSMA 2000 
90 Section 61(1) FSMA 2000 
91 Section 63(1) FSMA 2000 
92 Section 56(1) FSMA 2000 
93 (APPENDIX 1) supplemented by a Code of Practice to detelmine compliance 
94 FSA Policy StatementHigh Level Standards for Films and Individuals June 2000 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
It is the stated contention of tills thesis that the demutualisation of building societies may be 
understood as resulting ii'om the process of reconceptualisation that mutuality has undergone 
throughout its history. The reconceptualisation of mutuality has taken the concept of mutuality 
fl:om one that originally denoted equality in relationships between members of an unincorporated 
association to one that merely described a method of organizing finance in an incorporated entity. 
In order to examine the validity of this hypothesis, this thesis adopted the Marxist method of 
dialectical materialism. This method was adopted as it allowed for the contextual examination of 
mutuality as a simple concept within a dynamic and changing historical period, ii'om 1767 to 
2002. Dialectical materialism, based on an analysis of the whole within which the simple concept 
exists, allows the researcher to avoid detelministic conclusions. It does this by assessing the (often 
conflicting) relationships between the simple features of the whole and the manner in which this 
creates the whole. Dialectical materialism appreciates the ongoing nature of these conflicts and the 
mamler in which they create a dynamic for change- the new evolving from the old. 
Since the concept of mutuality exists within a particular historical period it will display 
characteristics that describe the norms of that period. And, when the societal context evolves 
historically as a response to the conflicting relationships within the whole, so the concept of 
mutuality contained within the whole also evolves. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the concept of mutuality that emerged within early building 
societies expressed the norms of that particular context. Early 'tenninating societies' were 
organized as a collective of working people for the purpose of saving for, and purchasing, housing 
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or land. Both the imperative and the ability of these individuals to engage in such an activity 
resulted from the rapid replacement of the agricultural economy by the commodity-market 
economy. This had the effect of creating a workforce that was neither tied to the land by feudal 
relations of production nor possessed the, albeit meager, protection afforded by a feudal hierarchy. 
Their labour was their property, saleable for a wage; they possessed nothing else. In addition to 
and complimentary to this, the market economy had the effect of transforming land into a saleable 
commodity. In this context the commodity, 'wage', could be exchanged for the commodity, 
'propeliy'. However, as the early market economy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
was labour intensive, employers, (supported by the state) were keen to keep wages low. In this 
period, characterized by Marx as a period of absolute surplus value (ASV), profit could be 
increased without the need to introduce additional capital (such as machinery) into the productive 
process. Instead, profit could be increased by directly targeting labour by such methods as, 
increasing the working day and/or by reducing wages. As this thesis has indicated, the government 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century placed great political and legislative emphasis 
on the control of working people. The resulting poor working conditions, low wages and lack of 
social welfare were all potential causes of umest and social disorder, and the govemment feared 
working class militancy from all directions. It responded with an anti-collective policy and a raft 
of legislation designed to punish the slightest hint of insurrection. 
In this context, and as an antidote to low wages, poor housing and high rents building societies 
emerged within working communities and were organized and initiated by working people. 
Building societies facilitated the purchase of housing by collective savings, for those who were too 
poor to purchase property as an individual but wealthy enough to have something remaining from 
their wages to save. I And, in this context, mutuality reflected the norms of collectivity- equality of 
responsibility and equality of benefit. All members of such societies were both members and 
borrowers, and all were members with the same ultimate object, to purchase a home. Thus, once 
this object had been achieved for all members, the society ceased to have a purpose and would 
itself cease to exist-hence they were known as 'terminating societies'. 
I The monthly subscriptions, as previously noted in chapter 2, being relatively high. 
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TIllS thesis went on to demonstrate that within the historically evolving economic and political 
context of the nineteenth century, mutuality underwent huge material changes. Firstly, the RefOlTI1 
Act of 1832 introduced a comprehensive and less onerous propeliy franchise requirement. This 
provided an opportunity to gain the vote through ownership of a pOliion of propeliy and as a result 
the popularity of building societies greatly increased, particularly in the context of the 
freeholdland movement illltiated by James Taylor. Secondly, the broad spectrum of those who 
supported free trade, a policy that crystallized around the anti com law campaign, saw that their 
own self interest could be served by giving the financial support to freeholdland societies that 
would (hopefully) ensure the vote of the newly enfranchised. This fmiher increased the popularity, 
number and size of building societies. 
The organizational fOlTI1 of the telTI1inating society was put under considerable strain by the 
hundreds of thousands of individuals that had joined building societies by the mid nineteenth 
cenhn-y. As a response to this, the 'pennanent society' evolved in a fOlTI1 that would facilitate a 
large and fluctuating membership, a shift that would have a profound effect on the nature of 
mutuality. The pern1anent society had perpetual succession-an independent existence from its 
membership, so when the nature of the permanent society was consolidated in the 1874 Building 
Societies Act it was understood as designating an incorporated entity. Thus, whilst the telTI1inating 
society was made up and composed of its membership, the permanent society was a legally 
distinct entity that acted as a financial broker between the saver members and the bOlTower 
members. Muhmlity was therefore reconceptualised as designating an internal trading relationsillp 
or an entity that traded with itself, whilst continuing the practice of one member one vote. It no 
longer designated equality of reward and responsibility between members. FmihelTI10re, the 
permanent societies' reliance on investors, who might have no stake as a bOlTower, meant that 
legislative controls were sought to ensure the security of the lender-members' investments. 
Significantly, this put bOlTower members under scrutiny and led to building societies introducing 
rigid lending criteria with a bOlTower profile that excluded all but white middle class men. In 
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addition to this, capital reserves designed to protect investors2, created a fund that could and would 
be used by ambitious building society directors in order to effect a demutualisation or conversion. 
This thesis had shown that in addition to the internal organizational demands on societies causing 
a change in the nature of mutuality, much of the conceptualisation of mutuality, from the 1870's 
onward was constructed by government policy. The 1874 Act determined that all new societies 
should be organised under the permanent fmID and gave statutory authority to its structure and to 
those that monitored its structure. With this, building societies ceased to be private anangements 
and instead became public institutions.3 Having designated societies thus, government policy 
increasingly detennined their orientation, tending to maintain them as quasi-public financial 
institutions for the industrious poor. So, as this thesis has submitted, the mutual society was 
unique among commercial institutions in collecting additional controls over its activities 
throughout a historical pe110d of liberalisation or laissez-faire. When compared to the commercial 
form of the company, government policy toward building societies is plainly revealed. In terms of 
statutory developments, shareholders enjoyed limited liability from 18554 onwards and allowed a 
company to restructure its capital from 1867.5 The laxity given to corporate activities by the 
judiciary in areas such as legal personalitl and ultra vires were not redressed by statute and 
tended to reflect government's laissez-faire attitude to business. In contrast, building society 
objects were carefully prescribed by statute and the prudential framework placed a higher level of 
care on the directors of building societies than those expected of company directors. 
Government policy, however, was only part of the picture. The conservative nature of building 
society activities was also due to factors internal to the building society movement itself. For, as 
chapter 2 evidenced, early building societies had ensured their insulation from the government's 
2 1981 Building Societies (Authorisation) Regulations required 2.5% of assets to be held as 
reserves. 
3 The 1836 Building Societies Act was far too brief and obscure to have designated building 
society organisation and the nature of mutuality. 
4 Limited Liability Act 1855 
5 Companies Act 1867 
6 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 57 
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draconian anti-collectives policies by adhering to strict intemal controls and a non- provocative 
attitude. 
As this thesis has endeavoured to demonstrate, the relationship between factors intemal to the 
building society movement and factors extemal to it, led to the emergence of demutualisations. 
Extemally, the legislative facility to demutualise was introduced by a famously neo-liberal 
administration in the form of the 1986 Building Societies Act.7 However, as this thesis suggests, it 
would be a mistake to understand this piece of legislation as just another Thatcherite ploy to 
introduce the free market into all areas of society, although there are, of course, shades of this. In 
the main, this legislation introduced many opportunities for building societies to be more 
competitive whilst retaining mutual status. Indeed, the small portion of this Act which refelTed to 
conversion, required complex procedures and a large propOliion of voting, pro-conversion 
members; more indicative of curtailing rather than encouraging conversions. Fmihermore, the 
demutualisation of over 80% of the building society sector could not have occurred without the 
enthusiastic activity of both directors and members. As societies operated on a 'one member one 
vote' basis, it is submitted that, notwithstanding the free market facility encompassed in the 1986 
Act, conversion would not have been possible without the active consent of a substantial 
propOliion of a society's membership. And, as chapter 5 indicates, motions to convert have for the 
most pati received the ovelwhelming support ofthe membership. 
However, what is also evident is the effectiveness of a aggressively pro-conversion management, 
particularly evidenced in the first ground-breaking demutualisation of the Abbey National. This, 
coupled with judicial decisions which signified an unwillingness to tamper with the provisions of 
a particular conversion, created an enviromnent where demutualisation would seem the obvious 
choice for all players and where only affirmative action could preserve mutuality. This action 
could not be taken in the 1980's as both Labour and Conservative Parties were critical of building 
society activities and both sought appropriate market refOlID. Fmihermore, the larger societies, 
patiicularly the Abbey National, under Peter Birch, sought the legal freedoms (and financial 
7 Furthennore, the BSA was part of the consultation process and produced the Spalding Report. 
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rewards) provided by the legal form of an incorporated company. Finally, the membership of 
building societies did not understand or experience a benefit from mutual status and therefore 
could not be expected to vote in favour of its preservation if the alternative was a cash reward. 
The nature of mutuality had undergone changes throughout the twentieth century that had 
removed the membership from any possible exercise of control. As this thesis has demonstrated, 
the pelmanent system required both managerial and actuarial expertise, shifting control from the 
membership to a professional elite. In addition to this, the permanent system accommodated large 
numbers of members which diluted the voting power of one individual member. Furthermore, and 
as Table A in chapter 3 indicates, the numerous amalgamations of building societies at the end of 
the nineteenth century led to a ten-fold decrease in the number of societies in existence per se, 
whilst the numbers of members involved with societies continued to increase. As chapter 3 shows 
the centralization of funds under the ambit of a few building societies inevitably led to a 
centralisation of power over societies' decision making regarding activities and policies; a 
tendency that was exacerbated by the advisory role undertaken by the Building Society 
Association. In this context, mutuality no longer denoted equality, member involvement and 
mutual reliance but, instead, indicated a method of organizing finance whereby the society 
effectively traded with itself. The structure provided by the permanent system facilitated this 
reconceptualisation and the economic tendency toward the centralization of finance took the 
pennanent system to its logical conclusion. Mutuality under this form provided little impetus for 
the membership to actively seek its preservation. 
From that point, the thesis proceeded to assess the factors that could give rise to the preservation 
of mutuality. It indicated that the activities of a pro-mutuality board could persuade a society'S 
membership to vote against a conversion, amply evidenced by the successful pro-mutuality 
activities of the Nationwide Building Society. Likewise, it is equally clear that a pro-conversion 
management can affect the wishes of new investor bOlTowers (who have less of a financial stake in 
the society and therefore more to gain from a conversion) notwithstanding the ambivalence of 
many of its bOlTowing members, as evidenced in the Bradford and Bingley conversion. The 
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empirical data suggested that better informed members were more likely to want to preserve 
mutuality. Thus, it is likely that the articulate, pro-mutuality position of a number of chief 
executives interviewed, particularly those from small local societies, would be effective in 
retaining the mutual status of their building society. However, as this thesis indicates, it is unlikely 
that mutuality will be retained as a significant method of organising financial business without the 
material support of government, which, under the present administration is not forthcoming. 
New Labour's 'third way' politics attempt to incorporate the norms of a market economy, albeit 
one based on service rather than manufacture, with the humanist concerns of socialism. But, as the 
latter is ideological and the fOlmer is structural, it is the former that prevails. Whilst New Labour 
may identify social problems, such as financial exclusion, it is unwilling to create or even support 
an organizational method for combating it. In the absence of a material commitment it is left with 
only the rhetoric of humanism, a rhetoric that stands in stark contrast to the reality of the market. 
Far from creating new institutions for a new economy, it merely oversees the destruction of old 
institutions that could still playa part in tackling social problems. 
And, whilst New Labour is willing to enjoin building societies to help combat financial exclusion, 
it is unwilling to protect the organisational status of mutuality, despite the building society 
executives' insistence that it is mutuality and mutuality alone that enables them to fight financial 
exclusion. It is more in line with 'third way' politics to prefer market demand for demutualisations 
above protective measures to preserve mutuality. However, a lingering attachment to social 
concerns forces New Labour to compensate for its lack of real commitment to equality by creating 
new concepts. Thus mutuality is reconceptualised as 'new mutualism', an essentially meaningless 
phrase that urges ethical business practice without making that practice possible. 
The thesis has indicated the legislative activity of New Labour has further undelmined the distinct 
identity of mutuality. We have seen that in the regulation of building society activities, the FSA 
retains huge powers, including the right to modify and develop its rules in order to regulate all 
imaginable future activities. And, as it is a method of regulation that is applicable to all 'persons' 
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who are engaged in the many 'controlled functions' outlined above, (that is all those in the 
financial services sector), mutual societies do not have an individualised system of regulation. 
Given the demise of the function of the chief registrar, they have no regulator assigned to mutual 
building societies alone. All functions previously performed by the registrar are now performed by 
the FSA and all relevant pmis of the Building Society Act 1986 have been repealed accordingly. 
This homogenization of regulation signals a continued lack of political will to preserve mutuality 
that, in today's climate, requires definitive action. As this thesis has demonstrated, mutuality 
emerged organically as a material description of the relationships between members of a 
collective. The popularity of building societies necessitated a new organizational form that 
diminished the original equality of mutuality, creating three legal beings, the borrower, the saver 
and the incorporated building society. From the period following the 1874 Building Societies Act, 
govermnent has maintained a central role in both the construction and destruction of mutuality. 
The former by introducing favourable commercial structures given on condition that building 
societies perf0l111ed more restricted commercial activities, the latter by introducing legislation 
pennitting conversion. 
In the twenty-first century, it is still government that can choose to preserve mutuality. Ironically, 
New Labour, a govel11ment wedded to the language of mutuality- the social coupled with the 
commercial- will not do so. Perhaps the final irony in the history of mutuality will be its fate 
retul11ing into the hands of its membership. The hypothesis that demutualisations or conversions 
may be understood as resulting from the historical reconceptualisation of mutuality has been 
proven. It remains to be seen if future government activity will reconstruct mutuality in a manner 
that precludes its mmihilation. 
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Appendix 1 
The Statements of Principle 
Statement of Principle 1 
"An approved person must act with integrity in carrying out his controlled function." 
Statement of Principle 2 peliaining to behaviour 
"An approved person must act with due skill, care and diligence in carrying out his controlled 
function. " 
Statement of Principle 3 
"An approved person must observe proper standards of market conduct in carrying out his 
controlled function" 
According to the FSA in many cases the required standards are set out in Inter-Professional 
Conduct and the Code of Practice of Market Conduct.8 
Statement of Principle 4 
"An approved person must deal with the FSA and other regulators in an open and co operative 
way and must disclose appropriately any information of which the FSA would reasonably expect 
notice." 
Statement of Principle 5 
"An approved person performing a significant influence function must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the business of the firm for which he is responsible is organised so that it can be 
controlled effectively." 
Statement of Principle 6 
"An approved person performing a significant influence function must exercise due skill, care and 
diligence in managing the business of the firm for which he is responsible in his controlled 
function" 
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Statement of Principle 7 
"An approved person performing a significant influence function must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the business of the firm for which he is responsible in his controlled function complies 
with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system." 
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Appendix 2 
STREET SURVEY 1997 & 2000 
1 Are you a member of a building society? 
a. no - proceed as normal but ask 4(b) 
b. yes - proceed as normal but ask question 4(a) 
2 Have you heard of the tenn mutuality, demutualisation or mutual status in the context of 
building societies? 
a. no - explain ternl and proceed to question 4. 
b. yes - proceed as normal 
3. What do you understand by this term? 
4. (a) If answer to question 1 was 'yes, I am a member of a building society' then ask, "has your 
society voted on the issue of becoming a pIc?" 
(i) If the answer is 'yes, my building has voted to become a pIc', then ask "How did you vote?" 
1. Voted in favour. 
2. Voted against. 
3. Did not vote. 
4. (a) (ii) If the answer is 'no, my building society has not voted on the issue of becoming a pIc', 
then ask "If your Building Society proposed becoming a pIc how would you vote?" 
1. hl favour of becoming a pIc 
2. Against becoming a pIc 
3. Would not vote 
4. (b) If answer to question 1 was 'no, I am not a member of a building society' then ask 
"If you were a member how would you vote?" 
1. In favour of becoming a pIc 
2. Against becoming a pIc 
3. Would not vote. 
5. Do you think that organisations with mutual status are worth preserving? 
6. Why do you think that? 
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Appendix 3 
Interview questions: ATTITUDES OF CHIEF EXECUTIVES· 
1. How long have you worked in mutual societies? 
2. How would you define mutuality? 
3. Do you think that shareholders could have anything positive to contribute to your organization 
if you demutualised? 
4. Would you personally stand to profit if your society were to demutualise? 
5. Do you think that the demutualisation of other societies has been member or manager led? 
• These interviews were undertaken at the BSA conference 1999 
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